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Foreword
The right to assemble peacefully, together with freedom of expression and freedom of 
association, rests at the core of any functioning democratic system. The right to free-
dom of assembly, as well as its limits, are clearly stated in Article 11 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and in the OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document. Most 
national constitutions and fundamental laws echo these documents or establish simi-
lar principles.
The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Coun-
cil of Europe’s Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) have been 
providing legislative support to OSCE participating states and Council of Europe mem-
bers to assist them in ensuring that their legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly 
complies with European and international standards and OSCE commitments. The de-
velopment of these Guidelines is a cornerstone of this assistance, adding to ODIHR’s 
LegislatiOnline.org database, where lawmakers can obtain good examples from other 
countries’ legislation that can help them frame their own choices.
Existing international standards certainly offer a clear general framework; however, too 
little guidance is available to legislators and executive branches on how the exercise of 
freedom of peaceful assembly may be regulated in practice at the local and national lev-
el. Good laws, by themselves, cannot mechanically generate improvements in practice. 
But even at the legislative level, in a number of cases an inclination towards a so-called 
command-and-control approach can be identified, as reflected in more regulations, 
more control and more bureaucratic hurdles. Public demonstrations and rallies, for 
instance, are not always seen as part of the routine that makes up a pluralistic democ-
racy. In some states, freedom of assembly is still regulated in a way that often results 
in its de facto denial.
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Approaches to regulating the right to freedom of assembly vary greatly across Europe 
and the OSCE area. Legislators in different countries have chosen a variety of models. 
These stretch from adopting specific laws to govern the exercise of this fundamental right 
to introducing provisions across a diverse array of relevant legislation, such as, most im-
portantly, acts pertaining to the police and general administrative law. This prompted 
ODIHR, together with the Venice Commission, to develop Guidelines aimed at formulat-
ing thresholds that should be met by national authorities in their regulation of the right.
This document is the second, revised edition of the ODIHR-Venice Commission 
Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, which were first published in 2007. The 
Guidelines are designed for practitioners in many sectors, i.e., drafters of legislation 
and those implementing it, as well as those affected by the implementation. Recogniz-
ing the great diversity of country contexts, the Guidelines do not attempt to provide 
ready-made solutions but, rather, to clarify key issues and discuss possible ways to ad-
dress them. Even when the legislative framework is in compliance with European and 
international standards and OSCE commitments, challenges to the practical implemen-
tation of those laws persist in the region.
The Guidelines offer a practical toolkit for legislators and practitioners responsible for 
implementing laws by drawing on good-practice examples from national legislations in 
European and OSCE participating States and the case-law of the ECtHR to illustrate the 
various legislative options used to regulate issues pertaining to the freedom of assembly. 
The Guidelines are a living instrument. They demarcate parameters for implementation 
consistent with international standards and illustrate key principles with examples of good 
practice from individual states. We are pleased to publish these Guidelines and hope they 
will find many users – drafters of legislation, law-enforcement personnel, municipal-gov-
ernment officials, judges, academics and members of civic organizations – and count on 
them to contribute their expertise and experience in order to further enrich this document.
	 Ambassador	Janez	Lenarčič,		 Gianni	Buquicchio,	
	 Director,			 President,	
	 OSCE	Office	for	Democratic	Institutions		 Venice	Commission	
	 and	Human	Rights	(ODIHR)	 of	the	Council	of	Europe
		
introduction
This second edition of the Guidelines	on	Freedom	of	Peaceful	Assembly, together with 
the Explanatory Notes, was prepared by the Panel of Experts on Freedom of Assembly 
of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in con-
sultation with the Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through 
Law (Venice Commission).1 Though set apart here in Section B, the Explanatory Notes 
constitute an integral part of the Guidelines found in Section A, and should be read in 
concert with them. The second edition of the Guidelines updates the first, published in 
2007, in the light of new case law and by drawing on comments and feedback received 
by the Panel.
Work on these Guidelines began in 2005, and the initial Guidelines and Explanatory 
Notes drafted by ODIHR were developed further over the course of four roundta-
ble sessions held in 2006 in Tbilisi, Belgrade, Almaty and Warsaw, respectively. These 
roundtable sessions brought together about 150 participants from 29 OSCE participat-
ing States. The participants came from a diverse range of fields and backgrounds and 
included law-enforcement officers and representatives of human rights NGOs, govern-
ment ministers and organizers of assemblies, academics and practicing lawyers. The 
document benefitted significantly from this wealth of hands-on experience in a broad 
range of contexts. The first edition of the Guidelines has since provided a basis for a 
number of Legal Opinions and Legislative Guidelines prepared jointly by the ODIHR 
Panel and the Venice Commission.2 Reference to the Guidelines has also been made in 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights3 and by UN bodies.4
The Guidelines and Explanatory Notes are based on international and regional trea-
ties and other documents related to the protection of human rights,5 on evolving state 
practice (as reflected, inter	alia, in the judgments of domestic courts),6 and on general 
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principles of law recognized by the community of nations. They set out a clear mini-
mum baseline in relation to these standards, thereby establishing a threshold that must 
be met by national authorities in their regulation of freedom of peaceful assembly. This 
document, however, does not attempt to codify these standards or summarize the rele-
vant case law. Instead, it is illustrated by examples of good practice (measures that have 
proven successful across a number of jurisdictions or that have demonstrably helped 
ensure that the freedom to assemble is accorded adequate protection).
The legal regulation of freedom of assembly is a complex matter. A wide range of is-
sues, both procedural and substantive, must be considered so as to best facilitate its 
enjoyment. Moreover, the approach to regulation varies greatly among OSCE partic-
ipating States – from the adoption of a single, consolidated law, to the incorporation 
of provisions concerning peaceful assemblies in a number of different laws (including 
those governing the powers of law-enforcement agencies, criminal and administrative 
codes, anti-terrorism legislation and election laws). Recognizing these differences and 
the great diversity of country contexts involved (particularly in relation to democratic 
traditions, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary), this document does 
not attempt to provide ready-made solutions. It is neither possible nor desirable to draft 
a single, transferable “model law” that can be adopted by all OSCE participating States. 
Rather, the Guidelines and the Explanatory Notes seek to clarify key issues and discuss 
possible ways to address them.
In regulating freedom of assembly, well-drafted legislation is vital in framing the discre-
tion afforded to the authorities.7 This requires that governments and those involved in 
the drafting of legislation consult with the individuals and groups affected by new laws 
or amendments to existing ones (including local human rights organizations) as an in-
tegral part of the drafting process. Often, however, it is not the text of the law that is at 
issue but its implementation. Therefore, while these Guidelines and Explanatory Notes 
will be of benefit to those involved in the drafting of legislation pertaining to freedom 
of assembly, they are also aimed at those responsible for implementing such legislation 
(the relevant administrative and law-enforcement authorities) and those affected by its 
implementation. The Guidelines and Explanatory Notes are, therefore, primarily ad-
dressed to practitioners – drafters of legislation, politicians, legal professionals, police 
officers and other law-enforcement personnel, local officials, trade unionists, the or-
ganizers of and participants in assemblies, NGOs, civil society organizations and those 
involved in monitoring both freedom of assembly and police practices.
The Explanatory Notes in Section B are not only essential to a proper understanding 
of Guidelines in Section A, but also provide examples of good practice, which is what 
makes this document special. Part I of Section B (chapters 1-5) emphasizes the impor-
tance of freedom of assembly and sketches its parameters. It outlines the importance 
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of freedom of assembly (chapter 1), identifies core issues in the regulation of freedom 
of assembly (chapter 2), sets out a number of guiding principles that should govern its 
regulation (chapter 3), examines the legitimate grounds for, and types of, restriction 
(chapter 4), and examines relevant procedural issues (chapter 5). Part II (chapters 6-8) 
is more practically focused and examines the implementation of freedom of assembly 
legislation. It covers the policing of public assemblies (chapter 6), the responsibilities 
of assembly organizers (chapter 7) and the role of the media and independent moni-
tors (chapter 8). Appendix A provides a summary description of a number of regional 
and international bodies concerned with the enforcement of international human rights 
standards, while Appendix B provides a list of cases cited. A Glossary of Terms defining 
the major concepts used in both the Guidelines and Explanatory Notes (with English-
Russian translation) is contained in Appendix C.
These Guidelines and Explanatory Notes can be downloaded from the ODIHR and Ven-
ice Commission websites, as well as from Legislationline.org, ODIHR’s online legislative 
database (www.legislationline.org), where national legislation on public assemblies 
and other related legal materials can also be found.
This second edition of the Guidelines and the Explanatory Notes remains a living doc-
ument, so ODIHR and the Venice Commission continue to welcome comments and 
suggestions, which should be addressed to assembly@odihr.pl.
SECTION A
Guidelines on Freedom 
of Peaceful Assembly
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1. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
1.1  Freedom of peaceful assembly is a fundamental human right that can be enjoyed 
and exercised by individuals and groups, unregistered associations, legal entities 
and corporate bodies. Assemblies may serve many purposes, including the expres-
sion of diverse, unpopular or minority opinions. The right can be an important 
strand in the maintenance and development of culture, such as in the preserva-
tion of minority identities. The protection of the freedom to peacefully assemble 
is crucial to creating a tolerant and pluralistic society in which groups with differ-
ent beliefs, practices or policies can exist peacefully together.
1.2 definition of assembly. For the purposes of the Guidelines, an assembly means 
the intentional and temporary presence of a number of individuals in a public place 
for a common expressive purpose.
 This definition recognizes that, although particular forms of assembly may raise 
specific regulatory issues, all types of peaceful assembly – both static and moving 
assemblies, as well as those that take place on publicly or privately owned premis-
es or in enclosed structures – deserve protection.
1.3 Only peaceful assemblies are protected. An assembly should be deemed peaceful 
if its organizers have professed peaceful intentions and the conduct of the assem-
bly is non-violent. The term “peaceful” should be interpreted to include conduct 
that may annoy or give offence, and even conduct that temporarily hinders, im-
pedes or obstructs the activities of third parties.
2. Guiding Principles
2.1 The presumption in favour of holding assemblies. As a fundamental right, freedom 
of peaceful assembly should, insofar as possible, be enjoyed without regulation. An-
ything not expressly forbidden by law should be presumed to be permissible, and 
those wishing to assemble should not be required to obtain permission to do so. A pre-
sumption in favour of this freedom should be clearly and explicitly established in law.
2.2 The state’s positive obligation to facilitate and protect peaceful assembly. It is the 
primary responsibility of the state to put in place adequate mechanisms and pro-
cedures to ensure that the freedom is practically enjoyed and not subject to undue 
bureaucratic regulation.  In particular, the state should always seek to facilitate and 
protect public assemblies at the organizers’ preferred location and should also en-
sure that efforts to disseminate information to publicize forthcoming assemblies 
are not impeded.
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2.3 Legality. Any restrictions imposed must have a formal basis in law and be in con-
formity with the European Convention on Human Rights and other international 
human rights instruments. To this end, well-drafted legislation is vital in framing 
the discretion afforded to the authorities. The law itself must be compatible with 
international human rights standards and be sufficiently precise to enable an indi-
vidual to assess whether or not his or her conduct would be in breach of the law, 
as well as the likely consequences of any such breaches.
2.4 Proportionality. Any restrictions imposed on freedom of assembly must be pro-
portional. The least intrusive means of achieving the legitimate objective being 
pursued by the authorities should always be given preference.
 The principle of proportionality requires that authorities do not routinely impose 
restrictions that would fundamentally alter the character of an event, such as re-
locating assemblies to less central areas of a city.
 A blanket application of legal restrictions tends to be over-inclusive and, thus, will 
fail the proportionality test, because no consideration has been given to the spe-
cific circumstances of the case.
2.5 Non-discrimination. Freedom of peaceful assembly is to be enjoyed equally by 
everyone. In regulating freedom of assembly the relevant authorities must not dis-
criminate against any individual or group on any grounds.
 The freedom to organize and participate in public assemblies must be guaran-
teed to individuals, groups, unregistered associations, legal entities and corporate 
bodies; to members of minority ethnic, national, sexual and religious groups; to na-
tionals and non-nationals (including stateless persons, refugees, foreign nationals, 
asylum seekers, migrants and tourists); to children, women and men; to law-en-
forcement personnel; and to persons without full legal capacity, including persons 
with mental illnesses.
2.6 Good administration. The public should be informed which body is responsible 
for taking decisions about the regulation of freedom of assembly, and this must 
be clearly stated in law. The regulatory authority should ensure that the general 
public has adequate access to reliable information about its procedures and oper-
ation. Organizers of public assemblies and those whose rights and freedoms will 
be directly affected by an assembly should have the opportunity to make oral and 
written representations directly to the regulatory authority. The regulatory proc-
ess should enable the fair and objective assessment of all available information. 
Any restrictions placed on an assembly should be communicated promptly and in 
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writing to the event organizer, with an explanation of the reason for each restric-
tion. Such decisions should be taken as early as possible so that any appeal to an 
independent court can be completed before the date provided in the notification 
for the assembly.
2.7 The liability of the regulatory authority. The regulatory authorities must comply 
with their legal obligations and should be accountable for any failure – procedur-
al or substantive – to do so. Liability should be gauged according to the relevant 
principles of administrative law and judicial review concerning the misuse of pub-
lic power.
3. restrictions on Freedom of Assembly
3.1 Legitimate grounds for restriction. The legitimate grounds for restriction are pre-
scribed in international and regional human rights instruments. These should not 
be supplemented by additional grounds in domestic legislation.
3.2 Public space. Assemblies are as legitimate uses of public space as commercial activ-
ity or the movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. This must be acknowledged 
when considering the necessity of any restrictions.
3.3 content-based restrictions. Assemblies are held for a common expressive purpose 
and, thus, aim to convey a message. Restrictions on the visual or audible content 
of any message should face a high threshold and should only be imposed if there 
is an imminent threat of violence.
3.4 “Time, place and manner” restrictions. A wide spectrum of possible restrictions 
that do not interfere with the message communicated is available to the regulatory 
authority. Reasonable alternatives should be offered if any restrictions are imposed 
on the time, place or manner of an assembly.
3.5 “sight and sound”. Public assemblies are held to convey a message to a particu-
lar target person, group or organization. Therefore, as a general rule, assemblies 
should be facilitated within “sight and sound” of their target audience.
4. Procedural issues
4.1 Notification. It is not necessary under international human rights law for domestic 
legislation to require advance notification about an assembly. Indeed, in an open 
society, many types of assembly do not warrant any form of official regulation. Pri-
or notification should, therefore, only be required where its purpose is to enable 
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the state to put in place necessary arrangements to facilitate freedom of assembly 
and to protect public order, public safety and the rights and freedoms of others. 
Any such legal provision should require the organizer of an assembly to submit a 
notice of intent rather than a request for permission.
 The notification process should not be onerous or bureaucratic. The period of no-
tice should not be unnecessarily lengthy, but should still allow adequate time for 
the relevant state authorities to make the necessary plans and preparations to sat-
isfy their positive obligations, and for the completion of an expeditious appeal to 
(and ruling by) a court should any restrictions be challenged.
 If the authorities do not promptly present any objections to a notification, the or-
ganizers of a public assembly should be able proceed with their activities according 
to the terms presented in their notification and without restriction.
4.2 spontaneous assemblies. Where legislation requires advance notification, the law 
should explicitly provide for an exception from the requirement where giving ad-
vance notice is impracticable. Such an exception would only apply in circumstances 
where the legally established deadline cannot be met. The authorities should al-
ways protect and facilitate any spontaneous assembly so long as it is peaceful in 
nature.
4.3 simultaneous assemblies. Where notification is provided for two or more unre-
lated assemblies at the same place and time, each should be facilitated as best as 
possible. The prohibition of a public assembly solely on the basis that it is due to 
take place at the same time and location as another public assembly will likely be 
a disproportionate response where both can be reasonably accommodated. The 
principle of non-discrimination requires, further, that assemblies in comparable 
circumstances do not face differential levels of restriction.
4.4 counter-demonstrations. Counter-demonstrations are a particular form of simul-
taneous assembly in which the participants wish to express their disagreement with 
the views expressed at another assembly. The right to counter-demonstrate does 
not extend to inhibiting the right of others to demonstrate. Indeed, demonstrators 
should respect the rights of others to demonstrate as well. Emphasis should be 
placed on the state’s duty to protect and facilitate each event where counter-dem-
onstrations are organized or occur, and the state should make available adequate 
policing resources to facilitate such related simultaneous assemblies, to the extent 
possible, within “sight and sound” of one another.
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4.5 decision-making. The regulatory authorities should ensure that the decision-mak-
ing process is accessible and clearly explained. The process should enable the fair 
and objective assessment of all available information. Any restrictions placed on 
an assembly should be communicated promptly and in writing to the event organ-
izers, with an explanation of the reason for each restriction. Such decisions should 
be taken as early as possible so that any appeal to an independent court can be 
completed before the date for the assembly provided in the notification.
4.6 review and appeal. The right to an effective remedy entails the right to appeal 
the substance of any restrictions or prohibitions on an assembly. An initial option 
of administrative review can both reduce the burden on courts and help build a 
more constructive relationship between the authorities and the public. However, 
where such a review fails to satisfy the applicant, there should be a mechanism for 
appeal to an independent court. Appeals should take place in a prompt and time-
ly manner so that any revisions to the authorities’ decision can be implemented 
without further detriment to the applicant’s rights. A final ruling, or at least relief 
through an injunction, should, therefore, be given prior to the date for the assem-
bly provided in the notification.
5. implementing Freedom of Peaceful Assembly Legislation
5.1 Pre-event planning with law-enforcement officials. Wherever possible, and espe-
cially in cases of large assemblies or assemblies related to controversial issues, it 
is recommended that the organizer discuss with the law-enforcement officials the 
security and public-safety measures that are to be put in place prior to the event. 
Such discussions might, for example, cover the deployment of law-enforcement 
personnel, stewarding arrangements and particular concerns relating to the po-
licing operation.
5.2 costs. The costs of providing adequate security and safety (including traffic and 
crowd management) should be fully covered by the public authorities. The state 
must not levy any additional financial charge for providing adequate policing. Or-
ganizers of non-commercial public assemblies should not be required to obtain 
public-liability insurance for their event.
5.3 A human rights approach to policing assemblies. The policing of assemblies must 
be guided by the human rights principles of legality, necessity, proportionality 
and non-discrimination and must adhere to applicable human rights standards. 
In particular, the state has a positive duty to take reasonable and appropriate 
measures to enable peaceful assemblies to take place without participants fear-
ing physical violence. Law-enforcement officials must also protect participants of 
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a peaceful assembly from any person or group (including agents	provocateurs 
and counter-demonstrators) that attempts to disrupt or inhibit the assembly in 
any way.
5.4 The use of negotiation and/or mediation to de-escalate conflict. If a stand-off or 
other dispute arises during the course of an assembly, negotiation or mediated di-
alogue may be an appropriate means of trying to reach an acceptable resolution. 
Such dialogue – although not always successful – can serve as a preventive tool to 
help avoid the escalation of conflict, the imposition of arbitrary or unnecessary re-
strictions, or recourse to the use of force.
5.5 The use of force. The use of force must be regulated by domestic law, which should 
set out the circumstances that justify its use (including the need to provide ade-
quate prior warnings) and the level of force acceptable to deal with various threats. 
Governments should develop a range of responses that enable a differentiated and 
proportional use of force. These responses should include the development of non-
lethal incapacitating weapons for use in appropriate situations where other more 
peaceful interventions have failed.
5.6 The liability and accountability of law-enforcement personnel. If the force used is 
not authorized by law, or more force was used than necessary in the circumstanc-
es, law-enforcement personnel should face civil and/or criminal liability, as well 
as disciplinary action. Law-enforcement personnel should also be held liable for 
failing to intervene where such intervention might have prevented other officers 
from using excessive force. Where it is alleged that a person is physically injured 
by law-enforcement personnel or is deprived of his or her life, an effective, inde-
pendent and prompt investigation must be conducted.
5.7 The liability of organizers. Organizers of assemblies should not be held liable for 
failure to perform their responsibilities if they have made reasonable efforts to do 
so. The organizers should not be liable for the actions of individual participants or 
for the actions of non-participants or agents	provocateurs. Instead, there should 
be individual liability for any individual who personally commits an offence or fails 
to carry out the lawful directions of law-enforcement officials.
5.8 stewarding assemblies. It is recommended that the organizers of assemblies be 
encouraged to deploy clearly identifiable stewards to help facilitate the holding of 
the event and ensure compliance with any lawfully imposed restrictions. Stewards 
do not have the powers of law-enforcement officials and should not use force but, 
instead, should aim to obtain the co-operation of assembly participants by means 
of persuasion.
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5.9 Monitors. The independent monitoring of public assemblies provides a vital source 
of information on the conduct of assembly participants and law-enforcement offi-
cials. This information may be used to inform public debate and, usefully, can also 
serve as the basis for dialogue among government, local authorities, law-enforce-
ment officials and civil society. NGOs and civil society organizations play a crucial 
watchdog role in any democracy and must, therefore, be permitted to freely ob-
serve public assemblies.
5.10 Media access. The role of the media as a public watchdog is to impart informa-
tion and ideas on matters of public interest – information that the public also has 
a right to receive. Media reports can thus provide an otherwise absent element of 
public accountability for both organizers of assemblies and law-enforcement offi-
cials. Media professionals should, therefore, be guaranteed as much access as is 
possible to an assembly and to any related policing operation.
SECTION B
Explanatory Notes
1. The importance of Freedom of Assembly
1. Throughout the Guidelines, the term “right to freedom of	peaceful assembly” is 
used in preference to that of “the right to peaceful assembly”. This emphasizes that 
any right to assemble is underpinned by a more fundamental freedom, the essence 
of which is that it should be enjoyed without interference.8 Participation in public 
assemblies should be entirely voluntary and uncoerced.9
2. Freedom of peaceful assembly is a fundamental human right that can be enjoyed 
and exercised by individuals and groups, unregistered associations, legal entities 
and corporate bodies. It has been recognized as one of the foundations of a func-
tioning democracy. Facilitating participation in peaceful assemblies helps ensure 
that all people in a society have the opportunity to express opinions they hold in 
common with others. As such, freedom of peaceful assembly facilitates dialogue 
within civil society and among civil society, political leaders and government.
3. Freedom of peaceful assembly can serve many purposes, including (but not limit-
ed to) the expression of views and the defence of common interests, celebration, 
commemoration, picketing and protest. The exercise of this freedom can have both 
symbolic and instrumental significance, and can be an important strand in the main-
tenance and development of culture and the preservation of minority identities. It 
is complemented by other rights and freedoms, such as freedom of association,10 
the right to establish and maintain contacts within the territory of a state,11 freedom 
of movement,12 the right to cross international borders,13 freedom of expression14 
and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.15 As such, freedom of assembly 
is of fundamental importance for the personal development, dignity and fulfilment 
of every individual and for the progress and welfare of society.16
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4. The protection of the right to freedom of assembly also underpins the realization of 
both social and economic rights (including employment and labour interests) and 
so-called “third generation” rights (such as the right to a healthy environment). Ar-
ticle 12 of the EU Charter, for example, emphasizes the particular importance of the 
right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association in relation to political, trade 
union and civic matters.17 Furthermore, those who seek to defend and advance so-
cio-economic and developmental interests (properly regarded as indivisible from 
civil and political rights) can also rely upon the right to organize, as recognized in 
both Article 5 of the European Social Charter18 and in the ILO Convention concern-
ing Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (C087).19 The 
interpretation of national labour laws should be consistent with these standards.
5. With appropriate media coverage, public assemblies communicate with local and 
national audiences and with the world at large. In countries where the media are 
limited or restricted, freedom of assembly is vital for those who wish to draw at-
tention to local issues. This communication potential underlines the importance 
of freedom of assembly in effecting change.
6. Public assemblies often have increased prominence and significance in the context 
of elections, when political parties, candidates and other groups and organizations 
seek to publicize their views and mobilize support (see para. 107).20 Legal measures 
that are potentially more restrictive than the normal regulatory framework govern-
ing freedom of assembly should not be necessary to regulate assemblies during or 
immediately after an election period, even if there is heightened tension. On the 
contrary, the general law on assemblies should be sufficient to cover assemblies 
associated with election campaigns, an integral part of which is the organization 
of public events.21 Open and free political expression is particularly valued in the 
human rights canon.
7. In addition to serving the interests of democracy, the ability to freely assemble is 
also crucial to creating a pluralistic and tolerant society in which groups with dif-
ferent and possibly conflicting, backgrounds, beliefs, practices or policies can exist 
peacefully together. In circumstances where the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion is also engaged, the role of the authorities “is not to remove 
the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing 
groups tolerate each other”.22 Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights 
has held that in creating a pluralistic, broadminded and tolerant society, “although 
individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democ-
racy does not simply mean that the views of the majority must always prevail: A 
balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minori-
ties and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.”23
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2. The regulation of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
The legal framework
8. international and regional standards: The sources of law identified in this section 
are among the most important treaties to which ODIHR refers when conducting re-
views of legislation. The international and regional standards concerning freedom 
of assembly derive mainly from two legal instruments: the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights	(ICCPR)24	and the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),25 and their optional 
protocols and protocols, respectively. The American Convention on Human Rights 
is also of particular relevance to member countries of the Organization of Amer-
ican States.26 Other relevant treaties include the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Con-
vention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (the CIS Convention).27 The key provisions in relation to the 
right to freedom of peaceful assembly are reproduced below.
Article 20(1), Universal declaration of human rights
Everyone	has	the	right	to	freedom	of	peaceful	assembly	and	
association.28
Article 21, international covenant on civil and Political rights
The	right	of	peaceful	assembly	shall	be	recognized.	No	restrictions	
may	be	placed	on	the	exercise	of	this	right	other	than	those	imposed	
in	conformity	with	the	law	and	which	are	necessary	in	a	democratic	
society	in	the	interests	of	national	security	or	public	safety,	public	order,	
the	protection	of	public	health	or	morals	or	the	protection	of	the	rights	
and	freedoms	of	others.
Article 15, convention on the rights of the child
1.	States	Parties	recognize	the	rights	of	the	child	to	freedom	of	
association	and	to	freedom	of	peaceful	assembly.
2.	No	restrictions	may	be	placed	on	the	exercise	of	these	rights	other	
than	those	imposed	in	conformity	with	the	law	and	which	are	necessary	
in	a	democratic	society	in	the	interests	of	national	security	or	public	
safety,	public	order	(ordre	public),	the	protection	of	public	health	or	
morals	or	the	protection	of	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	others.
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Article 11, european convention on human rights
1.	Everyone	has	the	right	to	freedom	of	peaceful	assembly	and	to	
freedom	of	association	with	others,	including	the	right	to	form	and	join	
trade	unions	for	the	protection	of	his	interests.
2.	No	restrictions	shall	be	placed	on	the	exercise	of	these	rights	other	
than	such	as	are	prescribed	by	law	and	are	necessary	in	a	democratic	
society	in	the	interests	of	national	security	or	public	safety,	for	the	
prevention	of	disorder	or	crime,	for	the	protection	of	health	or	morals	
or	for	the	protection	of	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	others.	This	article	
shall	not	prevent	the	imposition	of	lawful	restrictions	on	the	exercise	
of	these	rights	by	members	of	the	armed	forces,	of	the	police	or	of	the	
administration	of	the	State.
Article 15, American convention on human rights
The	right	of	peaceful	assembly,	without	arms,	is	recognized.	No	
restrictions	may	be	placed	on	the	exercise	of	this	right	other	than	those	
imposed	in	conformity	with	the	law	and	necessary	in	a	democratic	
society	in	the	interest	of	national	security,	public	safety	or	public	order,	
or	to	protect	public	health	or	morals	or	the	rights	or	freedoms	of	others.
Article 12, charter of Fundamental rights of the european Union
1.	Everyone	has	the	right	to	freedom	of	peaceful	assembly	and	to	
freedom	of	association	at	all	levels,	in	particular	in	political,	trade	union	
and	civic	matters,	which	implies	the	right	of	everyone	to	form	and	to	
join	trade	unions	for	the	protection	of	his	or	her	interests.
2.	Political	parties	at	Union	level	contribute	to	expressing	the	political	
will	of	the	citizens	of	the	Union.
Article 12, convention on human rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
of the commonwealth of independent states (the cis convention)
1.	Everyone	shall	have	the	right	to	freedom	of	peaceful	assembly	and	to	
freedom	of	association	with	others,	including	the	right	to	form	and	to	
join	trade	unions	for	the	protection	of	his	interests.
2.	No	restrictions	shall	be	placed	on	the	exercise	of	these	rights	other	
than	such	as	are	prescribed	by	law	and	are	necessary	in	a	democratic	
society	in	the	interests	of	national	security	or	public	safety,	public	order,	
public	health	or	morals,	or	for	the	protection	of	the	rights	and	freedoms	
of	others.
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This	Article	shall	not	preclude	the	imposition	of	lawful	restrictions	
on	the	exercise	of	these	rights	by	members	of	the	armed	forces	or	by	
members	of	the	law	enforcement	or	administrative	organs	of	the	State.
Osce copenhagen document 1990
[The	participating	States	reaffirm	that]:	
9.2	[E]veryone	will	have	the	right	of	peaceful	assembly	and	
demonstration.	Any	restrictions	which	may	be	placed	on	the	exercise	of	
these	rights	will	be	prescribed	by	law	and	consistent	with	international	
standards.
9. The significance of these treaties and documents derives, in part, from the juris-
prudence developed by their respective monitoring bodies – the UN Human Rights 
Committee,29 the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights.30 This body of case law is integral to the interpretation 
of these standards and should be fully understood by those charged with imple-
menting domestic laws on freedom of assembly. It is recommended, therefore, that 
governments ensure that accurate translations of key cases are made widely avail-
able.31
10. regulating freedom of assembly in domestic law: Freedom of peaceful assembly 
should be accorded constitutional protection, which ought, at a minimum, to con-
tain a positive statement of both the right and the obligation to safeguard it. There 
should also be a constitutional provision that guarantees fair procedures in the de-
termination of the rights contained therein. Constitutional provisions, however, 
cannot provide for specific details or procedures. Moreover, where a constitution 
does not expressly articulate the principles of legality and proportionality, consti-
tutional provisions relating to freedom of assembly that are of a general nature 
can, without further clarification, afford excessively wide discretion to the author-
ities and increase the possibility of abuse.
11. While there is no requirement that participating States enact a specific law on free-
dom of assembly, such legislation can greatly assist in protecting against arbitrary 
interference with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.32 Any such domestic 
legislation should confer broadly framed protection on freedom of assembly, and 
narrowly define those types of assembly for which some degree of regulation may 
be justified. It cannot be overemphasized that, in an open society, many types of as-
sembly do not warrant any form of official regulation. The provisions of a specific 
law can also serve as a guide for sound decision-making by regulatory authorities. 
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Consequently, many states or municipal authorities have enacted specific legisla-
tion, in addition to constitutional guarantees, dealing with public assemblies.33 The 
purpose of such legislation should never be to inhibit the enjoyment of the consti-
tutional right to freedom of peaceful assembly but, rather, to facilitate and ensure 
its protection. In this light, it is vital that any specific law should avoid the crea-
tion of an excessively regulatory or bureaucratic system.	This is a real risk in many 
countries and has been raised as a particular concern by the Venice Commission.34 
Well-drafted legislation, however, can help ensure that freedom of assembly is not 
over-regulated.
12. Domestic laws regulating freedom of assembly must be consistent with the inter-
national instruments ratified by the state in question. Domestic laws should also 
be drafted, interpreted and implemented in conformity with relevant internation-
al and regional jurisprudence and good practice. The enforcement of such laws 
will depend significantly upon the existence of an impartial and adequately trained 
police service and an independent judiciary.
13. Furthermore, the rule of law demands legal stability and predictability. Amend-
ments introduced as a response to particular events, for example, often result in 
partial and piecemeal reforms that are harmful to the protection of rights and to 
the overall coherence of the legislative framework. Those involved in the drafting 
of legislation should always consult with those most closely involved in its imple-
mentation and with other interested individuals and groups (including local human 
rights organizations). Such consultation should be considered an integral part of 
the drafting process. To this end, it may be helpful to place a statutory duty upon 
the relevant regulatory authority to keep the law under review in light of practice 
and to make considered recommendations for reform if necessary.
Freedom of peaceful assembly in the context of other rights and freedoms
14. It is also essential that those involved in drafting and implementing laws pertain-
ing to freedom of assembly give due consideration to the interrelation of the rights 
and freedoms contained in the international and regional standards. The imposi-
tion of restrictions on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly also potentially 
encroaches on the rights to freedom of association, expression and thought, con-
science and religion. Where issues under these other rights are also raised, the 
substantive issues should be examined under the right most relevant to the facts 
(the lex	specialis), and the other rights should be viewed as subsidiary (the lex	
generalis).35 Significantly, the European Court of Human Rights has stated that 
the ECHR is to be read as a whole and that the application of any individual Article 
must be in harmony with the overall spirit of the Convention.36
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15. The imperative of adopting a holistic approach to freedom of assembly is un-
derscored by the “destruction of rights” provisions contained in Article 30 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 5 of the ICCPR and Arti-
cle 17 of the ECHR.37 As detailed further in paragraph 96, for example, participants 
in public assemblies whose advocacy of national, racial or religious hostility con-
stitutes incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence will forfeit the protection 
of their expressive rights under the ECHR and ICCPR.
Article 30, Universal declaration of human rights
Nothing	in	this	Declaration	may	be	interpreted	as	implying	for	any	
State,	group	or	person	any	right	to	engage	in	any	activity	or	to	perform	
any	act	aimed	at	the	destruction	of	any	of	the	rights	and	freedoms	set	
forth	herein.
Article 5, international covenant on civil and Political rights
(1)	Nothing	in	the	present	Covenant	may	be	interpreted	as	implying	
for	any	State,	group	or	person	any	right	to	engage	in	any	activity	or	
perform	any	act	aimed	at	the	destruction	of	any	of	the	rights	and	
freedoms	recognized	herein	or	at	their	limitation	to	a	greater	extent	
than	is	provided	for	in	the	present	Covenant.
Article 17, european convention on human rights
Nothing	in	this	Convention	may	be	interpreted	as	implying	for	any	
State,	group	or	person	any	right	to	engage	in	any	activity	or	perform	
any	act	aimed	at	the	destruction	of	any	of	the	rights	and	freedoms	set	
forth	herein	or	at	their	limitation	to	a	greater	extent	than	is	provided	for	
in	the	Convention.
Principal definitions and categories of assembly
For the purposes of the Guidelines, an assembly means the intentional  
and temporary presence of a number of individuals in a public place  
for a common expressive purpose.38
16. An assembly, by definition, requires the presence of at least two persons. Nonethe-
less, an individual protester exercising his or her right to freedom of expression, 
where the protester’s physical presence is an integral part of that expression, should 
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also be afforded the same protections as those who gather together as part of an 
assembly.
17. A range of different activities are protected by the right to freedom of peaceful as-
sembly, including static assemblies (such as public meetings, mass actions, “flash 
mobs”,39 demonstrations, sit-ins and pickets)40 and moving assemblies (such as 
parades, processions, funerals, pilgrimages and convoys).41 These examples are 
not exhaustive, and domestic legislation should frame the types of assembly to be 
protected as broadly as possible (as demonstrated by the extracts from the laws 
in Kazakhstan and Finland, below). Recent case law demonstrates the variety of 
new forms of protest to which the right to freedom of assembly has been held to 
extend. These include mass processions by cyclists42 and drive-slow protests by mo-
torists,43 and the case law confirms that the right to freedom of expression includes 
the choice of the form in which ideas are conveyed, without unreasonable inter-
ference by the authorities – particularly in the case of symbolic protest activities.44
18. The question of at which point an assembly can no longer be regarded as a tempo-
rary presence (thus exceeding the degree of tolerance presumptively to be afforded 
by the authorities towards all peaceful assemblies) must be assessed according to the 
individual circumstances of each case.45 Nonetheless, the touchstone established by 
the European Court of Human Rights is that demonstrators ought to be given suf-
ficient opportunity to manifest their views.46 Where an assembly causes little or no 
inconvenience to others, then the authorities should adopt a commensurately less 
stringent test of temporariness (see, further, paras. 39-45 in relation to proportion-
ality). The extracts below also serve to highlight that the term “temporary” should 
not preclude the erection of protest camps or other non-permanent constructions.
Article 1, decree of the President in force of Law “On the procedure of or-
ganization and conduct of peaceful assemblies, mass meetings, processions, 
pickets and demonstrations in the republic of Kazakhstan” (1995)
…	the	forms	of	expression	of	public,	group	and	personal	interests	
and	protest	referred	to	as	assemblies,	meetings,	processions	and	
demonstrations	shall	also	include	hunger	strikes	in	public	places	and	
putting	up	yurts,	tents	and	other	constructions,	and	picketing.
section 11, Assembly Act, Finland (1999, as amended 2001)
In	a	public	meeting,	banners,	insignia,	loudspeakers	and	other	regular	
meeting	equipment	may	be	used	and	temporary	constructions	erected.	
In	this	event,	the	arranger	shall	see	to	it	that	no	danger	or
31
unreasonable	inconvenience	or	damage	is	thereby	caused	to	the	
participants,	bystanders	or	the	environment.
19.	 These Guidelines apply to assemblies held in public places that everyone has an 
equal right to use (including, but not limited to, public parks, squares, streets, 
roads, avenues, sidewalks, pavements and footpaths).47 In particular, the state 
should always seek to facilitate public assemblies at the organizers’ preferred lo-
cation, where this is a public place that is ordinarily accessible to the public (see 
paras. 39-45, in relation to proportionality).
20. Participants in public assemblies have as much a claim to use such sites for a rea-
sonable period as anyone else. Indeed, public protest, and freedom of assembly 
in general, should be regarded as equally legitimate uses of public space as the 
more routine purposes for which public space is used (such as commercial activ-
ity or for pedestrian and vehicular traffic).48 This principle has been clearly stated 
by both the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression: 
Balcik v. Turkey (2007), paragraph 52,  
and Ashughyan v. Armenia (2008), paragraph 90: 
Any	demonstration	in	a	public	place	may	cause	a	certain	level	of	
disruption	to	ordinary	life,	including	disruption	of	traffic	and,	where	
demonstrators	do	not	engage	in	acts	of	violence,	it	is	important	for	
the	public	authorities	to	show	a	certain	degree	of	tolerance	towards	
peaceful	gatherings	if	the	freedom	of	assembly	guaranteed	by	Article	11	
of	the	ECHR	is	not	to	be	deprived	of	all	substance.
inter-American commission on human rights:  
report of the Office of the special rapporteur for Freedom of expression 
(2008), paragraph 70: 
Naturally,	strikes,	road	blockages,	the	occupation	of	public	space,	and	
even	the	disturbances	that	might	occur	during	social	protests	can	cause	
annoyances	or	even	harm	that	it	is	necessary	to	prevent	and	repair.	
Nevertheless,	disproportionate	restrictions	to	protest,	in	particular	in	
cases	of	groups	that	have	no	other	way	to	express	themselves	publicly,	
seriously	jeopardize	the	right	to	freedom	of	expression.	The	Office	of	the	
Special	Rapporteur	is	therefore	concerned	about	the	existence
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of	criminal	provisions	that	make	criminal	offenses	out	of	the	mere	
participation	in	a	protest,	road	blockages	(at	any	time	and	of	any	kind)	
or	acts	of	disorder	that	in	reality,	in	and	of	themselves,	do	not	adversely	
affect	legally	protected	interests	such	as	the	life	or	liberty	of	individuals.
21. Other facilities ordinarily accessible to the public that are buildings and structures 
– such as publicly owned auditoriums, stadiums or buildings – should also be re-
garded as legitimate sites for public assemblies, and will similarly be protected by 
the rights to freedom of assembly and expression.49
22. The right to freedom of peaceful assembly has also been held to cover assemblies 
on private property.50 However, the use of private property for assemblies raises 
issues that are different from the use of public property. For example, prior noti-
fication (other than booking the venue or seeking the permission of the owner of 
the premises) is not required for meetings on private property.51
23. In general, property owners may legitimately restrict access to their property to 
whomsoever they choose.52 Nonetheless, there has been a discernable trend to-
wards the privatization of public spaces in a number of jurisdictions, and this has 
potentially serious implications for assembly, expression and dissent.53 The state 
may, on occasion, have a positive obligation to ensure access to privately owned 
places for the purposes of assembly or expression. In the case of Appleby	and	Oth-
ers	v.	the	United	Kingdom (2003), a case concerning freedom of expression in a 
privately owned shopping centre, the European Court of Human Rights stated 
that the effective exercise of freedom of expression “may require positive meas-
ures of protection, even in the sphere of relations between individuals.”54 Freedom 
of assembly in privately owned spaces may be deserving of protection where the 
essence of the right has been breached.
extract from Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom (2003),  
paragraph 47: 
Where	…	the	bar	on	access	to	property	has	the	effect	of	preventing	
any	effective	exercise	of	freedom	of	expression	or	it	can	be	said	that	
the	essence	of	the	right	has	been	destroyed,	the	Court	would	not	
exclude	that	a	positive	obligation	could	arise	for	the	State	to	protect	the	
enjoyment	of	Convention	rights	by	regulating	property	rights.	
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The	corporate	town,	where	the	entire	municipality	was	controlled	by	a	
private	body,	might	be	an	example.
24. Planning regulations and architectural design can also serve to constrict the 
availability of public places or make them entirely inaccessible for the purposes 
of freedom of assembly. For example, physical security installations that serve 
to prevent speakers from coming within close proximity of particular locations 
(particularly those of symbolic importance) may sometimes constitute an indi-
rect but disproportionate blanket restriction on freedom of assembly, much like 
direct prohibitions on assemblies at designated locations (see paras. 43, 89 and 
102).55 Similarly, urban landscaping (including the erection of fences and foun-
tains, the narrowing of sidewalks, streets and roads, or the planting of trees 
and shrubs) can potentially restrict the use of public space for assemblies. Ur-
ban-planning procedures should, therefore, allow for early and widespread 
consultation. Urban-planning laws might also usefully require that specific 
consideration be given to the potential impact of new designs on freedom of 
assembly.
Peaceful and non-peaceful assemblies
25. Peaceful assemblies: Only peaceful assembly is protected by the right to freedom 
of assembly. The European Court of Human Rights has stated that “[i]n practice, 
the only type of events that did not qualify as ‘peaceful assemblies’ were those in 
which the organizers and participants intended to use violence.”56 Participants must 
also refrain from using violence (though the use of violence by a small number of 
participants should not automatically lead to the categorization as non-peaceful of 
an otherwise peaceful assembly – see para. 164). An assembly should, therefore, 
be deemed peaceful if its organizers have professed peaceful intentions, and this 
should be presumed unless there is compelling and demonstrable evidence that 
those organizing or participating in that particular event themselves intend to use, 
advocate or incite imminent violence.57
26. The term “peaceful” should be interpreted to include conduct that may annoy or 
give offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that it is seeking to pro-
mote,58 and even include conduct that temporarily hinders, impedes or obstructs 
the activities of third parties.59 Thus, by way of example, assemblies involving pure-
ly passive resistance should be characterized as peaceful.60 Furthermore, in the 
course of an assembly, “an individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peace-
ful assembly as a result of sporadic violence or other punishable acts committed 
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by others in the course of the demonstration, if the individual in question remains 
peaceful in his or her own intentions or behaviour”.61
27. The spectrum of conduct that constitutes “violence” should be narrowly construed 
but may exceptionally extend beyond purely physical violence to include inhuman 
or degrading treatment62 or the intentional intimidation or harassment of a “cap-
tive audience”.63 In such instances, the destruction of rights provisions may also be 
engaged (see para. 15).
28. If this fundamental criterion of peacefulness is met, it triggers the positive obli-
gations entailed by the right to freedom of peaceful assembly on the part of the 
state authorities (see paras. 31-34,104 and 144-145). It should be noted that assem-
blies that survive this initial test (and are thus, prima facie, deserving of protection) 
may still legitimately be restricted on public-order or other legitimate grounds (see 
 chapter 4).
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3. Guiding Principles
29. Respect for the general principles discussed below must inform all aspects of the 
drafting, interpretation and application of legislation relating to freedom of as-
sembly. Those tasked with interpreting and applying the law must have a clear 
understanding of these principles. To this end, three principles – the presumption 
in favour of holding assemblies, the state’s duty to protect peaceful assembly, and 
proportionality – should be clearly articulated in legislation governing freedom of 
assembly.
The presumption in favour of holding assemblies
30. As a basic and fundamental right, freedom of assembly should be enjoyed without 
regulation insofar as is possible. Anything not expressly forbidden in law should, 
therefore, be presumed to be permissible, and those wishing to assemble should 
not be required to obtain permission to do so. A presumption in favour of the free-
dom should be clearly and explicitly established in law. In many jurisdictions this is 
achieved by way of a constitutional guarantee, but it can also be stated in legisla-
tion specifically governing the regulation of assemblies (see the extracts from the 
Law in Armenia and the Constitution of Romania, below). Such provisions should 
not be interpreted restrictively by the courts or other authorities.64 Furthermore, 
it is the responsibility of the state to put in place adequate mechanisms and pro-
cedures to ensure that the enjoyment of the freedom is practical and not unduly 
bureaucratic. The relevant authorities should assist individuals and groups who 
wish to assemble peacefully. In particular, the state should always seek to facilitate 
and protect public assemblies at the organizer’s preferred location, and should 
also ensure that efforts to disseminate information to publicize forthcoming as-
semblies are not impeded in any way.
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Law on conducting Meetings, Assemblies, rallies and demonstrations, 
republic of Armenia (2008)
1.	The	objective	of	this	law	is	to	create	the	necessary	conditions	for	
citizens	of	the	Republic	of	Armenia,	foreign	citizens,	stateless	persons	
(hereafter	referred	to	as	“citizens”)	and	legal	persons	to	exercise	their	
right	to	conduct	peaceful	and	weaponless	meetings,	assemblies,	rallies	
and	demonstrations	as	set	forth	in	the	Constitution	and	international	
treaties.	The	exercise	of	this	right	is	not	subject	to	any	restriction,	except	
in	cases	prescribed	by	law	and	that	are	necessary	in	a	democratic	
society	in	the	interests	of	national	security	or	public	security,	for	the	
prevention	of	disorder	and	crime,	for	the	protection	of	health	and	
morals,	or	for	the	protection	of	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	others.	This	
article	does	not	prevent	the	imposition	of	lawful	restrictions	on	the	
exercise	of	these	rights	by	police	and	state	bodies.
Article 39, constitution of romania 1991 (as amended, 2003)
Public	meetings,	processions,	demonstrations	or	any	other	assembly	
shall	be	free	and	may	be	organized	and	held	only	peacefully,	without	
arms	of	any	kind	whatsoever.
The state’s duty to protect peaceful assembly
31. The state has a positive duty to actively protect peaceful assemblies (see “The li-
ability and accountability of law-enforcement personnel”),65 and this should be 
expressly stated in any relevant domestic legislation pertaining to freedom of as-
sembly and police and military powers. This positive obligation requires the state 
to protect the participants of a peaceful assembly from any persons or groups (in-
cluding agents	provocateurs and counter-demonstrators) that attempt to disrupt 
or inhibit them in any way.
32. The importance of freedom of assembly for democracy was emphasized in para-
graph 2. In this light, the costs of providing adequate security and safety measures 
(including traffic and crowd management, and first-aid services)66 should be fully 
covered by the public authorities.67 The state must not levy any additional financial 
charge for providing adequate and appropriate policing.68 Furthermore, organiz-
ers of public assemblies should not be required to obtain public-liability insurance 
for their events. Similarly, the responsibility to clean up after a public assembly 
should lie with the municipal authorities.69 To require assembly organizers to pay 
such costs would create a significant deterrent for those wishing to enjoy their right 
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to freedom of assembly and might actually be prohibitive for many organizers. As 
such, imposing onerous financial requirements on assembly organizers is likely to 
constitute a disproportionate prior restraint.
Article 10, Law on Public Assemblies, republic of Moldova (2008)
(4).Public	authorities	will	undertake	actions	necessary	to	ensure	the	
provision	of	the	services	solicited	by	the	organizers	and	the	services	
that	are	normally	provided	by	subordinated	bodies	and	by	publicly	
administered	enterprises.
Article 20, Law on Public Assemblies, republic of Moldova (2008)
(3).Local	public	authorities	cannot	charge	the	organizers	for	services	
provided	that	are	services	normally	provided	by	subordinated	bodies	
and	by	publicly	administered	enterprises.
Article 18, Law of the russian Federation on rallies, Meetings, demonstra-
tions, Marches and Picketing (2004)
[T]he	maintenance	of	public	order,	regulation	of	road	traffic,	sanitary	
and	medical	service	with	the	objective	of	ensuring	the	holding	of	the	
public	event	shall	be	carried	out	on	a	free	basis	[by	the	authorities].
33. The state’s duty to protect peaceful assembly is of particular significance where 
the persons holding or attempting to hold an assembly are espousing a view that 
is unpopular, as this may increase the likelihood of hostile opposition. Howev-
er, potential disorder arising from hostility directed against those participating 
in a peaceful assembly must not be used to justify the imposition of restrictions 
on peaceful assembly. In addition, the state’s positive duty to protect peaceful as-
semblies also extends to simultaneous opposition assemblies (often known as 
counter-demonstrations).70 The state should, therefore, make available adequate 
policing resources to facilitate demonstrations and related simultaneous assem-
blies within “sight and sound” of one another (see paras. 122-124). The principle of 
non-discrimination requires, further, that assemblies in comparable circumstanc-
es do not face differential levels of restriction.
34. The duty to protect peaceful assembly also requires that law-enforcement offi-
cials be appropriately trained to deal with public assemblies and that the culture 
and ethos of the law-enforcement agencies adequately prioritizes the protec-
tion of human rights (see paras. 147-148 and 178).71 This not only means that they 
should be skilled in techniques of crowd management to minimize the risk of 
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harm to all concerned but, also, that they should be fully aware of and under-
stand their responsibility to facilitate as far as possible the holding of peaceful 
assemblies.
Legality
35. Any restrictions imposed must have a formal basis in primary law, as must the man-
date and powers of the restricting authority.72 The law itself must be sufficiently 
precise to enable an individual to assess whether or not his or her conduct would 
be in breach of the law, and also to foresee the likely consequences of any such 
breach.73 The incorporation of clear definitions in domestic legislation is vital to en-
suring that the law remains easy to understand and apply, and that regulation does 
not encroach upon activities that ought not to be regulated. Definitions, therefore, 
should neither be too elaborate nor too broad.
36. While this foreseeability requirement does not mean that a single consolidated 
law on freedom of assembly need be enacted, it does at least require consistency 
among the various laws that might be invoked to regulate freedom of assembly. Any 
law that regulates freedom of peaceful assembly should not duplicate provisions 
already contained in other legislation, as this would reduce the overall consisten-
cy and transparency of the legislative framework.
37. The more specific the legislation, the more precise the language used ought to be. 
Constitutional provisions, for example, will be less precise than primary legislation 
because of their general nature.74 In contrast, legislative provisions that confer dis-
cretionary powers on the regulatory authorities should be narrowly framed and 
should contain an exhaustive list of the grounds for restricting assemblies (see 
para. 69). Clear guidelines or criteria should also be established to govern the ex-
ercise of such powers and limit the potential for arbitrary interpretation.75
38. To aid certainty, any prior restrictions should be formalized in writing and commu-
nicated to the organizer of the event within a reasonable time-frame (see, further, 
para. 135). Furthermore, the relevant authorities must ensure that any restrictions 
imposed during an event are in full conformity with the law and consistent with es-
tablished jurisprudence. Finally, the imposition after an assembly of sanctions and 
penalties that are not prescribed by law is not permitted.
Proportionality
39. Any restrictions imposed on freedom of assembly must pass the proportionality 
test.76 “The principle of proportionality is a vehicle for conducting a balancing ex-
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ercise. It does not directly balance the right against the reason for interfering with 
it. Instead, it balances the nature and extent of the interference against the reason 
for interfering.”77 The extent of the interference should cover only the purpose that 
justifies it.78 Moreover, given that a wide range of interventions might be suitable, 
the least intrusive means of achieving the legitimate purpose should always be giv-
en preference.79
40. The regulatory authority must recognize that it has authority to impose a range 
of restrictions, rather than viewing the choice as simply between non-interven-
tion or prohibition (see, further, Time, Place and Manner Restrictions, in paras. 
99-100). Any restrictions should closely relate to the particular concerns raised 
and should be narrowly tailored to meet the specific aim(s) pursued by the au-
thorities. The state must show that any restrictions promote a substantial interest 
that would not be achieved absent the restriction. The principle of proportional-
ity thus requires that authorities do not routinely impose restrictions that would 
fundamentally alter the character of an event (such as relocating assemblies to 
less central areas of a city).80
extract from Article 7(i)-(ii), Law of the republic of Azerbaijan on Free-
dom of Assembly (1998)
I.	No	restrictions	shall	be	placed	on	the	exercise	of	the	right	to	freedom	
of	assembly	other	than	such	as	are	prescribed	by	law	and	are	necessary	
in	a	democratic	society	in	the	interests	of	national	security	or	public	
safety,	for	the	prevention	of	disorder	or	crime,	for	the	protection	of	
health	or	morals	or	for	the	protection	of	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	
others.
II.	Restriction	of	the	freedom	of	assembly	provided	for	in	part	I	of	the	
present	Article	must	be	proportionate	to	pursued	goals.	To	reach	the	
goal	such	a	restriction	must	not	exceed	necessary	and	sufficient	limits.
41. The principle of proportionality requires that there be an objective and detailed 
evaluation of the circumstances affecting the holding of an assembly. Furthermore, 
where other rights potentially conflict with the right to freedom of peaceful assem-
bly, decisions by the regulatory authorities should be informed by a parallel analysis 
of the respective rights at stake (bearing in mind that the limitations or qualifica-
tions permitted may not be identical for these other rights). In other words, there 
should a full assessment of each of the rights engaged, examining the proportion-
ality of any interference potentially caused by the full protection of the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly.81
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42. The European Court of Human Rights has further held that the reasons adduced 
by national authorities to support any claim of proportionality must be “relevant 
and sufficient”,82 “convincing and compelling”83 and based on “an acceptable assess-
ment of the relevant facts84”.85 Mere suspicion or presumptions cannot suffice.86 
This is particularly the case where the assembly concerns a matter of public inter-
est or where political speech is involved.
43. Consequently, the blanket application of legal restrictions – for example, banning 
all demonstrations during certain times, or in particular locations or public places 
that are suitable for holding assemblies – tends to be over-inclusive. Thus, they will 
fail the proportionality test, because no consideration has been given to the spe-
cific circumstances in each case. 87 Legislative provisions that limit the holding of 
assemblies to only certain specified sites or routes (whether in central or remote 
locations) seriously undermine the communicative purpose of freedom of assem-
bly, and should be regarded as a prima facie violations of the right. Similarly, the 
regulation of assemblies in residential areas or of assemblies at night time should 
be handled on a case-by-case basis rather than being specified as prohibited cat-
egories of assemblies.
44. The time, place and manner of individual public assemblies can, however, be regu-
lated to prevent them from unreasonably interfering with the rights and freedoms 
of other people (see chapter 4). This reflects the need for a proper balance to be 
struck between the rights of persons to express their views by means of assembly 
and the interest of not imposing unnecessary burdens on the rights of non-partic-
ipants.
45. If, having regard for the relevant factors, the authorities have a proper basis for 
concluding that restrictions should be imposed on the time or place of an assem-
bly (rather than merely the manner in which the event is conducted), a suitable 
alternative time or place should be made available.88 Any alternative must be such 
that the message that the protest seeks to convey is still capable of being effective-
ly communicated to those to whom it is directed – in other words, within “sight and 
sound” of the target audience (see para. 33 and Simultaneous Assemblies in par-
as. 122-124).89
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Article 13(4)-13(5), Law of the republic of Armenia on conducting 
Meetings, Assemblies, rallies and demonstrations (2008)
4.	Should	the	authorized	body	find	during	the	consideration	of	
notification	that	there	are	grounds	to	prohibit	the	conduct	of	a	mass	
public	event	pursuant	to	paragraph	2	or	the	last	paragraph	of	part	1	of	
this	Article,	the	authorized	body	shall	offer	the	organizer	other	dates	(in	
the	place	and	at	the	time	specified	in	the	notification)	or	other	hours	(in	
the	place	and	on	the	date	specified	in	the	notification)	for	conducting	a	
mass	public	event	or	other	conditions	concerning	the	form	of	the	event.
Any	date	proposed	by	the	authorized	body	shall	be	no	more	than	two	
days	after	the	date	proposed	by	the	organizer.
Any	time	proposed	by	the	authorized	body	shall	be	the	same	as	
proposed	by	the	organizer,	or	within	three	hours’	difference.
5.	Should	the	authorized	body	find,	during	consideration	of	the	
notification,	that	there	are	sufficient	grounds	to	prohibit	the	conducting	
of	a	mass	public	event	…	the	authorized	body	shall	offer	the	organizer	
another	place	for	conducting	the	mass	public	event	(on	the	date	and	
time	specified	in	the	notification).
Any	place	proposed	by	the	authorized	body	shall	meet	the	reasonable	
requirements	of	the	organizer,	specifically	with	regard	to	the	possibility	
of	participation	of	the	estimated	number	of	participants	(provided	
the	notification	contains	such	information).	Proposed	places	should	
not	include	areas	outside	the	selected	community	and,	in	the	case	of	
Yerevan,	areas	outside	selected	districts.	The	proposed	place	shall	be	as	
close	as	possible	to	the	place	specified	in	the	notification.
Non-discrimination
46. Freedom of peaceful assembly is to be enjoyed equally by all persons. The prin-
ciple that human rights shall be applied without discrimination lies at the core of 
the interpretation of human rights standards. Article 26 of the ICCPR and Article 
14 of the ECHR require that each state secure the enjoyment of the human rights 
recognized in these treaties for all individuals within its jurisdiction without dis-
crimination.90
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47. Article 14 of the ECHR does not provide a freestanding right to non-discrimination 
but complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Pro-
tocols. Thus, Article 14 is applicable only where the facts at issue (or arguably, the 
grounds of restriction) fall within the ambit of one or more of the other Convention 
rights.91 OSCE participating States and parties to the ECHR are encouraged to rati-
fy Protocol 12 (see below), which contains a general prohibition of discrimination.92 
Additionally, Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Dis-
crimination requires States Parties to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination.
Article 26 iccPr
All	persons	are	equal	before	the	law	and	are	entitled	without	any	
discrimination	to	the	equal	protection	of	the	law.	In	this	respect,	the	law	
shall	prohibit	any	discrimination	and	guarantee	to	all	persons	equal	
and	effective	protection	against	discrimination	on	any	ground,	such	as	
race,	colour,	sex,	language,	religion,	political	or	other	opinion,	national	
or	social	origin,	property,	birth	or	other	status.
Article 5, convention on the elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination
In	compliance	with	the	fundamental	obligations	laid	down	in	article	
2	of	this	Convention,	States	Parties	undertake	to	prohibit	and	to	
eliminate	racial	discrimination	in	all	its	forms	and	to	guarantee	the	
right	of	everyone,	without	distinction	as	to	race,	colour,	or	national	or	
ethnic	origin,	to	equality	before	the	law,	notably	in	the	enjoyment	of	the	
following	rights:	
…	(d)	Other	civil	rights,	in	particular;
…	(ix)	The	right	to	freedom	of	peaceful	assembly	and	association;
Article 14 echr
The	enjoyment	of	the	rights	and	freedoms	set	forth	in	this	Convention	shall	
be	secured	without	discrimination	on	any	ground	such	as	sex,	race,	colour,	
language,	religion,	political	or	other	opinion,	national	or	social	origin,	
association	with	a	national	minority,	property,	birth	or	other	status.
Protocol 12 echr, Article 1 – General prohibition of discrimination
1.	The	enjoyment	of	any	right	set	forth	by	law	shall	be	secured	without	
discrimination	on	any	ground	such	as	sex,	race,	colour,	language,	
religion,	political	or	other	opinion,	national	or	social	origin,	association	
with	a	national	minority,	property,	birth	or	other	status.
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2.	No	one	shall	be	discriminated	against	by	any	public	authority	on	any	
ground	such	as	those	mentioned	in	paragraph	1.
Article 21, charter of Fundamental rights of the european Union: 
Any	discrimination	based	on	any	ground	such	as	sex,	race,	colour,	
ethnic	or	social	origin,	genetic	features,	language,	religion	or	belief,	
political	or	any	other	opinion,	membership	of	a	national	minority,	
property,	birth,	disability,	age	or	sexual	orientation	shall	be	prohibited.
48. Any discrimination based on grounds such as sex, “race”, colour, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual ori-
entation shall be prohibited. Moreover, the failure of the state to prevent or take 
steps in response to acts of discrimination committed by private individuals may 
also constitute a breach of the right to freedom from discrimination.93
49. Importantly, Article 26 of the ICCPR has been interpreted to include sexual ori-
entation in the reference to non-discrimination on grounds of “sex”.94 Article 13 of 
the Amsterdam Treaty also provides for the European Union to “undertake nec-
essary actions to fight discrimination based on … sexual orientation”, and Article 
21(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibits “any discrimination on 
any ground”, including on the basis of sexual orientation.95 Both Principle 20 of 
the Yogyakarta	Principles96 and the Committee	of	Ministers	Recommendation	on	
measures	to	combat	discrimination	on	grounds	of	sexual	orientation97 are also di-
rectly relevant in this regard.
50. The regulatory authority must not impose more onerous preconditions on some 
persons wishing to assemble than on others whose cases are similar.98 The reg-
ulatory authority may, however, treat differently persons whose situations are 
significantly different.99 Article 26 of the ICCPR guarantees all persons equali-
ty before the law and equal protection of the law. This implies that decisions by 
the authorities concerning freedom of assembly must not have a discriminatory 
impact, and so both direct and indirect discrimination are prohibited.100 Further-
more, the law-enforcement authorities have an obligation to investigate whether 
discrimination is a contributory factor to any criminal conduct that occurs during 
an assembly (such as participants being physically attacked).101
51. Attempts to prohibit and permanently exclude assemblies organized by members 
of one ethnic, national or religious group from areas predominantly occupied by 
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members of another group may be deemed to promote segregation, and would 
be contrary to the UN	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Racial	Dis-
crimination, Article 3 of which affirms that “[p]arties particularly condemn racial 
segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all 
practices of this nature in territories under their jurisdiction.”
52. This following section highlights some of the key human rights provisions that 
protect the freedom of peaceful assembly by particular sections of society whose 
freedoms are sometimes not adequately protected.
53. Groups, unregistered associations and legal entities: Freedom of peaceful assem-
bly can be exercised by both individuals and corporate bodies (as, for example, 
provided in the extract from the Bulgarian Law on Gatherings, Meetings and 
Manifestations, below).102 In order to ensure that freedom of peaceful assembly is 
protected in practice, states should remove the requirement of mandatory registra-
tion of any public organization and guarantee the right of citizens to set up formal 
and informal associations. (See Freedom of Association and Freedom of Assem-
bly, in paras. 105-106).
Article 2, Bulgarian Law on Gatherings, Meetings and Manifestations (1990)
Gatherings,	meetings	and	manifestations	can	be	organized	and	held	by	
[individuals],	associations,	political	and	other	social	organizations.
54. Minorities: The freedom to organize and participate in public assemblies should be 
guaranteed to members of minority and indigenous groups. Article 7 of the Coun-
cil of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities (1995) provides that 
“[t]he Parties shall ensure respect for the right of every person belonging to a na-
tional minority to freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom 
of expression, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”103 Article 3(1), UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities (1992) also states that “[p]ersons belonging to minorities may 
exercise their rights... individually as well as in community with other members of 
their group, without any discrimination.”104 As noted in paragraph 7, “democracy 
does not simply mean that the views of the majority must always prevail: a balance 
must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and 
avoids any abuse of a dominant position”.105
55. Non-nationals (stateless persons, refugees, foreign nationals, asylum seekers, 
migrants and tourists): International human rights law requires that non-nationals 
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“receive the benefit of the right of peaceful assembly”.106 It is important, therefore, 
that the law extends freedom of peaceful assembly not only to citizens, but that 
it also includes stateless persons, refugees, foreign nationals, asylum seekers, mi-
grants and tourists. Note, however, that Article 16 of the ECHR provides that “[n]
othing in Articles 10, 11, and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting 
Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens.” The application 
of Article 16 should be confined to speech activities by non-nationals that directly 
burden national security. There is no reason to stop non-nationals from partici-
pating in an assembly that, for example, challenges domestic immigration laws or 
policies. The increase in transnational protest movements also underscores the im-
portance of facilitating freedom of assembly for non-nationals.107
56. Women: Under Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), States Parties are obliged to take all ap-
propriate measures to ensure the full development and advancement of women 
for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.108
57. children: Like adults, children have legitimate claims and interests. Freedom of 
peaceful assembly provides them with a means of expressing their views and con-
tributing to society. Article 15 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
requires States Parties to recognize the right of children to organize and partici-
pate in peaceful assemblies.109
Article 15, UN convention on the rights of the child
1.	States	Parties	recognize	the	rights	of	the	child	to	freedom	of	
association	and	to	freedom	of	peaceful	assembly.
2.	No	restrictions	may	be	placed	on	the	exercise	of	these	rights	other	
than	those	imposed	in	conformity	with	the	law	and	which	are	necessary	
in	a	democratic	society	in	the	interests	of	national	security	or	public	
safety,	public	order	(ordre	public),	the	protection	of	public	health	or	
morals	or	the	protection	of	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	others.
58. In light of the important responsibilities of the organizers of public assemblies (see 
paras. 185-198), the law may set a certain minimum age for organizers, having due 
regard to the evolving capacity of the child (see the examples from the Finland As-
sembly Act and the Law on Public Assemblies of the Republic of Moldova, below). 
The law may also provide that minors may organize a public event only if their par-
ents or legal guardians consent to their doing so.
46
section 5, Finland’s Assembly Act (1999):	Right	to	arrange	public	
meetings
…A	person	who	is	without	full	legal	capacity	but	who	has	attained	15	
years	of	age	may	arrange	a	public	meeting,	unless	it	is	evident	that	
he/she	will	not	be	capable	of	fulfilling	the	requirements	that	the	law	
imposes	on	the	arranger	of	a	meeting.	Other	persons	without	full	legal	
capacity	may	arrange	public	meetings	together	with	persons	with	full	
legal	capacity.
Law on Public Assemblies of the republic of Moldova (2008)
Article	6,	Organizers	of	assemblies	…
(2)	Minors	of	age	14	and	persons	declared	to	have	limited	legal	capacity	
can	organize	public	assemblies	together	with	persons	with	full	legal	
capacity.
Article	7,	Participants	in	assemblies
(1)	Everyone	is	free	to	actively	participate	and	assist	at	the	assembly.
(2)	Nobody	can	be	obliged	to	participate	or	assist	at	an	assembly	
against	his/her	will.
59. Persons with disabilities: The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disa-
bilities similarly emphasizes the need to “promote, protect and ensure the full and 
equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons 
with disabilities...”110 The international standards provide that “[e]very person with 
a mental illness shall have the right to exercise all civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural rights as recognized in … the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, and in other relevant instruments.”111 All individuals should thus be 
facilitated in the enjoyment of their freedom to peacefully assemble, irrespective 
of their legal capacity.
60. Law-enforcement personnel and state officials: The ECHR permits “lawful re-
strictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the 
police, or of the administration of the State”.112 Any such restrictions must be de-
signed to ensure that the responsibilities of those in the services concerned are 
properly discharged and that any need for the public to have confidence in their 
neutrality is maintained.113 The definition of neutrality is central. Neutrality should 
not be interpreted so as to unnecessarily restrict the freedom to hold and express 
an opinion. Legislation should not, therefore, restrict the freedom of assembly of 
law-enforcement personnel (including the police and the military) or state officials 
unless the reasons for restriction are directly connected with their service duties, 
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and then only to the extent absolutely necessary in light of considerations of pro-
fessional duty.
Good administration and transparent decision-making
61. The public should be informed which body is responsible for taking decisions about 
the regulation of freedom of assembly, and this should be clearly stated in law.114 It 
is important to have a properly mandated decision-making authority, as those of-
ficials who have to bear the risk of taking controversial decisions about assemblies 
often come under intense public pressure (potentially leading to decisions that do 
not adhere to or reflect the human rights principles set out in these Guidelines). 
In some jurisdictions, it may be appropriate for decisions about regulating assem-
blies to be taken by a different body from the authority tasked with enforcing the 
law. This separation of powers can assist those enforcing the law, by rendering 
them less amenable to pressure to change an unfavourable decision. In jurisdic-
tions where there are diverse ethnic and cultural populations and traditions, it 
might be helpful if the regulatory authority is broadly representative of those dif-
ferent backgrounds.115
62. The officials responsible for making decisions concerning the regulation of the right 
to freedom of assembly should be fully aware of and understand their responsibili-
ties in relation to the human rights issues bearing upon their decisions. To this end, 
such officials should receive periodic training in relation to the implications of ex-
isting and emerging human rights case law. The regulatory authority must also be 
adequately staffed and resourced, so as to enable it to effectively fulfil its obliga-
tions in a way that enhances co-operation between the organizer and authorities.
63. The regulatory authority should ensure that the general public has adequate access 
to reliable information relating to public assemblies,116 as well as about its proce-
dures and operation. Many countries already have legislation specifically relating 
to access to information, open decision-making and good administration, and these 
laws should be applicable to the regulation of freedom of assembly.
64. Procedural transparency should ensure that freedom of peaceful assembly is not 
restricted on the basis of imagined risks or even real risks which, if opportunities 
were given, could be adequately addressed prior to the assembly. In this regard, 
the authorities should ensure that its decisions are as well-informed as possible. 
Domestic legislation could, for example, require that a representative of the deci-
sion-making authority attend any public assembly in relation to which substantive 
human rights concerns have been raised (irrespective of whether or not any re-
strictions were actually imposed). Organizers of public assemblies and those whose 
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rights and freedoms will be directly affected by an assembly should also have an 
opportunity to make oral and written representations directly to the regulatory au-
thority (see Decision-making and review processes in paras. 132-140). It is of note 
that Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union pro-
vides that everyone has the right to good administration.
Article 41, charter of Fundamental rights of the european Union 
1.	 	Every	person	has	the	right	to	have	his	or	her	affairs	handled	
impartially,	fairly	and	within	a	reasonable	time	by	the	institutions	
and	bodies	of	the	Union.
2.	 This	right	includes:	
•	 	the	right	of	every	person	to	be	heard,	before	any	individual	
measure	which	would	affect	him	or	her	adversely	is	taken;
•	 	the	right	of	every	person	to	have	access	to	his	or	her	file,	while	
respecting	the	legitimate	interests	of	confidentiality	and	of	
professional	and	business	secrecy;
•	 	the	obligation	of	the	administration	to	give	reasons	for	its	decisions.
65. Laws relating to freedom of assembly should outline a clear procedure for interac-
tion between event organizers and the regulatory authorities. This should set out 
appropriate time limits, working backwards from the date of the proposed event, 
and should allow adequate time for each stage in the regulatory process
66. review and appeal: An initial option of administrative review (see para. 137) can 
both reduce the burden on courts and help build a more constructive relation-
ship between the authorities and the public. However, where such a review fails 
to satisfy the applicant, there should be an opportunity to appeal the decision of 
the regulatory authority to an independent court. Appeals should take place in a 
prompt and timely manner so that any revisions to the authorities’ decision can 
be implemented without further detriment to the applicant’s rights. A final ruling 
should, therefore, be given prior to the date of the assembly in the notification. In 
the absence of the possibility of a final ruling, the law should provide for the possi-
bility of interim relief by injunction. This requirement is examined further in Chapter 
5 “Procedural Issues” (Decision-making and review processes, paras. 132-140) and 
in Annex A, “Enforcement of international human rights standards”.
67. The liability of the regulatory authority: The regulatory authorities must comply 
with their legal obligations and should be accountable for any failure – procedur-
al or substantive – to do so whether before, during or after an assembly. Liability 
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should be gauged according to the relevant principles of administrative or crimi-
nal law or judicial review concerning the misuse of public power.
Article 183, Moldova’s Penal code (2002)
Violation of the right to freedom of assembly
Violation	of	the	right	to	public	assembly	by	illegal	actions	to	impede	
an	assembly	or	by	constraining	participation	is	liable	to	a	fine	or	
imprisonment	for	up	to	2	years.
Article 67, Moldova’s contraventions code (2008)
Violation of the right to freedom of assembly
Impeding	the	organization	and	carrying	out	of	assemblies,	as	well	as	
putting	obstacles	in	the	way	of	or	constraining	participation	in	the	
assembly,	will	be	sanctioned	by	a	fine.
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4. restrictions on Freedom of Assembly
68. While international and regional human rights instruments affirm and protect the right 
to freedom of peaceful assembly, they also allow states to impose certain limitations 
on that freedom. This chapter examines the legitimate grounds for the imposition of 
restrictions on public assemblies and the types of limitation which can be imposed.
Legitimate grounds for restriction
69. The legitimate grounds for such restrictions are prescribed by the relevant in-
ternational and regional human rights instruments, and these should neither be 
supplemented by additional grounds in domestic legislation117 nor loosely interpret-
ed by the authorities.118
70. The regulatory authorities must not raise obstacles to freedom of assembly unless 
there are compelling arguments to do so. Applying the guidance below should help 
the regulatory authorities test the validity of such arguments. The legitimate aims 
discussed in this section (as provided in the limiting clauses in Article 21 of the IC-
CPR and Article 11 of the ECHR) are not a licence to impose restrictions, and the 
onus rests squarely on the authorities to substantiate any justifications for the im-
position of restrictions.
71. Public order: The inherent imprecision of this term119 must not be exploited to jus-
tify the prohibition or dispersal of peaceful assemblies. Neither a hypothetical risk 
of public disorder nor the presence of a hostile audience are legitimate grounds 
for prohibiting a peaceful assembly.120 Prior restrictions imposed on the basis of the 
possibility of minor incidents of violence are likely to be disproportionate, and any 
isolated outbreak of violence should be dealt with by way of subsequent arrest and 
prosecution rather than prior restraint.121 The European Court of Human Rights 
has noted that “an individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assem-
bly as a result of sporadic violence or other punishable acts committed by others 
in the course of the demonstration, if the individual in question remains peaceful 
in his or her own intentions or behaviour”.122
72. An assembly that the organizers intend to be peaceful may still legitimately be re-
stricted on public-order grounds in certain circumstances. Such restrictions should 
only be imposed when there is evidence that participants will themselves use or in-
cite imminent, lawless and disorderly action and that such action is likely to occur. 
This approach is designed to extend protection to controversial speech and polit-
ical criticism, even where this might engender a hostile reaction from others (see, 
further, content-based restrictions in paras. 94-98).123
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73. Compelling and demonstrable evidence is required demonstrating that those or-
ganizing or participating in the particular event will themselves use violence. In the 
event that there is evidence of potential violence, the organizer must be given a full 
and fair opportunity for rebuttal by submitting evidence that the assembly will be 
peaceful.
74. Public safety: There is a significant overlap between public-safety considerations 
and those concerning the maintenance of public order. Particular public-safety con-
cerns might arise, for example, when assemblies are held outside daylight hours, 
or when moving vehicular floats form part of an assembly. In such instances, ex-
tra precautionary measures should generally be preferred to restriction.
75. The state has a duty to protect public safety, and under no circumstances should 
this duty be assigned or delegated to the organizer of an assembly. However, the 
organizer and stewards may assist in ensuring the safety of members of the public. 
An assembly organizer could counter any claims that public safety might be com-
promised by his or her event by, for example, ensuring adequate stewarding (see 
paras. 191-196).
76. The protection of health: In the rare instances in which a threat to persons’ health 
might be an appropriate basis for restricting of one or more public assemblies, 
those restrictions should not be imposed unless other similar concentrations of in-
dividuals are also restricted. Thus, before a restriction may be justified based on 
the need to protect public health, similar restrictions should also have been ap-
plied to attendance at school, concerts, sports events and other such activities at 
which people ordinarily gather.
77. Restrictions might also be justified on occasions where the health of participants in 
an assembly becomes seriously compromised. In the case of Cisse	v.	France	(2002), 
for example, the intervention of the authorities was justified on health grounds, 
given that the protesters had reached a critical stage during a hunger strike, and 
were confined in unsanitary conditions. Again, however, such reasoning should 
not be relied upon by the authorities to pre-emptively break up peaceful assem-
blies, even where a hunger strike forms part of the protest strategy.
78. The protection of morals: The main human rights treaties that protect freedom 
of assembly (the ICCPR and ECHR) are “living instruments” and are thus attuned 
to diverse and changing moral values. Measures purporting to safeguard public 
morals must, therefore, be tested against an objective standard of whether they 
meet a pressing social need and comply with the principle of proportionality.124 In-
deed, it is not sufficient for the behaviour in question merely to offend morality – it 
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must be behaviour that is deemed criminal and has been defined in law as such	
(see para. 35).125
79. Moreover, the protection of morals should not ordinarily be regarded as an ap-
propriate basis for imposing restrictions on freedom of assembly.126 Reliance on 
such a category can too easily lead to the regulation of content and discriminatory 
treatment. Restrictions will violate the right to freedom of peaceful assembly un-
less they are permissible under the standards governing the regulation of content 
(see paras. 94-98) and non-discrimination (paras. 46-60).127
80. The protection of the rights and freedoms of others: The regulatory authority 
has a duty to strike a proper balance between the important freedom to peace-
fully assemble and the competing rights of those who live, work, shop, trade and 
carry on business in the locality affected by an assembly. That balance should en-
sure that other activities taking place in the same space may also proceed if they 
themselves do not impose unreasonable burdens.128 Temporary disruption of ve-
hicular or pedestrian traffic is not, of itself, a reason to impose restrictions on an 
assembly.129 Nor is opposition to an assembly sufficient, of itself, to justify prior lim-
itations. Given the need for tolerance in a democratic society, a high threshold will 
need to be overcome before it can be established that a public assembly will un-
reasonably infringe upon the rights and freedoms of others.130 This is particularly 
so given that freedom of assembly, by definition, constitutes only a temporary in-
terference with these other rights.
81. While business owners and local residents do not normally have a right to be con-
sulted in relation to the exercise of fundamental rights131 where their rights are 
engaged, it is good practice for organizers and law-enforcement agencies to dis-
cuss with the affected parties how the various competing rights claims might best 
be protected to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned (see para. 134, in relation 
to negotiation and mediated dialogue).
82. Where the regulatory authority restricts an assembly for the purpose of protect-
ing the competing rights and freedoms of others, the body should state: 
 • The nature of any valid rights claims made;
 •  How, in the particular context, these rights might be infringed (outlining the 
specific factors considered);
 •  How, precisely, the authority’s decision mitigates against any such infringe-
ment (the necessity of the restrictions); and
 • Why less intrusive measures could not be used.
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83. Rights that might be claimed by non-participants affected by an assembly (al-
though these need not be rights enumerated in the ICCPR or ECHR)132 potentially 
include: the right to privacy (protected by Article 17 of the ICCPR and Article 8 of 
the ECHR)133 the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (protected by 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR),134 the right to liberty and security of person 
(Article 9 of the ICCPR and Article 5 of the ECHR),135 and the right to freedom of 
movement (Article 12 of the ICCPR and Article 2 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR).136 It 
may also be that restrictions on freedom of assembly could be justified to protect 
the right of others to freedom of expression and to receive information (Article 19 
of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ECHR),137 or to manifest their religion or belief 
(Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR).138 Nonetheless, no restrictions 
should be imposed on freedom of assembly on the grounds of protecting the rights 
of others unless the requisite threshold has been satisfied in relation to these oth-
er rights. Indeed, anyone seeking to exercise the right to freedom of assembly in 
a way that would destroy the rights of others already forfeits his or her right to as-
semble by virtue of the destruction of rights clause in Article 5 of the ICCPR and 
Article 17 of the ECHR (see para. 15).
84. Assessing the impact of public events on the rights of others must take due consid-
eration of the frequency of similar assemblies before the same audience. While a 
high threshold must again be met, the cumulative impact on a “captive audience” 
of numerous assemblies (for example, in a purely residential location) might con-
stitute a form of harassment that could legitimately be restricted to protect the 
rights of others. Repeated, albeit peaceful, demonstrations by particular groups 
might also in certain circumstances be viewed as an abuse of a dominant position 
(see paras. 7 and 54), legitimately restricted to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others.139 The principle of proportionality requires that, in achieving this aim, the 
least onerous restrictions possible should be used (see paras. 39-45).140
85. National security: The issue of national security is often given too wide an interpre-
tation in relation to freedom of assembly. The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation 
and Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights limit reliance on national-security grounds to justify restrictions of freedom 
of expression and assembly.
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“National security”, Part Vi, siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
derogation of Provisions in the international covenant on civil and 
Political rights
29.	National	security	may	be	invoked	to	justify	measures	limiting	certain	
rights	only	when	they	are	taken	to	protect	the	existence	of	the	nation	or	its	
territorial	integrity	or	political	independence	against	force	or	threat	of	force.
30.	National	security	cannot	be	invoked	as	a	reason	for	imposing	
limitations	to	prevent	merely	local	or	relatively	isolated	threats	to	law	
and	order.
31.	National	security	cannot	be	used	as	a	pretext	for	imposing	vague	
or	arbitrary	limitations	and	may	only	be	invoked	when	there	exist	
adequate	safeguards	and	effective	remedies	against	abuse.
32.	The	systematic	violation	of	human	rights	undermines	true	national	
security	and	may	jeopardize	international	peace	and	security.	A	State	
responsible	for	such	violation	shall	not	invoke	national	security	as	a	
justification	for	measures	aimed	at	suppressing	opposition	to	such	
violation	or	at	perpetrating	repressive	practices	against	its	population.
86.	 Similarly, Principle 6 of the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom 
of Expression and Access to Information establishes clear parameters for the impo-
sition of restrictions on freedom of expression in the interests of national security.141
Principle 6, Johannesburg Principles on National security, Freedom of 
expression and Access to information
expression That May Threaten National security
Subject	to	Principles	15	and	16,	expression	may	be	punished	as	a	threat	
to	national security	only	if	a	government	can	demonstrate	that:	
(a)	the	expression	is	intended	to	incite	imminent	violence;
(b)	it	is	likely	to	incite	such	violence;	and
(c)	there	is	a	direct	and	immediate	connection	between	the	expression	
and	the likelihood	or	occurrence	of	such	violence.
Legislation intended to counter terrorism and extremism
87. Efforts to tackle terrorism or extremism and to enhance security must never be in-
voked to justify arbitrary action that curtails the enjoyment of fundamental human 
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rights and freedoms. The International Commission of Jurists 2004 Declaration on 
Upholding Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Combating Terrorism (the Berlin 
Declaration)142 emphasized that “the odious nature of terrorist acts cannot serve as 
a basis or pretext for states to disregard their international obligations, in particu-
lar in the protection of fundamental human rights”. Similarly, both the Guidelines 
of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Protecting Freedom of 
Expression and Information in Times of Crisis (2007)143 and the OSCE manual	Coun-
tering	Terrorism,	Protecting	Human	Rights	(2007)144 caution against the imposition 
of undue restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression and assembly dur-
ing crisis situations.
88. Principle 8 of the Berlin Declaration is of particular relevance: 
Principle 8, Berlin declaration of the international commission of 
Jurists on Upholding human rights and the rule of Law in combating 
Terrorism
In	the	implementation	of	counter-terrorism	measures,	States	must	
respect	and	safeguard	fundamental	rights	and	freedoms,	including	
freedom	of	expression,	religion,	conscience	or	belief,	association,	and	
assembly,	and	the	peaceful	pursuit	of	the	right	to	self-determination,	
as	well	as	the	right	to	privacy,	which	is	of	particular	concern	in	the	
sphere	of	intelligence	gathering	and	dissemination.	All	restrictions	on	
fundamental	rights	must	be	necessary	and	proportionate.
89. Counter-terrorism measures pose a number of particular challenges to the right 
to freedom of peaceful assembly. Commonly, emergency legislation is introduced 
to increase police stop-and-search powers, and it may also extend the time pe-
riod allowed for administrative detention without charge. Other examples of 
exceptional measures include the proscription of particular organizations and the 
criminalization of expression of support for them, the creation of offences concern-
ing provocation to or advocacy of extremism and/or terrorism,145 the designation 
of specific sites or locations as prohibited areas (see paras. 24 and 43), increased 
penalties for participation in unlawful assemblies, and the imposition of border 
controls to prevent entry to individuals deemed likely to demonstrate and cause 
disturbances to public order. All of these have a detrimental impact on the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly, and all must be shown to be necessary and strictly 
proportionate (see General Principles in chapter 2).146
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90. Any such extraordinary pre-emptive measures should be transparent and based 
on corroborated evidence,147 have time limits and be subject to independent or ju-
dicial review. Specifically, the unilateral suspension of the Schengen Agreement 
to enable the re-imposition of border controls in anticipation of large-scale assem-
blies should not permit disproportionate or blanket restrictions on the freedom of 
movement of those travelling to participate in or observe an assembly.148
91. Domestic legislation designed to counter terrorism or extremism should narrow-
ly define the terms “terrorism” and “extremism” so as not to include forms of civil 
disobedience and protest, the pursuit of certain political, religious or ideological 
ends, or attempts to exert influence on other sections of society, the government 
or international opinion. Furthermore, any discretionary powers afforded to law-
enforcement officials should be narrowly framed and include adequate safeguards 
to reduce the potential for arbitrariness.149
derogations in times of war or other public emergency
92. Under Article 4 of the ICCPR and Article 15 of the ECHR, in times of war or public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation, states may take measures derogat-
ing from their obligation to guarantee freedom of assembly. They may do so only 
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under internation-
al law.150 The crisis or emergency must be one that “affects the whole population 
and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of which the State 
is composed”.151 The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provi-
sions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights state, further, that 
neither ”[i]nternal conflict and unrest that do not constitute a grave and imminent 
threat to the life of the nation” nor “[e]conomic difficulties” can justify derogations 
under Article 4.152
93. A public emergency must be both proclaimed to the citizens in the state con-
cerned153 and notification provided to other States Parties to the ICCPR through the 
intermediary of the UN Secretary-General (Article 4(3) of the ICCPR), the Secre-
tary General of the Council of Europe (Article 15(3) of the ECHR) and the Secretary 
General of the OSCE (Paragraph 28.10 of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference 
on the Human Dimension, 1991). Derogations should also have time limits.
Types of restriction
94. content-based restrictions: Speech and other forms of expression will normally 
enjoy protection under Article of the 19 ICCPR and Article 10 of the ECHR. In gen-
eral, therefore, the regulation of public assemblies should not be based upon the 
content of the message they seek to communicate. As the European Court of Hu-
man Rights has recently stated, it is “unacceptable from the standpoint of Article 
11 of the Convention that an interference with the right to freedom of assembly 
could be justified simply on the basis of the authorities’ own view of the merits of 
a particular protest”.154 This principle is explicitly reflected in the extract from the 
Netherlands’ Public Assemblies Act, cited below. Any restrictions on the visual or 
audible content of any message displayed or voiced should therefore face height-
ened (sometimes referred to as “strict” or “anxious”) scrutiny, and only be imposed 
if there is an imminent threat of violence. Moreover, criticism of government or 
state officials should never, of itself, constitute a sufficient ground for imposing re-
strictions on freedom of assembly; the European Court of Human Rights has often 
emphasized that the “limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the 
government than in relation to a private citizen”.155
section 5, the Netherlands’ Public Assemblies Act, (1988)
3.	A	condition,	restriction	or	prohibition	may	not	relate	to	the	religion	or	
belief	to	be	professed,	or	the	thoughts	or	feelings	to	be	expressed.
95.	 Whether behaviour constitutes the intentional incitement of violence is a ques-
tion that must inevitably be assessed based on the particular circumstances.156 
Some difficulty arises where the message concerns unlawful activity, or where it 
could be construed as inciting others to commit non-violent but unlawful acts. Ex-
pressing support for unlawful activity can, in many cases, be distinguished from 
disorderly conduct and, therefore, should not face restriction on public-order 
grounds. The touchstone must be, again, the existence of an imminent threat of 
violence.157
96. While expression should normally still be protected, even if it is hostile or insult-
ing to other individuals, groups or particular sections of society, the law should 
still prohibit the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes in-
citement to discrimination, hostility or violence.158 Specific instances of hate speech 
“may be so insulting to individuals or groups as not to enjoy the level of protec-
tion afforded by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights to other 
forms of expression. This is the case where hate speech is aimed at the destruc-
tion of the rights and freedoms laid down in the Convention or at their limitation 
to a greater extent than provided therein.”159 Even then, resort to such speech by 
participants in an assembly does not, of itself, necessarily justify the dispersal of 
all persons participating in the event, and law-enforcement officials should take 
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measures (such as arrest) only against the particular individuals involved (either 
during or after the event).
97. Where the insignia, uniforms, emblems, music, flags, signs or banners to be dis-
played or played during an assembly conjure memories of a painful historical past, 
this should not, of itself, be reason to interfere with the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly to protect the rights of others.160 On the other hand, where such sym-
bols are intrinsically and exclusively associated with acts of physical violence, the 
assembly might legitimately be restricted to prevent the reoccurrence of such vi-
olence or to protect the rights of others.
98. The wearing of a mask for expressive purposes at a peaceful assembly should not 
be prohibited, so long as the mask or costume is not worn for the purpose of pre-
venting the identification of a person whose conduct creates probable cause for 
arrest and so long as the mask does not create a clear and present danger of im-
minent unlawful conduct.161
99. “Time, place and manner” restrictions: The types of restriction that might be 
imposed on an assembly relate to its “time, place, and manner”. This phrase origi-
nates from jurisprudence in the United States, and captures the sense that a wide 
spectrum of possible restrictions that do not interfere with the message communi-
cated is available to the regulatory authority (see “Proportionality” in paras. 39-45). 
In other words, rather than the choice between non-intervention and prohibition, 
the authorities have recourse to many “mid-range” limitations that might adequate-
ly serve the purpose(s) they seek to achieve (including the prevention of activity 
that causes damage to property or harm to persons). These limitations can relate 
to changes to the time or place of an event, or the manner in which the event is 
conducted. An example of “manner” restrictions might relate to the use of sound-
amplification equipment or lighting and visual effects. In this case, regulation may 
be appropriate because of the location or time of day for which the assembly is 
proposed.
100. The regulatory authority must not impose restrictions simply to pre-empt possible 
disorder or interference with the rights of others. The fact that restrictions can be 
imposed during an event (and not only before it takes place) enables the authorities 
to avoid imposing onerous prior restrictions and to ensure that restrictions corre-
spond with and reflect the situation as it develops. This, however, in no way implies 
that the authorities can evade their obligations in relation to good administration 
(see paras. 61-67) by simply regulating freedom of assembly by administrative fiat. 
Furthermore, (as discussed in paras. 134 and 157) the use of negotiation and/or me-
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diation can help resolve disputes around assemblies by enabling law-enforcement 
authorities and the event organizer to reach agreement on any necessary limitations.
101. “sight and sound”: Given that there are often a limited number of ways to effec-
tively communicate a particular message, the scope of any restrictions must be 
precisely defined. In situations where restrictions are imposed, these should strict-
ly adhere to the principle of proportionality and should always aim to facilitate the 
assembly within “sight and sound” of its object or target audience (see paras. 33, 
45 and 123).
102. restrictions imposed prior to an assembly (“prior restraints”): These are restric-
tions on freedom of assembly either enshrined in legislation or imposed by the 
regulatory authority prior to the date of the event provided in the notification. Such 
restrictions should be concisely drafted so as to provide clarity for both those who 
have to follow them (assembly organizers and participants) and those tasked with 
enforcing them (the police or other law-enforcement personnel).	They can take 
the form of time, place and manner restrictions or outright prohibitions. However, 
blanket legislative provisions, which ban assemblies at specific times or in particular 
locations, require much greater justification than restrictions on individual assem-
blies.162 Given the impossibility of taking account of the specific circumstances of 
each particular case, the incorporation of such blanket provisions in legislation, as 
well as their application, may be disproportionate unless a pressing social need can 
be demonstrated. As the European Court of Human Rights has stated, “[s]weeping 
measures of a preventive nature to suppress freedom of assembly and expression 
other than in cases of incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles 
– however shocking and unacceptable certain views or words used may appear 
to the authorities, and however illegitimate the demands made may be – do a dis-
service to democracy and often even endanger it.”163
103. The organizer of an assembly should not be compelled or coerced either to accept 
whatever alternative(s) the authorities propose or to negotiate with the authorities 
about key aspects, particularly the time or place, of a planned assembly. To require 
otherwise would undermine the very essence of the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly.
104. Prohibition of an assembly is a measure of last resort, only to be considered when a 
less restrictive response would not achieve the purpose pursued by the authorities 
in safeguarding other relevant interests. Given the state’s positive duty to provide 
adequate resources to protect peaceful assembly, prohibition may actually repre-
sent a failure of the state to meet its positive obligations. Where a state body has 
unlawfully prohibited an action, the state bears legal responsibility.
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105. Freedom of association and freedom of peaceful assembly: Since the right to as-
semble presumes the active presence of others for its realization, restrictions of 
freedom of association (Article 22 of the ICCPR and Article 11 of the ECHR) will 
often undermine the right to assemble. Freedom of association encompasses the 
ability of groups of individuals to organize collectively and to mobilize in protest 
against the state and/or other interests. Restrictions on the right to freedom of 
association that might undermine freedom of assembly include requiring formal 
registration before an association can lawfully assemble, prohibiting the activities 
of unregistered groups, prescribing the scope of an association’s mandate,164 reject-
ing registration applications, disbanding or prohibiting an association, or imposing 
onerous financial preconditions.
106. Like freedom of peaceful assembly, the right to associate is essential to the effective 
functioning of democracy and civil society, and such restrictions to the freedom 
of peaceful association can, therefore, rarely be justified. Furthermore, while the 
right to associate – within a political party, a trade union or other civic body – may 
logically precede the organization of public assemblies (see para. 53), the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly should never be made contingent upon registra-
tion as an association.165 As the European Court of Human Rights stated in Stankov	
and	the	United	Macedonian	Organisation	ILINDEN	v.	Bulgaria (2001) that “while 
past findings of national courts which have screened an association are undoubt-
edly relevant in the consideration of the dangers that its gatherings may pose, an 
automatic reliance on the very fact that an organization has been considered an-
ti-constitutional – and refused registration – cannot suffice to justify under Article 
11(2) of the Convention a practice of systematic bans on the holding of peaceful 
 assemblies”.166
107. indirect restrictions on freedom of assembly: Restrictions that have the effect 
of burdening freedom of assembly should not be imposed on other rights unless 
there is a compelling justification for doing so. It is noteworthy that restrictions 
imposed on other rights often indirectly impact upon the enjoyment of the right 
to freedom of peaceful assembly, and should, therefore, be taken into considera-
tion when assessing the extent to which a state has met its positive obligations to 
protect freedom of assembly.167 For example, restrictions on liberty and freedom 
of movement within the territory of a state (Article 12 of the ICCPR, Article 5 of the 
ECHR and Article 2 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR), and across international borders 
can prevent or seriously delay participation in an assembly.168 Similarly, restric-
tions that impact upon a state’s obligation to hold free elections (under Article 25 
of the ICCPR169 and Article 3, Protocol 1 of the ECHR) such as the detention of po-
litical activists or the exclusion of particular individuals from electoral lists,170 can 
also indirectly curtail the right to freedom of assembly.
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108. restrictions imposed during an assembly: The role of the police or other law-
enforcement personnel during an assembly will often be to enforce any prior 
restrictions imposed in writing by the regulatory body. No additional restrictions 
should be imposed by law-enforcement personnel unless absolutely necessary in 
light of demonstrably changed circumstances. On occasion, however, the situa-
tion on the ground may deteriorate (participants, for example, might begin using 
or inciting violence), and the authorities may have to impose further measures to 
ensure that other relevant interests are adequately safeguarded.	In the same way 
that reasons must be adduced to demonstrate the need for prior restrictions, any 
restrictions imposed in the course of an assembly must be just as rigorously justi-
fied. Mere suspicions will not suffice, and the reasons must be both relevant and 
sufficient. In such circumstances, it will be appropriate for other civil authorities 
(such as an ombudsman’s office) to have an oversight role in relation to the policing 
operation, and law-enforcement personnel should be accountable to an independ-
ent body. Furthermore, as noted in paras. 37 and 91, unduly broad discretionary 
powers afforded to law-enforcement officials may breach the principle of legali-
ty, given the potential for arbitrariness. The detention of participants during an 
assembly (on grounds that they have committed administrative, criminal or oth-
er offences) should meet a high threshold, given the right to liberty and security 
of person and the fact that any interference with freedom of assembly is inevita-
bly time sensitive. Detention should be used only in the most pressing situations, 
when failure to detain would result in the commission of serious criminal offences.
109. sanctions and penalties imposed after an assembly: The imposition of sanctions 
(such as prosecution) after an event may sometimes be more appropriate than the 
imposition of restrictions prior to or during an assembly. For example, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has held that prior restrictions imposed on the basis 
of the possibility of minor incidents of violence are likely to be disproportionate. 
Any isolated outbreak of violence should be dealt with by way of subsequent pros-
ecution or other disciplinary action instead of by prior restraint.171 It is noteworthy, 
however, that the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human 
Rights have on several occasions found subsequent sanctions to constitute dispro-
portionate interference with the right to freedom of assembly or expression.172 As 
with prior restraints, the principle of proportionality also applies to liability arising 
after the event. Any penalties specified in the law should, therefore, allow for the 
imposition of minor sanctions where the offence concerned is of a minor nature.
110. defences: Anyone charged with an offence relating to an assembly must enjoy the 
right to a fair trial. All provisions that create criminal or administrative liability must 
comply with the principle of legality (see paras. 35-38). Furthermore, organizers 
of and participants in assemblies should benefit from a “reasonable excuse” de-
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fence. For example, the organizer of an assembly should not face prosecution for 
either underestimating or overestimating the number of expected participants in 
an assembly if this estimate was made in good faith.	Similarly, a participant in an 
assembly should not be held liable for anything done under the direction of a law-
enforcement official173 or for taking part in an unlawful assembly if the participant 
was not aware of the unlawful nature of the event. Furthermore, if there are rea-
sonable grounds for non-compliance with the notification requirement, then no 
liability or sanctions should adhere.
111. Individual participants in any assembly who themselves do not commit any violent 
act should not be prosecuted, even if others in the assembly become violent or dis-
orderly. As stated in the decision in Ezelin	v.	France (1991),”[i]t is not ‘necessary’ 
in a democratic society to restrict those freedoms in any way unless the	person	in	
question has committed a reprehensible act when exercising his rights.”174
112. Organizers of assemblies should not be held liable for the failure to perform their 
responsibilities if they have made reasonable efforts to do so. Furthermore, organ-
izers should not be held liable for the actions of participants or third parties, or 
for unlawful conduct that the organizers did not intend or directly participate in. 
Holding the organizers of an event liable would be a manifestly disproportionate 
response, since this would imply that organizers are imputed to have responsibili-
ty for acts by other individuals (including possible agents	provocateurs) that could 
not have been reasonably foreseen.
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5. Procedural issues
Advance notification
113. It is not necessary under international human rights law for domestic legislation to 
require advance notification about an assembly. Indeed, in an open society, many 
types of assembly do not warrant any form of official regulation.175 Prior notifica-
tion should, therefore, only be required where its purpose is to enable the state to 
put in place necessary arrangements to facilitate freedom of assembly and to pro-
tect public order, public safety and the rights and freedoms of others.
114. The UN Human Rights Committee has held that a requirement to give prior notice 
of an assembly, while a de	facto restriction on freedom of assembly, is compati-
ble with the permitted limitations laid down in Article 21 of the ICCPR.176 Similarly, 
the European Commission on Human Rights stated in Rassemblement	Jurassien 
(1979) that: “Such a procedure is in keeping with the requirements of Article 11(1), 
if only in order that the authorities may be in a position to ensure the peaceful na-
ture of the meeting, and accordingly does not as such constitute interference with 
the exercise of the right.” 177
115. It is good practice to require notification only when a substantial number of par-
ticipants are expected or only for certain types of assembly. In some jurisdictions 
there is no notice requirement for small assemblies (see the extracts from the laws 
in Moldova and Poland, below), or where no significant disruption of others is rea-
sonably anticipated by the organizers (such as might require the redirection of 
traffic).178 Furthermore, individual demonstrators should not be required to provide 
advance notification to the authorities of their intention to demonstrate.179 Where 
a lone demonstrator is joined by another or others, the event should be treated as 
a spontaneous assembly (see paras. 126-131).
Article 3, Moldova’s Law on Public Assemblies (2008): definitions
“Assemblies	with	a	small	number	of	participants”	are	public	assemblies	
that	gather	less	than	50	persons.
Article 12(5), Moldova’s Law on Public Assemblies (2008): exceptions 
from notification
It	is	not	obligatory	to	notify	local	public	authorities	in	the	case	of	
assemblies	with	a	small	number	of	participants.
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Article 6, Poland’s Law on Assemblies (1990)
1.	Assemblies	organized	in	the	open	in	areas	accessible	to	unspecified	
individuals,	hereinafter	referred	to	as	“public	assemblies”,	must	be	
reported	in	advance	to	the	commune	authority	with	competence	
ratione	loci	for	the	site	of	the	assembly.
2.	If	the	assembly	is	to	be	held	in	the	neighbourhood	of	a	diplomatic	
representation/mission,	consular	offices,	special	missions	or	
international	organizations,	which	are	covered	by	diplomatic	
immunities	and	privileges,	the	commune	authority	is	obliged	to	notify	
the	responsible	Police	commander	and	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs.
3.	The	commune	council	may	specify	areas	where	the	organization	of	
an	assembly	does	not	require	notification.
116. Any notification process should not be onerous or bureaucratic, as this would 
undermine the freedom to assemble by discouraging those who might wish to 
hold an assembly. Furthermore, the period of notice should not be unnecessari-
ly lengthy (normally no more than a few days prior to the event), but should still 
allow adequate time for the relevant state authorities to plan and prepare (for ex-
ample, by deploying police officers, equipment, etc.),180 for the regulatory body to 
give a prompt official response to the initial notification, and for the completion of 
an expeditious appeal to a tribunal or court should the legality of any restrictions 
imposed be challenged. While laws may legitimately specify a minimum period of 
advance notification for an assembly, any maximum period for notification should 
not preclude advance planning for assemblies. When a certain time limit is set out 
in the law, it should only be indicative.
117. The official receiving the notice should issue a receipt, explicitly confirming that the 
organizers of the assembly are in compliance with applicable notice requirements 
(see the example from Moldova, below). The notice should also be communicat-
ed immediately to all state organs involved in the regulatory process, including the 
relevant law-enforcement agencies.
Article 10(3), Moldova’s Law on Public Assemblies (2008)
10(3)	The	local	public	administration	authority	shall	register	the	prior	
declaration	and	issue	to	the	organizer	a	stamped	copy,	which	should	
contain	the	number,	date	and	hour	of	registration	of	the	declaration.
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118. Notification, not authorization: Any legal provisions concerning advance noti-
fication should require the organizers to submit a notice of the intent to hold an 
assembly, but not a request for permission.181	A permit requirement is more prone 
to abuse than a notification requirement, and may accord insufficient value to the 
fundamental freedom to assemble and the corresponding principle that every-
thing not regulated by law should be presumed to be lawful. It is significant that, 
in a number of jurisdictions, permit procedures have been declared unconstitu-
tional.182
119. Nonetheless, a permit requirement based on a legal presumption that a permit 
for the use of a public place will be issued (unless the regulatory authorities can 
provide evidence to justify a denial) can serve the same purpose as advance noti-
fication.183 Those countries in which a permit is required are encouraged to amend 
domestic legislation so as to require only notification.184 Any permit system must 
clearly prescribe in law the criteria for issuance of a permit. In addition, the crite-
ria should be confined to considerations of time, place and manner, and should 
not provide a basis for content-based regulation. As emphasized in paragraphs 
94-98, the authorities must not deny the right to assemble peacefully simply be-
cause they disagree with the merits of holding an event for the organizers’ stated 
purpose.185
120. There should be provision in law that, in the event of a failure on the part of the au-
thorities to respond promptly to notification for an event, the organizers of a public 
assembly may proceed with the activities according to the terms provided in the 
notification without restriction (see the example from the Armenian law, below). 
Even in countries where authorization, rather than notification, is still required, au-
thorization should be presumed granted if a prompt response is not given.
Article 12, Armenia’s Law on conducting Meetings, Assemblies, 
rallies and demonstrations (2008)
1.	The	authorized	body	shall	consider	the	notification	within	72	hours	of	
receiving	it,	in	the	order	in	which	notifications	have	been	received.
…
8.	Should	the	authorized	body	not	issue	a	decision	prohibiting	the	
convention	of	the	mass	public	event	within	72	hours	of	receiving	the	
notification,	the	organizers	shall	have	the	right	to	conduct	the	mass	
public	event	on	the	terms	and	conditions	set	forth	in	the	notification.
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121. If more people than anticipated by the organizers gather at an assembly for which 
notification has been given, the relevant law-enforcement agencies should facili-
tate the assembly so long as the participants remain peaceful (see also Defences, 
in paras. 110-112).
122. simultaneous assemblies: All persons and groups have an equal right to be present 
in public places to express their views. Where notification is submitted for two or 
more assemblies for the same place and time, the events should be held together 
if they can be accommodated.186 If this is not possible (due, for example, to lack of 
space), the parties should be encouraged to engage in dialogue to find a mutually 
satisfactory resolution. Where such a resolution cannot be found, the authori-
ties may seek to resolve the issue by adopting a random method of allocating the 
events to particular locations, so long as this does not discriminate between differ-
ent groups. This may, for example, be a “first come, first served” rule, although the 
abuse of such a rule (where notification about an assembly is deliberately submit-
ted early to block access to other events) should not be allowed. The authorities 
may even hold a ballot to determine which assembly should be held in the loca-
tion provided in the notification (see the example from the law in Malta, below). 
A prohibition against conducting public events in the same place and at the same 
time of another public event where they can both be reasonably accommodated 
is likely to be a disproportionate response.
Article 5(3), Malta’s Public Meetings Ordinance (1931)
When	two	or	more	persons,	whether	as	individuals	or	on	behalf	of	an	
association,	simultaneously	give	notice	of	their	intention	of	holding	
a	meeting	in	the	same	locality	and	at	the	same	time,	preference	shall	
be	given	to	the	person	whose	name	is	extracted	in	a	draw	held	by	the	
Commissioner	of	Police	or	any	other	Police	officer	deputed	by	him.
123. counter-demonstrations: Persons have a right to assemble as counter-demon-
strators to express their disagreement with the views expressed at another public 
assembly.187 On such occasions, the coincidence in time and venue of the two assem-
blies is likely to be an essential part of the message to be conveyed by the second 
assembly. Such related simultaneous assemblies should be facilitated so that they 
occur within sight and sound of their target in so as far as this does not physically 
interfere with the other assembly (see paras. 33, 45 and 101).
124. Nonetheless, as clearly stated in the European Court of Human Rights case of 
Plattform	 ‘Ärzte	 für	das	Leben’	v.	Austria (1988), “the right to counter-demon-
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strate cannot extend to inhibiting the exercise of the right to demonstrate”.188 
Thus, because each person or group has a right to express their views undisrupt-
ed by others, counter-demonstrators may not disrupt the activities of those who 
do not share their views.	Emphasis should be placed on the state’s duty to pre-
vent disruption of the main event where counter-demonstrations are organized.189 
Furthermore, a clear question is raised where the intention of the organizers of a 
counter-demonstration is specifically to prevent the other assembly from taking 
place – effectively, to deny the rights of others. In such cases, Article 5 of the IC-
CPR and Article 17of the ECHR may be engaged, and the counter-demonstration 
will not enjoy the protection afforded according to the right to freedom of peace-
ful assembly (see para. 15).
exceptions from the notification process
125. It will be up to the legislature in each jurisdiction to determine whether there should 
be any specific exceptions from the notification process. Exceptions must not be 
discriminatory in effect and should be targeted towards a class of assembly rath-
er than a class of organizer.
126. spontaneous assemblies: A spontaneous assembly is generally regarded as one 
organized in response to some occurrence, incident, other assembly or speech, 
where the organizer (if there is one) is unable to meet the legal deadline for pri-
or notification, or where there is no organizer at all. Such assemblies often occur 
around the time of the triggering event, and the ability to hold them is important 
because delay would weaken the message to be expressed.190
127. While the term “spontaneous” does not preclude the existence of an organizer of 
an assembly, spontaneous assemblies may also include gatherings with no iden-
tifiable organizer. Such assemblies are coincidental and occur when a group of 
persons gathers at a particular location with no prior advertising or invitation. 
These are often the result of some commonly held knowledge or knowledge dis-
seminated via the Internet about a particular event (such as a visit by a foreign head 
of state).191 Numbers may be swelled by passers-by who choose to join the assem-
bly, although it is also possible that, once a crowd begins to gather, mobilization 
can be achieved by various forms of instantaneous communication (telephone, 
text message, word of mouth, the Internet, etc). Such communication should not, 
of itself, be interpreted as evidence of prior organization. Where a lone demon-
strator is joined by another or others, the gathering should be treated similarly to 
a spontaneous  assembly.
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Moldova’s Law on Public Assemblies (2008): 
Article 3, Main definitions
For	the	purposes	of	this	Law:	(…)	a	spontaneous	assembly	shall	mean	
an	assembly,	that	has	been	initiated	and	organized	as	a	direct	and	
immediate	response	to	social	events	and	which,	in	the	opinion	of	
participants,	cannot	be	postponed	and,	as	a	result,	for	which	the	usual	
notification	procedure	is	not	possible…
Article 12, exceptions from notification
(1)	In	the	cases	of	spontaneous	assemblies,	notification	is	allowed	
without	formal	written	conformation	or	within	the	provided	5	days	prior	
the	organization	of	the	assembly;	it	is	sufficient	to	communicate	the	
place,	data,	time,	scope	and	the	organizers
(2)	The	organizers	exercise	the	right	to	spontaneous	assembly	
provided	in	(1)	with	good-faith	and	inform	the	local	public	authorities	
immediately	about	their	intention	as	it	becomes	known	in	order	to	
facilitate	the	provision	of	the	necessary	services	by	the	local	public	
authorities.
Article 10(1), Armenia’s Law on conducting Meetings, Assemblies, 
rallies and demonstrations (2008)
With	the	exception	of	spontaneous	public	events,	mass	public	events	
may	be	conducted	only	after	notifying	the	authorized	body	in	writing.
section 6(2)(b), Northern ireland’s Public Processions Act (1998)
Where	notification	is	not	“reasonably	practicable”	notification	should	
be	given	“as	soon	as	it	is	reasonably	practicable.”
128. Spontaneous assemblies should be lawful and are to be regarded as an expectable 
(rather than exceptional) feature of a healthy democracy. Of course, the ability of 
the organizers of an assembly to meet a deadline for prior notification will depend 
on how early the deadline is set (and these requirements vary significantly among 
participating States). Laws regulating freedom of assembly should explicitly pro-
vide either for exemption from prior-notification requirements for spontaneous 
assemblies (where giving advance notice is impracticable) or for a shortened no-
tification period (whereby the organizer must notify the authorities as soon as is 
practicable). Such an exception would only apply in circumstances where an or-
ganizer is unable to meet the legally established deadline.192 It is appropriate that 
organizers should inform the authorities of their intention to hold an assembly as 
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early as possible. Only in this way can the authorities reasonably be expected to 
fulfil their positive obligations to protect the assembly, maintain public order and 
uphold the rights and freedoms of others.
129. The European Court of Human Rights has clarified what it considers should consti-
tute such “special circumstances” (i.e., when the right to hold spontaneous events 
may override the obligation to give prior notification). These circumstances arise	
“if an immediate response to a current event is warranted in the form of a demon-
stration. In particular, such derogation from the general rule may be justified if a 
delay would have rendered that response obsolete”.193
130. Whether a specific organizer was unable to meet the deadline for prior notifica-
tion or whether a delay in holding the assembly would have rendered its message 
obsolete are questions of fact and must be decided according to the particular 
circumstances of each case. For example, even within a sustained, long-running 
protest campaign (which might ordinarily suggest that timely notification would 
be possible) there may be events of urgent or special significance to which an im-
mediate response by way of a spontaneous assembly would be entirely justified.
131. Even where no such exemption for spontaneous assemblies exists in the law, the 
authorities should still protect and facilitate any spontaneous assembly so long as 
it is peaceful in nature. The European Court of Human Rights has stated that “a 
decision to disband such assemblies ‘solely because of the absence of the requisite 
prior notice, without any illegal conduct by the participants, amounts to a dispro-
portionate restriction on freedom of peaceful assembly’.”194
decision-making and review processes
132. The regulatory authority should make publicly available a clear explanation of the 
decision-making procedures. It should fairly and objectively assess all available in-
formation to determine whether the organizers and participants in an assembly 
for which they have received notification are likely to conduct the event in a peace-
ful manner and to ascertain the probable impact of the event on the rights and 
freedoms of non-participant stakeholders. In doing so, it may be necessary to fa-
cilitate meetings with the event organizers and other interested parties.
133. The regulatory authority should also ensure that any relevant concerns raised are 
communicated to the event organizers, who should be offered an opportunity to 
respond to any concerns raised. This is especially important if these concerns might 
later be cited as the basis for imposing restrictions on the event. Providing the organ-
izers with such information allows them the opportunity to address the concerns, 
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thus diminishing the potential for disorder and helping foster a co-operative, rath-
er than confrontational, relationship between the organizers and the authorities.
134. The organizers of an assembly, the designated regulatory authorities, law-enforce-
ment officials and other parties whose rights might be affected by an assembly 
should make every effort to reach mutual agreement on the time, place and manner 
of an assembly. If, however, agreement is not possible and no obvious resolution 
emerges, negotiation or mediated dialogue may help reach a mutually agreeable 
accommodation in advance of the date provided in the notification for the assem-
bly. Genuine dialogue between relevant parties can often yield a more satisfactory 
outcome for everyone involved than formal recourse to the law. The facilitation of 
negotiations or mediated dialogue can usually best be performed by individuals 
or organizations not affiliated with either the state or the organizer. The presence 
of these parties’ legal representatives may also assist in facilitating discussions be-
tween the organizers of the assembly and law-enforcement authorities. Such a 
dialogue is usually most successful in establishing trust between parties if it is be-
gun at the earliest possible opportunity. While not always successful, it serves as 
a preventive tool to help avoid the escalation of conflict or the imposition of arbi-
trary or unnecessary restrictions.
135. Any restrictions placed on an assembly should be communicated in writing to or-
ganizers of the event, with a brief explanation of the reason for each restriction 
(noting that these explanations must correspond with the permissible grounds en-
shrined in human rights law and as interpreted by the relevant courts). The burden 
of proof should be on the regulatory authority to show that the restrictions imposed 
are reasonable in the circumstances.195 Such decisions should also be communicat-
ed to the organizers within a reasonable time-frame – i.e., sufficiently in advance of 
the date of a proposed event to allow the decision to be appealed to an independ-
ent tribunal or court before the date provided in the notification for the event.
136. The regulatory authority should publish its decisions so that the public has access 
to reliable information about events taking place in the public domain. This might 
be done, for example, by posting decisions on a dedicated website.196
137. The organizers of an assembly should have recourse to an effective remedy through 
a combination of administrative and judicial review. The availability of effective ad-
ministrative review can both reduce the burden on courts and help build a more 
constructive relationship between the authorities and the public. Any administra-
tive review procedures must be sufficiently prompt to enable judicial review to take 
place once administrative remedies have been exhausted, prior to the date of the 
assembly provided in the notification.
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138. Ultimately, the organizers of an assembly should be able to appeal the decision of 
the regulatory authority to an independent court or tribunal. This should be a de	
novo review, empowered to quash the contested decision and to remit the case 
for a new ruling. The burden of proof and justification should remain on the regu-
latory authorities. Any such review must also be prompt, so that the case is heard 
and the court ruling published before the date for the planned assembly (see para. 
66). This makes it possible to hold the assembly if the court invalidates the restric-
tions.197 To expedite this process, the courts should be required to give priority to 
appeals concerning restrictions on assemblies. The law may also provide for the 
option of granting organizers injunctory relief. That is, in the case that a court is 
unable to hand down a final decision prior to the planned assembly, it should have 
the power to issue a preliminary injunction. The issuance of an injunction by the 
court in the absence of the possibility of a final ruling must necessarily be based 
on the court’s weighing of the consequences of such an issuance.
Article 14(2), Georgia’s	Law on Assemblage and Manifestations (1997, 
as amended 2009)
A	decision	of	a	local	governance	body	forbidding	the	holding	of	an	
assemblage	or	manifestation	may	be	appealed	in	a	court.	The	court	
shall	hand	down	a	final	decision	within	two	working	days.
Article 7, Kyrgyz republic’s Law on the right of citizens to Assemble 
Peacefully, without Weapons, and to Freely conduct Meetings and 
demonstrations (2002)
...	A	decision	of	bodies	of	local	State	administration	or	local	self-
government...	is	subject	to	court	appeal,	and	shall	be	considered	by	the	
court	within	24	hours	if	less	than	48	hours	remains	before	the	planned	
public	assembly.
139. The parties and the reviewing body should have access to the evidence on which 
the regulatory authority based its initial decision (such as relevant police reports, 
risk assessments or other concerns or objections raised). Only then can the propor-
tionality of the restrictions imposed be assessed fully. If such access is refused by 
the authorities, the parties should be able to obtain an expeditious judicial review 
of the decision to withhold the evidence.198 The disclosure of information enhanc-
es accessibility and transparency, as well as the prospects for the co-operative and 
early resolution of any contested issues.
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140. It is good practice for the regulatory authority to have a legal obligation to keep 
the regulatory framework under review and to make recommendations for its im-
provement. It is also good practice for the regulatory authority to submit an annual 
report on its activity (including relevant statistics on, for example, the number of 
assemblies for which it received notification and the number that were restricted) 
to an appropriate supervisory body, such as a national human rights institution, 
ombudsman or parliament.199 At the very least, the regulatory authority should 
publish annual statistics and make these accessible to the public.200
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introduction
141. Part I of these Guidelines focused on the parameters of freedom of assembly and 
the drafting of legislation consistent with international human rights standards. 
These earlier sections addressed the substantive grounds for restriction and the 
procedures that accord priority to the freedom to assemble. The implementation 
of freedom of assembly legislation, however, brings with it different challenges. 
If laws are to provide more than mere paper guarantees, and if rights are to be 
practical and effective rather than theoretical or illusory, the implementation by 
domestic law-enforcement agencies of laws relating to freedom of assembly must 
also meet exacting standards. These standards are the subject of this second sec-
tion.
142. The socio-economic, political and institutional context in which assemblies take 
place often impacts upon the success of steps taken to implement the law. It is vital 
to note, however, that the presence of certain socio-economic or political factors 
does not, of itself, make violence at public assemblies inevitable. Indeed, violence 
can often be averted by the skilful intervention of law-enforcement officials, munic-
ipal authorities and other stakeholders, such as monitors and stewards. Measures 
taken to implement freedom of assembly legislation should, therefore, neither un-
duly impinge on the rights and freedoms of participants or other third parties nor 
further aggravate already tense situations by being unnecessarily confrontation-
al. Such interventions must, instead, aim to minimize potential harm. The guiding 
principles outlined in chapter 3 (including non-discrimination and good adminis-
tration) are of particular relevance at the implementation stage.
143. Furthermore, the law-enforcement agencies and judicial system in participating 
States play a crucial role in the prevention of violence and the apprehension and 
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prosecution of offenders. It was often emphasized during the roundtable sessions 
that were part of the drafting of the first edition of these Guidelines that the inde-
pendence of both law-enforcement personnel and the judiciary from the influence 
of partisan interests or, in the particular case of the judiciary, from interference by 
the executive branch must be assured. Law-enforcement personnel in some juris-
dictions have, in the past, failed to intervene to protect peaceful assemblies. States 
are urged to implement measures (including policy-development and targeted re-
cruitment initiatives) to increase trust and confidence in the law-enforcement and 
justice systems.201
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6. Policing Public Assemblies
144. The diversification of protest tactics and new modes of communication undoubt-
edly present challenges for the policing of public assemblies. Nonetheless, the role 
of law-enforcement officials goes beyond recognizing the existence of fundamen-
tal rights and includes positively safeguarding those rights (see paras. 31-34 and 
104).202 This obligation derives from the state’s general duty to secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the ECHR.203
A human rights approach to policing
145. A human rights approach to policing assemblies first requires that the authorities 
consider their duty to facilitate the enjoyment of the right to freedom of peace-
ful assembly. The state has a positive duty to take reasonable and appropriate 
measures to enable peaceful assemblies to take place without participants fearing 
physical violence.204 More broadly, the state also has a positive obligation to pro-
tect the right to life (Article 6 of the ICCPR, Article 2 of the ECHR) and the right to 
freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 7 of the ICCPR, Article 3 
of the ECHR). These rights enshrine some of the most basic values protected by 
international human rights law, from which no derogation is permitted.205 The po-
licing of assemblies must also be informed by the principles of legality, necessity, 
proportionality and non-discrimination (see chapter 3).
146. The rights of law-enforcement personnel should be recognized: In the fulfilment 
of their obligation to protect human rights, law-enforcement personnel should 
plainly also pay regard to the rights, health and safety of police officers and other 
law-enforcement personnel. The nature of their job may place them in difficult and 
dangerous situations, in which they have to make split-second judgments based 
upon uncertain and rapidly evolving information. On occasion, law-enforcement 
officers may suffer the emotional, physical and behavioural consequences of post 
traumatic or critical-incident stress. In such cases, law-enforcement agencies should 
have recourse to skilled mental-health professionals to facilitate confidential indi-
vidual debriefings.206
Training
147. Governments must ensure that law-enforcement officials receive adequate train-
ing in the policing of public assemblies. Training should equip law-enforcement 
agencies to act in a manner that avoids escalation of violence and minimizes con-
flict, and should include “soft skills”, such as negotiation and mediation. Training 
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should also include relevant human rights issues207 and should cover the control 
and planning of policing operations, emphasizing the imperative of minimizing 
recourse to force to the greatest extent possible.208 In this way, training can help 
ensure that the culture and ethos of law-enforcement agencies adequately priori-
tizes a human-rights-centred approach to policing.
148. The UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, together with other 
relevant international human rights standards,209 should form the core of law-en-
forcement training. Domestic legislation should also provide standards that will 
guide the actions of law-enforcement personnel, and such provisions should be 
covered in the preparation and planning for major events. A “diversity awareness” 
perspective should be integrated into the development and implementation of law-
enforcement training, policy and practice.
extract from Osce Guidebook on democratic Policing (2008): Use of 
Force paragraph 72 (references omitted)
72.	Police	officers	should	be	trained	in	proficiency	standards	in	the	use	
of	force,	“alternatives	to	the	use	of	force	and	firearms,	including	the	
peaceful	settlement	of	conflict,	the	understanding	of	crowd	behaviour,	
and	the	methods	of	persuasion,	negotiation	and	mediation,	as	well	as	
technical	means,	with	a	view	to	limiting	the	use	of	force	and	firearms.”	
Practical	training	should	be	as	close	to	reality	as	possible.	Only	
officers	whose	proficiency	in	the	use	of	force	has	been	tested	and	who	
demonstrate	the	required	psychological	skills	should	be	authorized	to	
carry	guns.
extract from the european committee for the Prevention of Torture 
and inhuman or degrading Treatment or Punishment (cPT), 2nd 
General report: 210 Training of law enforcement personnel
59.	…	the	CPT	wishes	to	emphasise	the	great	importance	it	attaches	
to	the	training	of	law	enforcement	personnel	(which	should	include	
education	on	human	rights	matters	-	cf.	also	Article	10	of	the	United	
Nations	Convention	against	Torture	and	Other	Cruel,	Inhuman	or	
Degrading	Treatment	or	Punishment).	There	is	arguably	no	better	
guarantee	against	the	ill-treatment	of	a	person	deprived	of	his	liberty	
than	a	properly	trained	police	or	prison	officer.	Skilled	officers	will	be	
able	to	carry	out	successfully	their	duties	without	having	recourse	to	ill-
treatment	and	to	cope	with	the	presence	of	fundamental	safeguards	for	
detainees	and	prisoners.
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60.	In	this	connection,	the	CPT	believes	that	aptitude	for	interpersonal	
communication	should	be	a	major	factor	in	the	process	of	recruiting	
law	enforcement	personnel	and	that,	during	training,	considerable	
emphasis	should	be	placed	on	developing	interpersonal	communication	
skills,	based	on	respect	for	human	dignity.	The	possession	of	such	skills	
will	often	enable	a	police	or	prison	officer	to	defuse	a	situation	which	
could	otherwise	turn	into	violence,	and	more	generally,	will	lead	to	
a	lowering	of	tension,	and	raising	of	the	quality	of	life,	in	police	and	
prison	establishments,	to	the	benefit	of	all	concerned.
Policing assemblies – general principles of good practice
149. Law-enforcement agencies should be proactive in engaging with assembly organ-
izers: Officers should seek to send clear messages that inform crowd expectations 
and reduce the potential for conflict escalation.211 Furthermore, there should be a 
point of contact within the law-enforcement agency whom protesters can contact 
before or during an assembly. These contact details should be widely advertised.212
150. The policing operation should be characterized by a policy of “no surprises”: 
Law-enforcement officers should allow time for people in a crowd to respond as 
individuals to the situation they face, including any warnings or directions given to 
them.213
151. Law-enforcement command structures should be clearly established: Clear-
ly identifiable command structures and well-defined operational responsibilities 
enable proper co-ordination between law-enforcement personnel, and between 
law-enforcement agencies and the assembly organizers, as well as helping to en-
sure accountability for operational decisions.
152. Inter-agency communication should be ensured: It is imperative that law-en-
forcement officials and the representatives of regulatory authorities and other 
public-safety agencies (fire and ambulance services, for example) are able to com-
municate with one another and exchange data during public assemblies. As chapter 
7 emphasizes, it is also vital that the organizers of an assembly do everything with-
in their power to assist these agencies in responding to emergencies or criminal 
conduct. Thorough inter-agency contingency planning can help ensure that lines 
of communication are maintained.214
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153. Law-enforcement personnel should be clearly and individually identifiable: When 
in uniform, law-enforcement personnel must wear or display some form of iden-
tification (such as a nameplate or number) on their uniform and/or headgear and 
not remove or cover this identifying information or prevent persons from reading 
it during an assembly.
154. Intrusive anticipatory measures should not be used: Unless a clear and present 
danger of imminent violence actually exists, law-enforcement officials should not 
intervene to stop, search or detain protesters en route to an assembly.215
155. Powers to intervene should not always be used: The presence of police (or other 
law-enforcement) powers to intervene in or disperse an assembly, or to use force, 
does not mean that such powers should always be exercised to enforce the law. 
Where an assembly occurs in violation of applicable laws, but is otherwise peace-
ful, non-intervention or active facilitation may sometimes be the best way to ensure 
a peaceful outcome. In many cases, the dispersal of an event may create more law-
enforcement problems than its accommodation and facilitation, and overzealous 
or heavy-handed policing is likely to significantly undermine police-community re-
lationships. Furthermore, the policing costs of protecting freedom of assembly and 
other fundamental rights are likely to be significantly lower than the costs of polic-
ing disorder borne of repression. Post-event prosecution for violations of the law 
remains an option.
156. The response of law-enforcement agencies must be proportionate: A wide range 
of options are available to the relevant authorities, and their choice is not simply 
one between non-intervention or the enforcement of prior restrictions and termi-
nation or dispersal.
157. Using mediation or negotiation to de-escalate tensions during an assembly: If a 
stand-off or dispute arises during the course of an assembly, negotiation or me-
diated dialogue may be an appropriate means of trying to reach an acceptable 
resolution. As noted in paragraph 142, such interventions can significantly help 
avert the occurrence of violence. The Municipality of Warsaw, for example, de-
ploys civil servants with previous experience in dealing with assemblies who may 
be present at an assembly and who can facilitate communication between the 
organizers and law-enforcement officials.216 (See para. 134, regarding the use of 
negotiation and/or mediation to help resolve disputes in advance of assemblies).
158. Law-enforcement officials should differentiate between participants and non-
participants: The policing of public assemblies should be sensitive to the possible 
presence of “non-participants” (such as accidental bystanders or observers) in the 
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vicinity of an assembly.217 See, further, the discussion of “kettling”218 in paragraph 
160.
159. Law-enforcement officials should differentiate between peaceful and non-peace-
ful participants: Neither isolated incidents of sporadic violence nor the violent acts 
of some participants in the course of a demonstration are themselves sufficient 
grounds to impose sweeping restrictions on peaceful participants in an assembly.219 
Law-enforcement officials should not, therefore, treat a crowd as homogenous in 
detaining participants or (as a last resort) forcefully dispersing an assembly. 220 See, 
further, the discussion of “kettling” in paragraph 160.
160. strategies of crowd control that rely on containment (a tactic known in the 
United Kingdom as “kettling”) must only be used exceptionally: Such strategies 
tend to be indiscriminate, in that they do not distinguish between participants and 
non-participants, or between peaceful and non-peaceful participants. While it is un-
doubtedly the case that allowing some individuals to cross a police line while, at the 
same time, preventing others from doing so can exacerbate tensions, an absolute 
cordon permitting no egress from a particular area potentially violates individual 
rights to liberty and freedom of movement.221 As noted by the United Kingdom’s 
Joint Committee on Human Rights, “it would be a disproportionate and unlawful 
response to cordon a group of people and operate a blanket ban on individuals 
leaving the contained area, as this fails to consider whether individual circumstanc-
es require a different response”.222
section 108, district of columbia, United states, First Amendment 
rights and Police standards Act (2004)
Use of police lines
No	emergency	area	or	zone	will	be	established	by	using	a	police	line	
to	encircle,	or	substantially	encircle,	a	demonstration,	rally,	parade,	
march,	picket	line,	or	other	similar	assembly	(or	subpart	thereof)	
conducted	for	the	purpose	of	persons	expressing	their	political,	social,	
or	religious	views	except	where	there	is	probable	cause	to	believe	that	
a	significant	number	or	percentage	of	the	persons	located	in	the	area	
or	zone	have	committed	unlawful	acts	(other	than	failure	to	have	an	
approved	assembly	plan)	and	the	police	have	the	ability	to	identify	
those	individuals	and	have	decided	to	arrest	them;	provided,	that	this	
section	does	not	prohibit	the	use	of	a	police	line	to	encircle	an	assembly	
for	the	safety	of	the	demonstrators.
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161. Protocols for the stop and search, detention or arrest of participants should be 
established: It is of paramount importance that states establish clear and prospec-
tive protocols for the lawful stop and search or arrest of participants in assemblies. 
Such protocols should provide guidance as to when such measures are appropri-
ate and when they are not, how they should be conducted, and how individuals 
are to be dealt with following arrest. In drafting these protocols, regard should 
be paid to international jurisprudence concerning the rights to private and family 
life, to liberty and to freedom of movement. While mass arrests are to be avoid-
ed, there may be occasions involving public assemblies when numerous arrests 
are deemed necessary. However, large numbers of participants should not be de-
prived	of their liberty simply because the law-enforcement agencies do not have 
sufficient resources to effect individual arrests – adequate resourcing forms part of 
the positive obligation of participating States to protect the right to assemble (see 
paras. 31-34 and 104).223 The retention of fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA 
profiles of persons suspected but not convicted of offences must be strictly limit-
ed by law.224
162. detention conditions must meet minimum standards: Where individuals are de-
tained, the authorities must ensure adequate provision for first aid, basic necessities 
(water and food), the opportunity to consult with lawyers, and the separation of 
minors from adults, and male from female detainees. Detainees must not be ill-
treated while being held in custody.225 Where detention facilities are inadequate 
to deal with the number of individuals, arrested individuals must be freed, unless 
doing so would pose a threat to public safety. Procedures must be established to 
limit the duration of detention to a strict minimum.
163. Facilitating peaceful assemblies that do not comply with the requisite precondi-
tions or that substantially deviate from the terms of notification: If the organizers 
fail or refuses to comply with any requisite preconditions for the holding of an as-
sembly (including valid notice requirements and necessary and proportionate 
restrictions based on legally prescribed grounds), they might face prosecution. The 
European Court of Human Rights has stated that “a decision to disband” such as-
semblies “‘solely because of the absence of the requisite prior notice, without any 
illegal conduct by the participants, amounts to a disproportionate restriction on 
freedom of peaceful assembly”.226 Such events may include “flash mobs” (defined 
in note 39) the	raison	d’être of which demands an element of surprise that would 
be defeated by prior notification. Such assemblies should still be accommodated 
by law-enforcement authorities as far as possible. If a small assembly is scheduled 
to take place and, on the day of the event, turns into a significantly larger assembly 
because of an unexpectedly high turnout, the assembly should be accommodated 
by law-enforcement authorities and should be treated as being lawful so long as 
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it remains peaceful. As stated in Basic Standard 4 of Amnesty International’s “Ten 
Basic Human Rights Standards for Law Enforcement Officials”,227 law-enforce-
ment personnel should “[a]void using force when policing unlawful but non-violent 
 assemblies”.
164. Policing peaceful assemblies that turn into non-peaceful assemblies: Assemblies 
can change from being peaceful to non-peaceful and, thus, forfeit the protection 
afforded under human rights law (see paras. 25-28). Such assemblies may thus 
be terminated in a proportionate manner. However, the use of violence by a small 
number of participants in an assembly (including the use of inciteful language) 
does not automatically turn an otherwise peaceful assembly into a non-peaceful 
assembly, and any intervention should aim to deal with the particular individuals 
involved rather than dispersing the entire event.
165. dispersal of assemblies: So long as assemblies remain peaceful, they should not be 
dispersed by law-enforcement officials. Indeed, the dispersal of assemblies should 
be a measure of last resort and should be governed by prospective rules informed 
by international standards. These rules need not be elaborated in legislation but 
should be expressed in domestic law-enforcement guidelines, and legislation 
should require that such guidelines be developed. Guidelines should specify the 
circumstances that warrant dispersal and who is entitled to issue dispersal orders 
(for example, only police officers of a specified rank and above).
166. Dispersal should not occur unless law-enforcement officials have taken all reason-
able measures to facilitate and protect the assembly from harm (including by, for 
example, quieting hostile onlookers who threaten violence) and unless there is an 
imminent threat of violence.228
extract from section 107, district of columbia, United states, First 
Amendment rights and Police standards Act (2004): 
(d)	The	[police]	shall	not	issue	a	general	order	to	disperse	to	
participants	in	a[n]...	assembly	except	where:	
(1)	A	significant	number	or	percentage	of	the	assembly	participants	
fail	to	adhere	to	the	imposed	time,	place,	and	manner	restrictions,	
and	either	the	compliance	measures	set	forth	in	subsection	(b)	of	this	
section	have	failed	to	result	in	substantial	compliance	or	there	is	no	
reasonable	likelihood	that	the	measures	set	forth	in	subsection	(b)	of	
this	section	will	result	in	substantial	compliance;
(2)	A	significant	number	or	percentage	of	the	assembly	participants	are	
engaging	in,	or	are	about	to	engage	in,	unlawful	disorderly	conduct	or	
violence	toward	persons	or	property;	or
(3)	A	public	safety	emergency	has	been	declared	by	the	Mayor	that	
is	not	based	solely	on	the	fact	that	the	First	Amendment	assembly	is	
occurring,	and	the	Chief	of	Police	determines	that	the	public	safety	
concerns	that	prompted	the	declaration	require	that	the...	assembly	be	
dispersed.
(e)(1)	If	and	when	the	[police]	determines	that	a[n]...	assembly,	or	part
thereof,	should	be	dispersed,	the	[police]	shall	issue	at	least	one	clearly	
audible	and	understandable	order	to	disperse	using	an	amplification	
system	or	device,	and	shall	provide	the	participants	a	reasonable	and	
adequate	time	to	disperse	and	a	clear	and	safe	route	for	dispersal.
(2)	Except	where	there	is	imminent	danger	of	personal	injury	or	
significant	damage	to	property,	the	MPD	shall	issue	multiple	dispersal	
orders	and,	if	appropriate,	shall	issue	the	orders	from	multiple	
locations.	The	orders	shall	inform	persons	of	the	route	or	routes	by	
which	they	may	disperse	and	shall	state	that	refusal	to	disperse	will	
subject	them	to	arrest.
(3)	Whenever	possible,	MPD	shall	make	an	audio	or	video	recording	of	
orders	to	disperse.
167. Dispersal should not, therefore, result where a small number of participants in an 
assembly act in a violent manner. In such instances, action should be taken against 
those particular individuals.	Similarly, if agents	provocateurs infiltrate an otherwise 
peaceful assembly, the authorities should take appropriate action to remove the 
agents	provocateurs rather than terminating or dispersing the assembly or declar-
ing it to be unlawful (see paras. 131 and 163, regarding the facilitation of peaceful 
assemblies, even where the organizers have not complied with the requisite pre-
conditions established by law).
168. If dispersal is deemed necessary, the assembly organizers and participants should 
be clearly and audibly informed prior to any intervention by law-enforcement per-
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sonnel. Participants should also be given reasonable time to disperse voluntarily. 
Only if participants then fail to disperse may law-enforcement officials intervene 
further. Third parties (such as monitors, journalists and photographers) may also 
be asked to disperse, but they should not be prevented from observing and re-
cording the policing operation (see Chapter 8: Monitoring Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly and “Use of force”, in paras. 171-178).
169. Photography and video recording (by both law-enforcement personnel and par-
ticipants) should not be restricted, but data retention may breach the right to 
private life: During public assemblies the photographing or video recording of par-
ticipants by law-enforcement personnel is permissible. However, while monitoring 
individuals in a public place for identification purposes does not necessarily give 
rise to interference with their right to private life,229 the recording of such data and 
the systematic processing or permanent nature of the record created and retained 
might give rise to violations of privacy.230 Moreover, photographing or making video 
recordings of assemblies for the purpose of gathering intelligence can discourage 
individuals from enjoying the freedom to assemble and should, therefore, not be 
done routinely. The photographing or video recording of the policing operation by 
participants and other third parties should not be prevented, and any requirement 
to surrender film or digitally recorded images or footage to the law-enforcement 
agencies should be subject to prior judicial scrutiny.231 Law-enforcement agencies 
should develop and publish a policy related to their use of overt filming/photog-
raphy at public assemblies.232
170. Post-event debriefing of law-enforcement officials (particularly after non-routine 
events) should become standard practice: Debriefing might usefully address a 
number of specific issues, including human rights, health and safety, media safe-
ty, community impact, operational planning and risk assessment, communications, 
command and decision-making, tactics, resources and equipment, and future train-
ing needs. Event organizers should be invited to participate in debriefing sessions 
held by law-enforcement officials after the assembly.
Use of force
171. The inappropriate, excessive or unlawful use of force by law-enforcement au-
thorities can violate fundamental freedoms and protected rights, undermine 
police-community relationships, and cause widespread tension and unrest. The 
use of force should, therefore, be regulated by domestic law.233 Such provisions 
should set out the circumstances that justify the use of force (including the need 
to provide adequate prior warnings) as well as the level of force acceptable to deal 
with various threats.
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172. Governments should develop a range of means of response that enable a dif-
ferentiated and proportional use of force. These responses should include the 
development of non-lethal incapacitating weapons for use in appropriate situa-
tions. Moreover, law-enforcement officers ought to be provided with self-defence 
equipment, such as shields, helmets, fire-retardant clothing, and bullet-proof vests 
and transport in order to decrease the need for them to use weapons of any kind.234 
This, again, emphasizes the requirement that the state provide adequate resources 
for its law-enforcement agencies in satisfaction of its positive duty to protect free-
dom of peaceful assembly.
173. International standards give detailed guidance regarding the use of force in the 
context of dispersal of both unlawful, non-violent and unlawful, violent assemblies. 
The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials provide that “[i]n the dispersal of assemblies that are unlawful but non-
violent, law enforcement officials shall avoid the use of force or, where that is not 
practicable, shall restrict such force to the minimum extent necessary.”235 The UN 
Basic Principles also stipulate that “[i]n the dispersal of violent assemblies, law 
enforcement officials may use firearms only when less dangerous means are not 
practicable and only to the minimum extent necessary ….”236
174. The right to life (Article 6 of the ICCPR, Article 2 of the ECHR) covers not only in-
tentional killing, but also instances where the use of force results in the deprivation 
of life. Its protection entails “a stricter and more compelling test of necessity”, stip-
ulating that “the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of 
the permitted aims”.237 When assessing the use of force by law-enforcement offi-
cials, the European Court of Human Rights has applied the evidential standard, 
“beyond reasonable doubt”.238 The burden or proof “rests on the Government to 
demonstrate with convincing arguments that the use of force was not excessive”,239 
and “proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and con-
cordant inferences or similar unrebutted presumptions of fact… ”.240 What will be 
judged to be a reasonable action or reaction requires an objective and real-time 
evaluation of the totality of circumstances.241
175. The OSCE Guidebook	on	Democratic	Policing242 was published as a reference 
source for good policing practice and internationally adopted standards. The fol-
lowing reproduces those principles most closely related to the use of force in the 
context of freedom of peaceful assembly.
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extract from Osce Guidebook on democratic Policing (2008): Use of 
Force paras.9, 65-74 (references omitted)
9.	…	[D]emocratic	policing	requires	that	the	police	simultaneously	
stand	outside	of	politics	and	protect	democratic	political	activities	
and	processes	(e.g.	freedom	of	speech,	public	gatherings,	and	
demonstrations).	Otherwise,	democracy	will	be	threatened.
…
65.	Policing	in	a	democratic	society	includes	safeguarding	the	exercise	
of	democratic	activities.	Therefore,	police	must	respect	and	protect	the	
rights	of	freedom	of	speech,	freedom	of	expression,	association,	and	
movement,	freedom	from	arbitrary	arrest,	detention	and	exile,	and	
impartiality	in	the	administration	of	law.	“In	the	event	of	unlawful	but	
non-violent	assemblies,	law	enforcement	officials	must	avoid	the	use	of	
force	or,	where	this	is	not	possible,	limit	its	use	to	the	minimum	…”
66.	In	dispersing	violent	assemblies,	firearms	may	be	used	only	when	
less	dangerous	means	prove	ineffective	and	when	there	is	an	imminent	
threat	of	death	or	of	serious	injury.	“Firing	indiscriminately	into	a	violent	
crowd	is	never	a	legitimate	or	acceptable	method	of	dispersing	it.”
67.	The	police	must	have	as	their	highest	priority	the	respect	for	and	the	
protection	of	life.	This	principle	has	particular	applications	for	the	use	
of	force	by	police.
68.	While	the	use	of	force	is	often	indispensable	to	proper	policing	–	
in	preventing	a	crime	or	in	effecting	or	assisting	in	the	lawful	arrest	of	
offenders	or	suspected	offenders	police	officers	must	be	committed	to	
the	principle	that	the	use	of	force	must	be	considered	as	an	exceptional	
measure,	which	must	not	be	executed	arbitrarily,	but	must	be	
proportionate	to	the	threat,	minimizing	damage	and	injury,	and	used	
only	to	the	extent	required	to	achieve	a	legitimate	objective.
69.	Law	enforcement	officials	may	not	use	firearms	or	lethal	force	
against	persons	except	in	the	following	cases:	to	act	in	legitimate	“self-
defence	or	the	defence	of	others	against	the	imminent	threat	of	death	or	
serious	injury;	to	prevent	the	perpetration	of	a	particularly	serious	crime	
involving	grave	threat	to	life;	to	arrest	a	person	presenting	such	a	danger	
and	resisting	their	authority;	or	to	prevent	his	or	her	escape,	and	only	
when	less	extreme	means	are	insufficient	to	achieve	these	objectives.	In	
any	event,	intentional	lethal	use	of	firearms	may	only	be	made	when	
strictly	unavoidable	in	order	to	protect	life.”70.	If	forced	to	use	firearms,	
“ law	enforcement	officials	shall	identify	themselves	as	such	and	give	a	
clear	warning	of	their	intent	to	use	firearms,	with	sufficient	time	for	the
warning	to	be	observed,	unless	to	do	so	would	unduly	place	the	law	
enforcement	officials	at	risk	or	would	create	a	risk	of	death	or	serious	
harm	to	other	persons,	or	would	be	clearly	inappropriate	or	pointless	in	
the	circumstances	of	the	incident.”
71.	Law	enforcement	officials	must	ensure	that	assistance	and	medical	
aid	are	rendered	to	any	injured	or	affected	person	at	the	earliest	
possible	moment	and	that	relatives	or	close	friends	of	the	injured	or	
affected	person	are	notified	at	the	earliest	possible	moment.
…
73.	In	every	instance	in	which	a	firearm	is	discharged,	a	report	should	be	
made	promptly	to	the	competent	authorities.	(See	also	paragraph	89.)
74.	The	disproportionate	use	of	force	has	to	be	qualified	as	a	criminal	
offence.	Instances	of	the	use	of	force	must	therefore	be	investigated	to	
determine	whether	they	met	the	strict	guidelines…
176. The following principles should underpin all occasions when force is used in the 
policing of public assemblies: 
 •  Where pepper spray or other irritant chemicals may be used, decontamina-
tion procedures must be set out;243
 •  The use of attenuated energy projectiles (AEPs), baton rounds or plastic/rub-
ber bullets, water cannon and other forceful methods of crowd control must 
be strictly regulated;244
 •  Under no circumstances should force be used against peaceful demonstra-
tors who are unable to leave the scene; and
 •  The use of force should trigger an automatic and prompt review process after 
the event. It is good practice for law-enforcement officials to maintain a written 
and detailed record of force used (including weapons deployed).245 Moreo-
ver, where injuries or deaths result from the use of force by law-enforcement 
personnel, an independent, open, prompt and effective investigation must be 
established (see, Liability and accountability in paras. 179-184).
177. It is vital that governments and law-enforcement agencies keep the ethical issues 
associated with the use of force, firearms and emerging technologies constantly 
under review.246 Standards concerning the use of firearms are equally applicable 
to the use of other potentially harmful techniques of crowd management, such as 
batons, horses, tear gas or other chemical agents, and water cannon.
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section 15(2), hungary’s Act XXXiV on the Police (1994): 
Of	several	possible	and	suitable	options	for	Police	measures	or	means	
of	coercion,	the	one	which	is	effective	and	causes	the	least	restriction,	
injury	or	damage	to	the	affected	person	shall	be	chosen.
extract from: United states department of Justice Principles for 
Promoting Police247
Policing	requires	that	at	times	an	officer	must	exercise	control	of	a	
violent,	assaultive,	or	resisting	individual	to	make	an	arrest,	or	to	
protect	the	officer,	other	officers,	or	members	of	the	general	public	from	
a	risk	of	imminent	harm.	Police	officers	should	use	only	an	amount	of	
force	that	is	reasonably	necessary	to	effectively	bring	an	incident	under	
control,	while	protecting	the	lives	of	the	officers	and	others.[…]When	
the	use	of	force	is	reasonable	and	necessary,	officers	should,	to	the	
extent	possible,	use	an	escalating	scale	of	options	and	not	employ	more	
forceful	means	unless	it	is	determined	that	a	lower	level	of	force	would	
not	be,	or	has	not	been,	adequate.	The	levels	of	force	that	generally	
should	be	included	in	the	agency’s	continuum	of	force	include:	verbal	
commands,	use	of	hands,	chemical	agents,	baton	or	other	impact	
weapon,	canine,	less-than-lethal	projectiles,	and	deadly	force.
178. Public-order policies and training programmes should be kept under review 
to incorporate lessons learnt, and regular refresher courses should be provid-
ed to law-enforcement officials. These standards should be circulated as widely 
as possible, and monitoring of their implementation should be performed by an 
independent overseer, with investigative powers to compel witnesses and docu-
mentation and who publishes periodic reports.
Liability and accountability
179. Law-enforcement officials should be liable for any failure to fulfil their positive 
obligations to protect and facilitate the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 
Moreover, liability should also extend to private agencies or individuals acting on 
behalf of the state; the European Court of Human Rights has stated that “the ac-
quiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in the acts of 
private individuals which violate the Convention rights of other individuals with-
in its jurisdiction may engage that State’s responsibility under the Convention”.248
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180. The compliance of law-enforcement officials with international human rights stand-
ards should be closely monitored.249 It is good practice for an independent oversight 
mechanism to review and report on any large-scale or contentious policing opera-
tion relating to public assemblies. In Northern Ireland, for example, human rights 
experts from the police-oversight body (the Policing Board) have routinely mon-
itored all elements of police operations related to controversial assemblies.250 A 
police-complaints mechanism should be established where none exists, with a 
range of potential resolutions at its disposal. In certain cases, there may also be a 
monitoring role for the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 251
181. Where a complaint is received regarding the conduct of law-enforcement officials 
or where a person is seriously injured or is deprived of his or her life as a result of 
the actions of law-enforcement officers, an “effective official investigation” must 
be conducted.252 The core purpose of any investigation should be to secure the 
effective implementation of domestic laws that protect the right to life and bod-
ily integrity, and in those cases involving state agents or entities, to ensure their 
accountability for deaths or physical injuries occurring under their responsibility. 
The particular form of investigation required to achieve those purposes may vary 
according to the circumstances.253
182. If the force used is not authorized by law or more force was used than necessary in 
the circumstances, law-enforcement officers should face civil and/or criminal liabil-
ity, as well as disciplinary action. The relevant law-enforcement personnel should 
also be held liable for failing to intervene where such intervention may have pre-
vented other officers from using excessive force.
183. An applicant complaining of a breach of the right to life need only show that the 
authorities did not do all that could reasonably be expected in the circumstances 
to avoid the risk.254 Where allegations are made against law-enforcement officials 
in relation to inhuman or degrading treatment or torture, the European Court of 
Human Rights will conduct “a particularly thorough scrutiny even if certain domes-
tic proceedings and investigations have already taken place”.255
184. Specific definitions of terms such as “self defence” – subject to important qualifi-
cations (such as a reasonableness test, and requirements that an attack was actual 
or imminent and that there was no other less forceful response available) – should 
be contained in domestic criminal law.
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Paragraph 21.2 of the Moscow Meeting of the conference on the 
human dimension of the csce, 1991
(OSCE)	participating	States	are	urged	to	‘ensure	that	law	enforcement	
acts	are	subject	to	judicial	control,	that	law	enforcement	personnel	are	
held	accountable	for	such	acts,	and	that	due	compensation	may	be	
sought,	according	to	domestic	law,	by	the	victims	of	acts	found	to	be	in	
violation	of	the	above	commitments.’
Paragraph 7 of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law enforcement Officials
‘[G]overnments	shall	ensure	that	the	arbitrary	or	abusive	use	of	force	
and	firearms	by	law	enforcement	officials	is	punished	as	a	criminal	
offence	under	their	law.’256
extract from report of the special commission of experts on the 
demonstrations, street riots and Police Measures in september-
October 2006, in Budapest, hungary (February 2007) at p.11
The	Commission	recommends	that	the	Government	draft	a	bill	that	
ensures	the	possibility	of	legal	remedy	in	case	of	unlawful	riot	control	
actions	or	in	case	police	officers,	acting	individually	or	in	groups,	
infringe	the	requirement	of	proportionality.
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7. responsibilities of the Organizer
The organizer
185. The organizer is the person or persons with primary responsibility for the assembly. 
It is possible to define the organizer as the person in whose name prior notifica-
tion is submitted. As noted in paragraph 127, it is also possible for an assembly not 
to have any identifiable organizer.
Article 5, Montenegro’s Public Assembly Act (2005)
The	organizer	of	a	peaceful	assembly	is	any	legal	or	physical	entity	
(henceforth	referred	to	as:	the	organizer)	which,	in	line	with	this	Act,	
organizes,	holds	and	supervises	the	peaceful	assembly.	Peaceful	
assembly	under	paragraph	1	of	this	article	can	also	be	organized	by	a	
group	of	citizens,	or	more	than	one	legal	entity.
186. Organizers of assemblies should co-operate with law-enforcement agencies to en-
sure that participants in their assemblies comply with the law and the terms of any 
submitted notification. There should be clarity as to who precisely is involved in 
the organization of any assembly, and it can be assumed that the official organizer 
is the person or persons in whose name prior notification is submitted. This need 
not be a legal entity and could, for example, be a committee of individuals or an 
informal organization (see also paras. 53 and 105-106).257
ensuring the peaceful nature of an assembly – principles of good practice
187. Pre-event planning with law-enforcement officials: Where possible, it is good 
practice for the organizer(s) to agree with the law-enforcement officials about what 
security and public-safety measures are being put in place prior to the event. Such 
discussions can, for example, cover stewarding arrangements (see paras. 191-196) 
and the size, positioning and visibility of the police deployment. Discussions might 
also focus upon contingency plans for specific locations (such as monuments, trans-
port facilities or hazardous sites) or upon particular concerns of the police or the 
organizer(s). For example, the organizer may fear that a heavy police presence in 
a particular location would be perceived by participants as unnecessarily confron-
tational, and might thus request that the police maintain a low visibility.
Article 30, slovenia’s Act on Public Assembly (2004)
Police assistance
When	as	regards	the	nature	of	the	gathering	or	event	or	as	regards	
the	circumstances	in	which	the	gathering	or	event	is	held	…	there	
exists	a	possibility	that	police	measures	will	be	necessary,	the	police,	
in	agreement	with	the	organizer,	shall	determine	the	number	of	police	
officers	necessary	for	assisting	in	the	maintenance	of	the	public	order	
at	the	gathering	or	event.	In	the	event	of	such,	the	ranking	police	
officer	shall	come	to	an	agreement	with	the	leader	on	the	method	of	co-
operation.
In	the	instances	specified	in	the	previous	paragraph,	the	organizer	
of	the	gathering	or	event	is	obliged	also	to	co-operate	with	the	police	
regarding	the	planning	of	measures	for	the	maintenance	of	order	at	the	
gathering	or	event.
188. An example of legislation from outside the OSCE region, in South Africa, provides 
a useful model of good practice, in that it specifically requires a signed contract 
detailing the duties and responsibilities of both the police and the demonstrators.
south Africa’s regulation of Gatherings Act, No 205 (1993)
The	Act	states	that	the	peaceful	exercise	of	the	right	to	assemble	is	
the	joint	responsibility	of	the	convenor	(organiser)	of	the	event,	an	
authorised	member	of	the	police	and	a	responsible	officer	of	the	local	
authority.	Together,	these	three	parties	form	a	‘safety	triangle’	with	
joint	responsibility	for	ensuring	order	and	safety	at	public	events.	The	
success	of	the	safety	triangle	is	based	upon	collective	planning	and	co-
ordination	between	the	three	parties	and	a	willingness	to	negotiate	and	
compromise	where	disputes	arise.258
189. risk Assessment: Organizers – in co-operation with relevant law-enforcement and 
other agencies (such as fire and ambulance services) – should consider what risks 
are presented by their assembly and how they would deal with them should they 
materialize. The imposition by law of mandatory risk assessments for all open-air 
public assemblies would, however, create an unnecessarily bureaucratic and com-
plicated regulatory regime that would unjustifiably deter groups and individuals 
from enjoying their freedom of peaceful assembly.
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190. responsibility to obey the lawful directions of law-enforcement officials: The law 
on assemblies might legitimately place organizers (as well as participants) under a 
duty to obey the lawful orders of law-enforcement officials. Refusal to do so may 
entail liability (see paras. 197-198).
stewarding assemblies
191. Stewards and marshals (the terms are often used interchangeably) are individuals 
who assist the organizers of an assembly in managing the event.259 Laws governing 
freedom of assembly may provide for the possibility of organizers being assisted by 
volunteer stewards. For example, while the police may have overall responsibility 
for public order, organizers of assemblies are encouraged to deploy stewards dur-
ing the course of a large or controversial assembly. Stewards are persons, working 
in co-operation with the assembly organizers, with a responsibility to facilitate the 
event and help ensure compliance with any lawfully imposed restrictions.
192. Stewards do not have the powers of law-enforcement officials and cannot use 
force, but should rather aim to obtain the co-operation of assembly participants 
by means of persuasion. Their presence can provide reassurance to the public and 
help set the mood of an event. The primary role of stewards is to orient the pub-
lic and provide it with explanations and information to identify potential risks and 
hazards before and during an assembly. In cases of public disorder, the stewards 
(and organizers) should have the responsibility to promptly inform the relevant law-
enforcement officials. Law-enforcement agencies should work in partnership with 
event stewards, and each must have a clear understanding of their respective roles.
193. Training, briefing and debriefing: Stewards should receive appropriate training 
and a thorough briefing before the assembly takes place (in particular, stewards 
should be familiar with the geography of the area in which the assembly is being 
held), and it is the responsibility of the organizers to co-ordinate the stewarding 
operation. For larger events, a clear hierarchy of decision-making should be estab-
lished and stewards must be able to communicate with one another and with the 
organizers at all times during an assembly. As with law-enforcement officials (see 
para. 170), it is important that stewards – together with the event organizers – hold 
a thorough post-event debriefing and evaluation after any non-routine assembly.
194. identification: It is desirable that stewards be clearly identifiable (e.g., through the 
wearing of special bibs, jackets, badges or armbands).
195. requirement to steward certain assemblies: Under some circumstances, it may 
be legitimate to impose on organizers the condition that they arrange a certain 
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level of stewarding for their gathering. However, such a condition should only be 
imposed as the result of a specific assessment and never by default. Otherwise, 
it would likely violate the proportionality principle.260 Any requirement to provide 
stewarding in no way detracts from the positive obligation of the state to provide 
adequately resourced policing arrangements. Stewards are not a substitute for the 
adequate presence of law-enforcement personnel and law-enforcement agencies 
must still bear overall responsibility for public order. Nonetheless, efficient stew-
arding can help reduce the need for a heavy police or military presence at public 
assemblies.
196. In some jurisdictions, it is commonplace for professional stewards or private securi-
ty firms to be contracted and paid to provide stewarding for assemblies. However, 
there should never be a legal obligation upon organizers to pay for stewarding ar-
rangements. To impose such a cost burden would seriously erode the essential 
essence of freedom of assembly and undermine the core responsibility of the state 
to provide adequate policing.
Liability
197. Organizers and stewards have a responsibility to make reasonable efforts to com-
ply with legal requirements and to ensure that their assemblies are peaceful, but 
they should not be held liable for failure to perform their responsibilities if they 
made reasonable efforts to do so. The organizers should not be liable for the ac-
tions of individual participants or of stewards not acting in accordance with the 
terms of their briefing.261 Instead, individual liability should arise for any steward 
or participant if they commit an offence or fail to carry out the lawful directions of 
law-enforcement officials.
198. The organizers may wish to take out public-liability insurance for their event. In-
surance, however, should not be made a condition of freedom of assembly, as any 
such requirement would have a disproportionate and inhibiting effect on the en-
joyment of the freedom of assembly. Moreover, if an assembly degenerates into 
serious public disorder it is the responsibility of the state – not the organizers or 
event stewards – to limit the damage caused. In no circumstances should the or-
ganizers of a lawful and peaceful assembly be held liable for disruption caused to 
others.
8. Monitoring Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
199. The right to observe public assemblies is part of the more general right to receive 
information (a corollary of the right to freedom of expression).262 In this regard, 
the safeguards guaranteed to the media are particularly important.263 However, 
freedom to monitor public assemblies should not only be guaranteed to all media 
professionals264 but also to others in civil society, such as human rights activists, 
who might be regarded as performing the role of social watchdogs and whose aim 
is to contribute to informed public debate.265
200. The monitoring of public assemblies provides a vital source of independent infor-
mation on the activities of both participants and law-enforcement officials that may 
be used to inform public debate and serve as the basis for dialogue between state 
and local authorities, law-enforcement officials and civil society.
independent monitors
201. For the purposes of these Guidelines, monitors are defined as non-participant 
third-party individuals or groups whose primary aim is to observe and record the 
actions and activities taking place at public assemblies. Independent monitoring 
may be carried out by local NGOs, human rights defenders,266 domestic ombuds-
man offices or national human rights institutions; or by international human rights 
organizations (such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International) or intergov-
ernmental networks (such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE or the UN Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights).267 Such individuals and groups should, 
therefore, be permitted to operate freely in the context of monitoring freedom of 
assembly.
202. Monitoring public assemblies can be a difficult task, and the precise role of moni-
tors will depend on why, and by whom, they have been deployed.268 Monitors may, 
for example, be tasked with focusing on particular aspects of an assembly, such as: 
 •  The policing of an assembly (to consider whether the state is fulfilling its pos-
itive obligations under human rights law);
 •  Whether parties adhere to a prior agreement about how an assembly is to be 
conducted;
 •  Whether any additional restrictions are imposed on an assembly during the 
course of the event;
 •  Any instances of violence or use of force, by participants or by law-enforce-
ment personnel;
 •  The interaction between participants in an assembly and an opposing assem-
bly; and
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 •  The conduct of participants in a moving assembly that passes a sensitive lo-
cation.
203. Monitors will usually write up the findings of their observations in a report, and 
this may be used to highlight issues of concern to the state authorities. The report 
can thus serve as the basis for dialogue and engagement on such matters as the 
effectiveness of the current law and the extent to which the state is respecting its 
positive obligations to protect freedom of peaceful assembly. Monitoring reports 
may also be used to engage with the relevant law-enforcement agencies or with the 
municipal authorities and might highlight areas where further training, resources 
or equipment may be needed.
204. Independent monitoring reports may also be a useful resource for informing inter-
national bodies, such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the United Nations, 
of the level of respect and protection for human rights in a particular country (see 
Appendix A, Enforcement of international human rights standards).
205. ODIHR has developed a training programme for monitoring freedom of assembly 
that has been used to support the work of human rights defenders in a number of 
countries in Europe and Central Asia. ODIHR has also developed a handbook for 
monitoring freedom of assembly that further elaborates on the theory and prac-
tice of independent monitoring.269 The following section, which is drawn from the 
training pack, highlights some of the ethical issues for monitors.
Principles and standards in Monitoring
Monitoring	is	an	ethically	based	activity	that	aims	to	increase	protection	
of,	and	respect	for	human	rights.	Monitors	have	to	work	to	high	standards	
to	ensure	that	their	observations	and	reports	are	respected	and	can	stand	
scrutiny.	The	following	principles	have	been	drawn	from	the	experiences	of	
monitors	working	in	a	diverse	range	of	contexts	and	environments
1.	 	Monitoring	is	a	tool	to	defend	and	protect	human	rights	and	monitors	
should	respect	the	human	rights	of	all	parties.	Monitors	should	adhere	
to	the	principle	of	‘do	no	harm’.
2.	 	Monitors	must	show	respect	for	the	law.	They	should	obey	the	lawful	in-
structions	from	the	police	and	emergency	services.	Monitors	should	also	
bear	in	mind	that	the	witnessing	of	illegal	activities	(by	the	police,	demon-
strators	or	others)	might	require	them	to	give	evidence	at	a	later	date.
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3.	 	Monitors	must	maintain	their	independence	throughout	the	process.	
Monitors	should	ensure	their	independence	is	not	compromised	by	their	
location,	dress	or	demeanour.	They	should	not	actively	participate	in	a	
demonstration	/	picket	/	protest.	Monitors	may	introduce	themselves	to	
participants	but	should	not	voice	opinions	on	events	and	activities
4	.	 	Monitors	should	remain	neutral.	Monitors	are	citizens,	with	their	own	
rights	and	responsibilities,	however,	when	monitoring	it	is	important	to	
maintain	a	neutral	position.	Monitors	should	not	advise	parties	on	the	
ground	or	voice	opinions	about	the	actions	of	any	party.
5	.	 	The	work	of	monitors	should	be	visible.	They	should	have	a	form	of	
identification	available	at	all	times.	Monitoring	is	a	transparent	and	
open	practice	and	it	is	hoped	that	the	visible	presence	of	monitors	will	
have	a	positive	impact	on	respect	for	human	rights	and	deter	acts	of	
aggression	and	violence.
6	.	 	Monitors	will	generally	work	as	part	of	a	team.	They	should	have	an	
agreed	plan	of	action,	a	chain	of	command,	and	an	agreed	means	of	
communication	with	other	team	members.	They	should	have	an	agreed	
public	location	(café,	train	station,	etc.)	for	rendezvous	after	the	event.
7	.	 	Monitors	should	be	mindful	of	their	own	safety.	Monitors	should	ideally	
work	in	pairs	(although	this	is	not	always	necessary	or	practical)	and	at	
times	it	may	be	necessary	for	monitors	to	withdraw	from	a	location	or	
from	public	space	entirely	if	they	have	concerns	for	their	personal	safety.
8.	 	Despite	the	provisos	specified	above,	monitors	should	also	remember	
their	social	responsibilities	as	citizens	and	there	may	be	times	when	
an	individual	may	consider	it	necessary	to	intervene	in	a	particular	
situation.	The	monitoring	team	should	discuss	such	eventualities	as	part	
of	its	general	preparation.
9	.	 	Monitors	should	never	act	in	a	way	that	will	discredit	the	larger	
monitoring	team.	Monitors	should	never	consume	alcohol	or	other	
illegal	drugs	or	substances	before	or	during	events.
10	.	 	Monitors	should	not	offer	any	formal	opinions	to	the	media	or	other	
agencies	during	the	assembly.	Any	comments	should	be	limited	to	
identification	of	their	role	as	independent	human	rights	monitors.
11	.	 	The	monitoring	team	should	verbally	debrief	as	soon	as	possible	at	
the	end	of	an	event.	Written	reports	should	ideally	be	prepared	within	
twenty-four	hours	of	the	end	of	an	event	from	notes	made	at	the	time.
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12	.	 	Monitors	reports	should	be	accurate	and	impartial.	Monitors	should	
ensure	that	their	reports	are	based	on	what	they	have	seen	and	heard.	
They	must	resist	any	efforts	to	influence	their	report.	They	should	not	
report	hearsay.
Media
206. The media perform a pre-eminent role in a state governed by the rule of law. The 
role of the media as public watchdogs is to impart information and ideas on mat-
ters of public interest – information that the public also has a right to receive. 270
207. Media professionals, therefore, have an important role to play in providing inde-
pendent coverage of public assemblies. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of 
the Media has noted that “uninhibited reporting on demonstrations is as much a 
part of the right to free assembly as the demonstrations are themselves the exer-
cise of the right to free speech”.271
208. Furthermore, “[a]ssemblies, parades and gatherings are often the only means that 
those without access to the media may have to bring their grievances to the atten-
tion of the public.”272 Media reports and footage thus provide an important element 
of public accountability, both for organizers of events and law-enforcement offi-
cials. As such, the media must be given full access by the authorities to all forms of 
public assembly and to the policing operations mounted to facilitate them.
Article 17, Moldova’s Law on Public Assemblies (2008): Observance of 
Assemblies
(1)	Any	person	can	make	video	or	audio	recording	of	the	assembly.
(2)	Access	for	the	press	is	ensured	by	the	organizers	of	the	assembly	
and	by	the	public	authorities.
(3)	Seizure	of	technical	equipment,	as	well	as	of	video	and	audio	
recordings	of	assemblies,	is	only	possible	in	accordance	with	the	law.
209. There have, however, been numerous instances where journalists have been restrict-
ed from reporting at public assemblies and occasions on which journalists have been 
detained and/or had their equipment damaged.273 As a result, the OSCE Represent-
ative on Freedom of the Media issued a special report on handling the media during 
political demonstrations; the following excerpt highlights its recommendations.274
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Osce representative on Freedom of the Media, special report: 
handling of the media during political demonstrations, Observations 
and recommendations (June 2007)
There	have	been	a	number	of	instances	recently	where	journalists	have	
received	particularly	harsh	treatment	at	the	hands	of	law-enforcers	
while	covering	public	demonstrations.	This	has	highlighted	the	need	
to	clarify	the	modus	operandi	of	both	law	enforcement	agencies	and	
journalists	at	all	public	events,	in	order	that	the	media	is	able	to	provide	
coverage	without	hindrance.
Both	law-enforcers	and	journalists	have	special	responsibilities	at	a	
public	demonstration.	Law-enforcers	are	responsible	for	ensuring	that	
citizens	can	exercise	their	right	to	peaceful	assembly,	for	protecting	
the	rights	of	journalists	to	cover	the	event	regardless	of	its	legal	status,	
and	for	curbing	the	spread	of	violence	by	peaceful	means.	Journalists	
carry	the	responsibility	to	be	clearly	identified	as	such,	to	report	without	
taking	measures	to	inflame	the	situation,	and	should	not	become	
involved	in	the	demonstration	itself.
Law-enforcers	have	a	constitutional	responsibility	not	to	prevent	or	
obstruct	the	work	of	journalists	during	public	demonstrations,	and	
journalists	have	a	right	to	expect	fair	and	restrained	treatment	by	the	
police.	This	flows	from	the	role	of	law-enforcers	as	the	guarantor	of	
public	order,	including	the	right	to	free	flow	of	information,	and	their	
responsibility	for	ensuring	the	right	to	freedom	of	assembly.
recommendations
1.	Law	enforcement	officials	have	a	constitutional	responsibility	
not	to	prevent	or	obstruct	the	work	of	journalists	during	public	
demonstrations.	Journalists	have	a	right	to	expect	fair	and	restrained	
treatment	by	the	police.
2.	Senior	officials	responsible	for	police	conduct	have	a	duty	
to	ensure	that	officers	are	adequately	trained	about	the	role	
and	function	of	journalists	and	particularly	their	role	during	a	
demonstration.	In	the	event	of	an	over-reaction	from	the	police,	the	
issue	of	police	behaviour	vis-à-vis	journalists	should	be	dealt	with	
separately,	regardless	of	whether	the	demonstration	was	sanctioned	
or	not.	A	swift	and	adequate	response	from	senior	police	officials	is	
necessary	to	ensure	that	such	an	over-reaction	is	not	repeated	in	the	
future	and	should	send	a	strong	signal	that	such	behaviour	will	not	
be	tolerated.
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3.	There	is	no	need	for	special	accreditation	to	cover	demonstrations	
except	under	circumstances	where	resources,	such	as	time	and	
space	at	certain	events,	are	limited.	Journalists	who	decide	to	cover	
‘unsanctioned	demonstrations’	should	be	afforded	the	same	respect	
and	protection	by	the	police	as	those	afforded	to	them	during	other	
public	events.
4.	Wilful	attempts	to	confiscate,	damage	or	break	journalists’	
equipment	in	an	attempt	to	silence	reporting	is	a	criminal	offence	
and	those	responsible	should	be	held	accountable	under	the	law.	
Confiscation	by	the	authorities	of	printed	material,	footage,	sound	
clips	or	other	reportage	is	an	act	of	direct	censorship	and	as	such	is	
a	practice	prohibited	by	international	standards.	The	role,	function,	
responsibilities	and	rights	of	the	media	should	be	integral	to	the	
training	curriculum	for	law-enforcers	whose	duties	include	crowd	
management.
5.	Journalists	should	identify	themselves	clearly	as	such,	should	
refrain	from	becoming	involved	in	the	action	of	the	demonstration	
and	should	report	objectively	on	the	unfolding	events,	particularly	
during	a	live	broadcast	or	webcast.	Journalists’	unions	should	agree	
on	an	acceptable	method	of	identification	with	law	enforcement	
agencies	and	take	the	necessary	steps	to	communicate	this	
requirement	to	media	workers.	Journalists	should	take	adequate	
steps	to	inform	and	educate	themselves	about	police	measures	that	
will	be	taken	in	case	of	a	riot.
6.	Both	law	enforcement	agencies	and	media	workers	have	the	
responsibility	to	act	according	to	a	code	of	conduct,	which	should	be	
reinforced	by	police	chiefs	and	chief	editors	in	training.	Police	chiefs	
can	assist	by	ensuring	that	staff	officers	are	informed	of	the	role	and	
function	of	journalists.	They	should	also	take	direct	action	when	
officers	overstep	the	boundaries	of	these	duties.	Media	workers	can	
assist	by	remaining	outside	the	action	of	the	demonstration	and	clearly	
identifying	themselves	as	journalists.
210. In addition, the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
on Protecting Freedom of Expression and Information in Times of Crisis under-
line that not only is media coverage “crucial in times of crisis by providing accurate, 
timely and comprehensive information”, but that “media professionals can make 
a positive contribution to the prevention or resolution of certain crisis situations 
by adhering to the highest professional standards and by fostering a culture of 
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tolerance and understanding between different groups in society”. The follow-
ing extracts are particularly relevant in relation to media coverage of freedom of 
peaceful assembly: 
extracts from: Guidelines of the committee of Ministers of the 
council of europe on Protecting Freedom of expression and 
information in Times of crisis
“Member	States	should	assure	to	the	maximum	extent	the	safety	
of	media	professionals	–	both	national	and	foreign.	The	need	to	
guarantee	the	safety,	however,	should	not	be	used	by	member	States	as	
a	pretext	to	limit	unnecessarily	the	rights	of	media	professionals	such	as	
their	freedom	of	movement	and	access	to	information.”	(paragraph	2);
“Military	and	civilian	authorities	in	charge	of	managing	crisis	situations	
should	provide	regular	information	to	all	media	professionals	covering	
the	events	through	briefings,	press	conferences,	press	tours	or	other	
appropriate	means…”	(paragraph	11);
“National	governments,	media	organisations,	national	or	international	
governmental	and	non-governmental	organisations	should	strive	to	
ensure	the	protection	of	freedom	of	expression	and	information	in	times	
of	crisis	through	dialogue	and	co-operation”	(paragraph	27);
“Non-governmental	organisations	and	in	particular	specialised	
watchdog	organisations	are	invited	to	contribute	to	the	safeguarding	
of	freedom	of	expression	and	information	in	times	of	crisis	in	various	
ways,	such	as:	
•	 	Maintaining	help	lines	for	consultation	and	for	reporting	
harassment	of	journalists	and	other	alleged	violations	of	the	right	
to	freedom	of	expression	and	information;
•	 	Offering	support,	including	in	appropriate	cases	free	legal	
assistance,	to	media	professionals	facing,	as	a	result	of	their	work,	
lawsuits	or	problems	with	public	authorities;
•	 	Co-operating	with	the	Council	of	Europe	and	other	relevant	
organisations	to	facilitate	exchange	of	information	and	to	
effectively	monitor	possible	violations.”	(paragraph	30).
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Annex A –  enforcement of international human rights 
standards
Where states fail to fulfil their human rights obligations, the role of human rights de-
fenders, civil society organizations (CSOs) and NGOs (both domestic and international) 
becomes especially important. Such individuals and groups – together with national 
institutions, such as ombudspersons or national human rights institutions (NHRIs) – 
perform a vital task in seeking to ensure that rights are enforced in practice and that 
something is learned as a result of any failures. While such organizations will inevitably 
have different priorities, skills and experience, organizational capacities and resources, 
their respective strengths can be harnessed so as to make the protection of the right to 
freedom of assembly practical and effective.
There are a variety of options that may be available in any given context. This annex 
provides an overview of only the main regional and international mechanisms through 
which a failure to adhere to these Guidelines might be exposed and/or challenged. Inter-
state procedures (such as those available under the ICCPR and ECHR) are not examined.
As emphasized in chapter 8, “Monitoring Freedom of Peaceful Assembly”, wherever 
possible, the starting point should be dialogue among government, local authorities, law-
enforcement officials and civil society. Reports issued by independent monitors, human 
rights defenders, NGOs and media professionals can, certainly, provide an impetus for 
such discussions. Nonetheless, complaints of human rights violations should not be based 
exclusively on reports in mass media, and should be corroborated wherever possible. See: 
•  “Guidelines on International Human Rights Fact-Finding Visits and Reports (The 
Lund-London Guidelines)”, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law, Lund University, June 2009, at: <http://www.factfinding-
guidelines.org/guidelines.html>; and
•  Julie Mertus, “Considerations for Human Rights Fact Finding by NGOs”, at: 
<http://academic3.american.edu/~mertus/HR%20fact-finding.htm>.
Legislative support: The Osce / Odihr and Venice commission
ODIHR’s primary task in the field of legislative assistance is to respond to requests 
from participating States and to ensure the consistency of such responses. Assist-
ance generally involves a review of draft legislation in areas covered by the human 
dimension to ensure compliance with international standards, particularly OSCE 
commitments. ODIHR also provides states with good practices that have been culled 
from years of experience of working with a number of countries. Such practices and 
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sample legislation may serve as a source of inspiration for lawmakers in other parts 
of the OSCE region.
With regard to legislative assistance in the area of freedom of assembly, ODIHR, through 
its Panel of Experts on Freedom of Assembly, provides advice to OSCE participating 
States on draft legislation pertaining to this field. The advice is solicited through an 
official request from the authorities of the participating State in question or the respec-
tive OSCE field operation. In exceptional cases, comments are released on legislation 
in force, but only when there is a prospect for reform and an attested political will to 
engage in a reform process. The comments seek to help the OSCE participating States 
meet their international obligations (whether they are embodied in legally binding stand-
ards or politically binding commitments).
Moreover, the assessment of compliance with standards takes into account various pa-
rameters, including those that characterize the legal system, the legal culture and the 
institutional setup of a particular country. This requires the collection of information 
on the issues addressed or affected by the legal provisions under consideration. See: 
• ODIHR website, “Legislative support”, at: 
<http://www.osce.org/odihr/13431.html>.
The Venice Commission’s primary task is to give impartial legal advice to individual 
countries that are drafting or revising constitutions or laws on legislation that is impor-
tant for the democratic functioning of institutions. Generally, a request for an opinion 
is made by the state itself. The Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly, 
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council Europe, and the Sec-
retary General, or any international organization or body participating in the Venice 
Commission’s work, may also request an opinion. The Commission’s working meth-
od when providing opinions is to appoint a working group of rapporteurs (primarily 
from among its own members), which advises national authorities in the preparation 
of the relevant law. After discussions with the national authorities and stakeholders in 
the country, the working group prepares a draft opinion on whether the legislative text 
meets the democratic standards in its field and on how to improve it on the basis of com-
mon experience. The draft opinion is discussed and adopted by the Venice Commission 
during a plenary session, usually in the presence of representatives from the country 
in question. After the opinion’s adoption it becomes public and is forwarded to the re-
questing body. Although its opinions are generally reflected in the adopted legislation, 
the Venice Commission does not impose its solutions but, instead, adopts a non-direc-
tive approach based on dialogue. For this reason, as a rule, the working group, visits the 
country concerned and meets with the different political actors involved in the issue in 
order to ensure the most objective view of the situation possible. See: 
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•  Council of Europe website, Venice Commission, at: 
<http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/Presentation_E.asp>.
UN Treaty-Based Mechanisms
The human rights committee (iccPr)
States Parties to the ICCPR must initially report one year after acceding to the Covenant, 
and thereafter whenever the Committee requests (usually every four years). The Com-
mittee examines each report and makes recommendations to the State Party by way of 
“concluding observations”. Where the state in question is also a party to the first Option-
al Protocol to the ICCPR, an individual communication (petition) may be lodged with the 
UN Human Rights Committee by individuals (not organizations or associations)275 who 
claim a violation by the State Oarty of Article 21, ICCPR (or other Covenant right). See: 
•  “How to Complain to the UN Human Rights Treaty System, at: 
<http://www.bayefsky.com/unts/index.html>.
•  Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights website, “Human Rights 
Bodies”, at: <http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/Pages/HumanRights-
Bodies.aspx>, for information on the other UN Treaty based bodies, including 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Com-
mittee against Torture(CAT); and
•  Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights  website, “Model  
question naires for communications/complaints”, at: 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/question.htm>.
UN charter-Based Mechanisms
Universal Periodic review
The UN Human Rights Council is mandated to undertake a review of the human rights 
record of each UN Member State once every four years. This process – called “Univer-
sal Periodic Review” (UPR) – is designed to facilitate interactive discussion between the 
state under review and other UN Member States. Reviews are based upon state sub-
missions (and states are encouraged to engage in “a broad consultation process at the 
national level with all relevant stakeholders” in preparing their submissions), reports 
by independent human rights experts and groups, and information from other stake-
holders (including NGOs and national human rights institutions). NGOs can attend the 
UPR Working Group sessions and can make comments at meetings of the Human Rights 
Council when the “outcome report” of the review is considered. Outcome reports adopt-
ed by the Working Group provide the basis for subsequent reviews, and the Council will 
decide on appropriate measures if a Member State persists in failing to co-operate. See: 
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•  Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights website, “Informa-
tion and Guidelines for Relevant Stakeholders on the Universal Periodic Review 
Mechanism, at: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/
TechnicalGuideEN.pdf>.
The human rights council complaints Procedure
This confidential complaints procedure (the successor to the “1503 Procedure”) is de-
signed to address consistent patterns of gross and reliably attested violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. Communications are examined by two working 
groups – the Working Group on Communications and the Working Group on Situa-
tions. See: 
•  Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights website, “Human Rights 
Council Complaints Procedure”, at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bod-
ies/chr/complaints.htm>; and
•  Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights website, “Commu-
nications”, at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/
communications.htm>.
special Procedures of the human rights council
See: 
•  Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Office of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights website, at: 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/detention/index.htm>;
•  Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
website, at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/index.htm>;
•  Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Of-
fice of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights website, at: 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/religion/index.htm>; and
•  Special Rapporteur on the situation on human rights defenders, (complaints 
procedure),276 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights website, 
at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/index.htm>.
The european court of human rights
For those OSCE participating States that are High Contracting Parties to the ECHR, 
Article 1 of the ECHR requires states to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in the Convention (irrespective of nationality or place of 
residence – see paragraph 55 of the Explanatory Notes). Where the state fails to fulfil 
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its Convention obligations, Article 13 of the ECHR – which guarantees the right to an ef-
fective remedy – entails a personal right to the exercise by the state of its supervisory 
powers.277 In this regard, the competent national authority must be able to deal with the 
substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief.278 There 
is “no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective,”279 
and the burden is upon the government to demonstrate that any unused remedies “were 
accessible, were capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant’s complaints 
and offered reasonable prospects of success”.280 This underscores the imperative of a 
legal culture committed to the rule of law and of an independent judiciary.
Given that the timing of an assembly will often be critical to its message, the notion of 
an effective remedy also implies the possibility of obtaining an appeal ruling before the 
time of the planned event.281 Post-hoc review will normally be regarded as inadequate, 
and laws governing the regulation of freedom of peaceful assembly should provide for 
an expedited review and appeal process.
Under Article 34 of the ECHR, any person, NGO or group of individuals282 claiming to 
be the victim of a violation by a High Contracting Party, may submit an application to 
the European Court of Human Rights within 6 months of the final decision taken in the 
domestic proceedings (Article 35(1) ECHR). The application must demonstrate prima 
facie grounds that there has been a breach of the Convention so as not to be deemed 
manifestly ill-founded under Article 35(3).283
An applicant to the European Court of Human Rights should initially appeal any claimed 
violation of Convention rights in the relevant national courts, adhering to any formal 
requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law. Applicants must also use “any 
procedural means that might prevent a breach of the Convention”.284 Thus, where any 
concerns arising in relation to a notified assembly can reasonably be addressed and/or 
accommodated by an organizer of an assembly (without undermining the event or its 
message), pre-event liaison can serve to prevent later breaches of the Convention (but 
see paragraph 103 of the Explanatory Notes, above, which emphasizes that an organiz-
er of an assembly should not be compelled or coerced into accepting any alternatives 
proposed by the authorities). In addition, it will be important for civil society groups to 
monitor the implementation of general and specific enforcement measures stipulated 
by the Committee of Ministers. See: 
•  European Court of Human Rights website, “Application pack: Documentation for 
persons wishing to apply to the European Court of Human Rights”, at: <http://
www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Applicants/Apply+to+the+Court/
Application+pack/>.
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The inter-American commission and inter-American court on human rights
Under Article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights (adopted in 1969 and 
came into force in 1978), any person, group or NGO legally recognized in one or more 
of the Member States of the Organization of American States (OAS) can lodge a pe-
tition complaining of a violation of the Convention by a State Party. Petitioners must 
exhaust domestic remedies and lodge their petition within 6 months of being notified 
of the final domestic judgment. Article 47 of the Convention provides that the petition/
communication must state facts that ”tend to establish” a violation, must not be mani-
festly groundless or obviously out of order, and must not be substantially the same as 
one previously studied by the Commission or by another international organization. On 
examining such a petition, the Commission can carry out an investigation, if necessary 
and advisable. The Commission may also request that states provide any pertinent in-
formation and, if requested, shall hear oral statements or receive written statements 
from parties concerned (Article 48 (d) and (e)).
The Commission also has a mandate to promote respect for human rights in the region 
and acts as a consultative body to the OAS in this matter (Article 41). This promotional 
mandate includes the preparation of such studies or reports as it considers advisable, 
and the Commission can request the governments of Member States to supply it with in-
formation on any measures adopted. The Commission also carries out specialized work 
in certain thematic areas, including that done by the the Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Expression, and there is a separate unit on human rights defenders. The Commis-
sion can conduct in	loco visits (as it did, for example, to Honduras in August 2009 to 
observe the human rights situation in the context of the coup	d’état of June 28, 2009).
Only States Parties and the Commission can submit a case to the Court (Article 61). The 
Court’s contentious jurisdiction must have been recognized by States Parties before a 
case can be heard (Article 62(3)). On finding a violation, the Court can rule that the 
measure or situation that constituted the breach be remedied and that fair compensation 
be paid (Article 63(1)). The judgment of Court is final and not subject to appeal (Article 
67) and is binding on States Parties in cases to which they are parties (Article 68(1)). See: 
•  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights website, “Petitions”, at: 
<https://www.cidh.oas.org/cidh_apps/instructions.asp?gc_language=E>; and
•  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights website, “Publications” (country reports, 
annual reports, and resolutions), at: <http://www.cidh.oas.org/publi.eng.htm>.
The council of europe, Office of the commissioner for human rights
The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights is a non-judicial institution, and 
thus unable to act upon individual complaints. Nonetheless, the Commissioner’s office 
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seeks to encourage Council of Europe Member States to adopt reform measures where 
human rights violations have been identified. The Commissioner seeks to maintain a 
dialogue with Member States and evaluates the on-the-ground human rights situation 
through official country missions. The Commissioner also provides advice on the pro-
tection of human rights and may provide opinions on draft laws and specific practices 
(either on the request of national bodies or on his/her own initiative). See: 
•  Council of Europe website, “Commissioner for Human Rights: Contact us”, at: 
<http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/Office/contact_en.asp>; and
•  Council of Europe website, “Commissioner for Human Rights: Human Rights Com-
ment”, at: <http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/Media/HRComment_en.asp>.
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Annex c: english-russian glossary of key terms
english term english definition Russian term Russian definition
Accountability An obligation to explain one’s 
actions to another person or 
organization.
Ответственность Обязательство объяснить соб-
ственные действия другому 
лицу или организации.
Assembly The intentional and tempo-
rary presence of a number 
of individuals in an open-air 
public place for a common 
purpose.
Собрание Намеренное и временное 
присутствие группы лиц на об-
щественной территории вне 
помещения с какой-либо об-
щей целью.
Authorization The act of authorizing; per-
mission (expressly provided 
in writing).
Разрешение; 
Санкция
Акт санкционирования, раз-
решение (ясно выраженное 
в письменной форме).
Blanket (e.g. ban, 
restriction)
Effective or applicable in all 
instances.
Всеобъемлющая 
норма
Решение, которое действует 
или подлежит применению во 
всех случаях.
“clear and 
present danger” 
test
A doctrine that allows the 
imposition of restrictions 
only when participants in an 
assembly incite imminent law-
less action and such action is 
likely to occur.
Анализ на 
выраженное 
присутствие 
непосредственной 
опасности
Принцип, который позволяет 
применение ограничений лишь 
в тех случаях, когда участники 
собрания призывают к немед-
ленным незаконным действиям, 
и когда существует реальная 
опасность совершения таких 
действий.
content neutrality 
(principle of)
A principle that only allows 
the restriction of expression 
without regard to the content 
or communicative impact of 
the message conveyed.
Нейтральный 
подход к 
содержанию 
(принцип)
Принцип, согласно которому 
запрещается ограничение сво-
боды выражения мнения лишь 
на основании его содержания 
или коммуникативного воздей-
ствия.
content-based 
restrictions
A restriction that limits ex-
pression on the basis of the 
message it conveys.
Ограничения на 
содержание
Ограничение на выражение 
мнения в связи с его содержа-
нием.
counter-
demonstration
An assembly that is convened 
to express disagreement with 
the views expressed at anoth-
er public assembly, and takes 
place at, or almost at, the 
same the same time and place 
as the one it disagrees with.
Собрание в знак 
несогласия с 
другим собранием
Собрание, которое созывает-
ся с целью выразить несогласие 
с взглядами, выражаемыми на 
другом публичном собрании, 
и совпадающее или практиче-
ски совпадающее по времени 
и месту проведения с этим со-
бранием.
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data retention The storage or preservation 
of recorded information, re-
gardless of its format or the 
media on which it may be re-
corded.
Хранение данных Хранение или архивирование 
записанной информации, не-
зависимо от вида информации 
или носителей, на которых она 
записана.
demonstration An assembly or procession 
held to express the point of 
view of the participants.
Общественное 
выступление
Публичное собрание или про-
цессия, которые проводятся 
с целью выражения точки зре-
ния участников.
derogation A partial repeal of a norm. Временное 
отступление 
государства от 
выполнения 
взятых на себя 
международных 
обязательств
Частичный отказ от выполне-
ния нормы.
dispersal A formal requirement that 
participants in an assembly 
leave the site of the assembly, 
with the threat of the use of 
force by the authorities.
Разгон Официальное требование 
к участникам собрания по-
кинуть место собрания под 
угрозой применения властя-
ми силы. 
disruption An interruption of the normal 
course of action.
Прерывание; 
Срыв
Вмешательство, приводящее 
к нарушению нормального хода 
мероприятия.
human rights 
defender
Individuals, groups or oth-
er organs of society that work 
or act to promote and protect 
universally recognized hu-
man rights and fundamental 
freedoms.
Защитник прав 
человека 
Лица, группы или иные обще-
ственные институты, которые 
работают или действуют в це-
лях продвижения и защиты 
общепризнанных прав челове-
ка и основных свобод.
Liability An enforceable legal obliga-
tion.
Правовая 
ответственность 
Правовое обязательство, вы-
полнение которого может быть 
истребовано в судебном по-
рядке.
Monitor see Observer Монитор См. Наблюдатель
National security The quality or state of being 
capable of resisting hostile or 
destructive acts from inside 
or outside a state.
Национальная 
безопасность
Качество или состояние спо-
собности противостоять 
враждебным или деструктив-
ным действиям внутри или 
извне страны.
Non-lethal 
weapons
A weapon that is designed to 
incapacitate the target rather 
than kill or seriously injure.
Специальные 
несмертельные 
средства
Оружие, предназначенное для 
того, чтобы обезвредить цель, 
а не убить или серьезно ранить.
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Non-nationals Those who are not citizens of 
a given state.
Неграждане Те, кто не являются гражданами 
данного государства.
Notification A notice that provides in-
formation on an upcoming 
assembly and does not consti-
tute a request for permission.
Уведомление Извещение, которое содержит 
информацию о планируемом 
собрании и не является прось-
бой о разрешении.
Observer Someone who watches and 
reports on the progress of an 
assembly from a neutral point 
of view.
Наблюдатель Лицо, которое занимается на-
блюдением за ходом собрания 
и сообщает о происходящем с 
нейтральной точки зрения.
Organizer The person or persons with 
primary responsibility for an 
assembly.
Организатор Лицо или лица, несущие 
основную ответственность 
за собрание.
Parade see Procession. Парад См. Шествие.
Participant A person intentionally and 
voluntarily present at an as-
sembly who supports the 
message of the assembly.
Участник Лицо, которое намеренно и до-
бровольно присутствует на 
собрании и поддерживает вы-
ражаемое на нем мнение.
Peaceful 
enjoyment of 
one’s possessions 
(right to)
The right to protection of 
property and against its dep-
rivation.
Мирное 
обладание своим 
имуществом
Право на защиту собственности 
и от посягательств на нее.
Penalty A punishment established by 
law for its breach.
Мера наказания Установленное законом наказа-
ние за нарушение закона.
Peremptory norm A fundamental principle of in-
ternational law considered to 
have acceptance among
the international community 
of states as a whole. Peremp-
tory norms do not require 
consent and cannot be violat-
ed by any state.
Императивная 
норма
Основной принцип между-
народного права, который 
считается общепринятым 
в международном сообществе 
государств в целом. Импе-
ративные нормы не требуют 
согласия, и ни одно государство 
не имеет права их нарушать
Permit The formal grant of permis-
sion by a regulatory authority 
to hold an assembly.
Разрешение Официальное согласие упол-
номоченного органа на 
проведение собрания.
Presumption in 
favor of holding 
assemblies
The presumption that an as-
sembly may proceed in the 
absence of well-founded justi-
fications for the imposition of 
restrictions or for preventing 
the assembly from occurring.
Презумпция 
в пользу 
проведения 
собрания
Предположение о том, что, 
при отсутствии обоснован-
ных причин для наложения 
ограничения или запрета на 
проведение данного собрания, 
такое собрание может состо-
яться.
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Prior restraint Restrictions imposed in ad-
vance of an event.
Предварительное 
ограничение
Ограничение, наложенное до 
проведения собрания.
Procession A gathering that moves along 
public thoroughfares. A pro-
cession may involve the use of 
vehicle or other conveyances.
Шествие; 
Процессия
Вид собрания, характеризу-
ющийся движением вдоль 
дорог общего пользования. 
Процессия может включать ис-
пользование транспортных и 
иных средств передвижения.
Proportionality 
(principle of)
The principle requiring that 
the least intrusive means of 
achieving the legitimate ob-
jective being pursued by the 
authorities should always be 
given preference.
Соразмерности 
(принцип)
Принцип требующий, 
чтобы при применении вла-
стями мер для достижения 
законной цели, предпочтение 
всегда отдавалось мерам, пред-
усматривающим наименьший 
уровень вмешательства. 
Protection of 
health and morals
The notion refers to public 
health and public morals.
Охрана здоровья 
и нравственности
Это понятие относится к здоро-
вью населения и общественной 
морали.
Protection 
of rights and 
freedoms of 
others
The prevention of major in-
terference with the conflicting 
rights and freedoms of oth-
ers.
Защита прав и 
свобод других лиц
Предотвращение серьезного 
вмешательства в осуществле-
ние прав и свобод других лиц.
Public order Security in public places. Общественный 
порядок
Безопасность в публичных ме-
стах.
Public safety A broad notion involving the 
protection of the population 
at large from various kinds 
of significant damage, harm, 
or danger, including emer-
gencies.
Общественная 
безопасность
Широкое понятие, включаю-
щее защиту населения в целом 
от разных видов серьезного 
ущерба, вреда или опасности, 
включая защиту в чрезвычай-
ных ситуациях.
Public space A space where everyone is 
free to come and leave with-
out restriction (e.g., streets 
or parks).
Общественное 
место
Территория или место, доступ 
к которому и выход с которого 
открыт для всех без ограниче-
ния (к примеру, улицы, парки 
и т.д.).
rally A static demonstration. Митинг Общественное выступление, 
которое происходит на одном 
месте
“reasonable 
excuse” defence
A defence applicable where 
failure to comply was not 
willful but a matter of impos-
sibility.
Защита на 
основании 
наличия 
объективных 
препятствий 
к соблюдению 
закона
Принцип защиты, применимый 
там, где несоблюдение зако-
на произошло не по свободной 
воле, а в связи с невозможно-
стью его соблюдения.
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regulatory 
authority
The authority responsible for 
taking decisions about public 
assemblies.
Орган 
регулирования
Орган, ответственный за при-
нятие решений в отношении 
публичных собраний.
riot control Measures taken to control an 
act of public violence by an 
unruly mob.
Действия по 
пресечению 
массовых 
беспорядков
Меры пресечения насильствен-
ных действий, совершаемых 
вышедшей из-под контроля 
толпой. 
risk assessment An assessment of possible 
risks or problems associated 
with an assembly and the de-
velopment of a plan of action 
to counter such risks. 
Оценка риска Оценка возможных рисков 
или проблем, связанных с со-
бранием, и разработка плана 
действий для противодействия 
этим рискам.
sanction A coercive measure intend-
ed to ensure compliance with 
the law.
Мера 
принуждения
Принудительные меры, на-
правленные на обеспечение 
соблюдения закона.
simultaneous 
assemblies
An assembly that takes place 
at the same time and place as 
another one, but which has 
no relationship to the oth-
er event. 
Одновременные 
собрания
Собрание, которое проходит 
в то же время и в том же месте, 
что и другое собрание, и вы-
ражаемые на этом собрании 
мнения не противоречат иде-
ям, выражаемым в ходе другого 
собрания.
sit-in A static demonstration in 
which participants seat them-
selves in a particular place 
and refuse to move.
Сидячее 
общественное 
выступление 
Общественное выступление, 
участники которого усажива-
ются в определенном месте 
и отказываются его покинуть.
spontaneous 
assembly
An assembly that takes place 
as an urgent response to an 
event or item of news.
Стихийное 
собрание
Собрание, которое проходит 
без предварительного уведом-
ления.
steward; marshal A person, working in co-
operation with assembly 
organizer(s), with a respon-
sibility to facilitate an event 
and help ensure compliance 
with any lawfully imposed re-
strictions.
Распорядитель 
(на собрании)
Лицо, работающее совместно 
с организатором (организато-
рами) собрания, в обязанности 
которого входит содействие 
проведению собрания и оказа-
ние помощи по обеспечению 
соблюдения любых законных 
ограничений.
supporter Someone who is in the close 
proximity of the assembly and 
shares the views expressed.
Сочувствующее 
лицо
Любое лицо, которое находится 
в непосредственной близости 
от собрания и разделяет выра-
жаемые на нем взгляды.
Unlawful 
assembly
An assembly that proceeds in 
non-compliance with the law 
regulating assemblies.
Собрание 
с несоблюдением 
закона
Собрание, которое проходит не 
в соответствии с законом, регу-
лирующие собрания.
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Use of force The exertion of physical force 
as a means of compulsion or 
coercion.
Применение силы Применение физической силы 
как средства принуждения или 
подавления.
Violence Illegal or abusive exertion of 
physical force.
Насилие Незаконное или чрезмерное 
применение физической силы.
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endnotes
1 See CDL-AD(2005)040 “Opinion on the OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines for Drafting Laws Pertain-
ing to Freedom of Assembly”, adopted by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe at 
its 64th Plenary Session, Venice, 21-22 October 2005. 
2 These Opinions can be found at: <http://www.legislationline.org> and <http://www.ven-
ice.coe.int/site/dynamics/N_Opinion_ef.asp?L=E>.
3 See, for example, Oya Ataman v. Turkey (2006), para.16 (referring to the Venice Commission’s 
Opinion on the then-draft Guidelines); and Gillan and Quinton v. UK (2010), para.47 (a re-
quest for referral to the Grand Chamber was pending at the time of writing). 
4 See, for example, “Note by the Secretary-General on Human rights defenders: Promotion 
and protection of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for 
improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (A/62/225 
Sixty-second session), paras. 91-92, regarding the monitoring role performed by the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) during the April 2006 protests in Nepal. 
Also see UN Doc. A/HRC/7/28/Add.3, “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the situation of human rights defenders, Hina Jilani, Addendum: Mission to Serbia, 
including Kosovo” (4 March 2008), para.111 (see. Further, note 33).
5 Principally, the relevant standards contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, and the jurisprudence of the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, respectively.
6 Including the constitutional courts of OSCE participating States and other states.
7 As the United Kingdom Joint Committee on Human Rights has recently stated, it is better “to 
draft legislation itself in sufficiently precise terms so as to constrain and guide police discretion, 
rather than to rely on decision makers to exercise a broad discretion compatibly with human 
rights.” See Joint Committee on Human Rights, Demonstrating Respect for Rights: A Human 
Rights Approach to Policing Protest (Volume 1) (London: HMSO, HL Paper 47-I; HC 320-I, 23 
March 2009), pp.21-22 and para.76 (and repeated in Recommendation 4).
8 See, for example, Bączkowski and Others v. Poland (2006), para. 25: “The Constitution clear-
ly guaranteed the freedom of assembly, not a right. It was not for the State to create a right to 
assembly; its obligation was limited to securing that assemblies be held peacefully.”
9 Tajik law, for example, defines a “participant” in terms of his or her support for the aims of the 
event. 
10 Article 22 of the ICCPR and Article 11of the ECHR. See Indirect Restrictions on Freedom of As-
sembly in para. 107.
11 Article 17, Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities, which draws upon 
paras. 32.4 and 32.6 of the Copenhagen Document of the CSCE.
12 Article 12 of the ICCPR and Article 2 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR.
13 For example, Djavit An v. Turkey (2003); Foka v. Turkey (2008). Also see Indirect Restrictions 
on Freedom of Assembly in para.107.
14 Article 19(2) and (3) of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ECHR. Freedom of expression includes 
the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interfer-
ence by public authorities and regardless of frontiers. The European Court of Human Rights 
has recognized that freedom of assembly and freedom of expression are often, in practice, 
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closely associated. See, for example, Ezelin v. France (1991), paras. 37, 51; Djavit An v. Tur-
key (2003), para. 39; Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova (2006), para. 62; and 
Öllinger v. Austria (2006), para. 38.
15 Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR.
16 See, “Joint Statement on Racism and the Media by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression”, available at: <http://www.osce.org/documents/
rfm/2000/11/195_en.pdf>. Also see Helen Fenwick, “The Right to Protest, the Human Rights Act 
and the Margin of Appreciation” Modern Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 4, July 1999, pp. 491-492-3.
17 See, for example, Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey (2009, in French only), in which the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that, in participating in a na-
tional one-day strike action, trade-union members had been exercising their right to freedom 
of peaceful assembly. Moreover, while the right to strike is not absolute, a ban prohibiting all 
public servants or employees from taking such action was disproportionate and did not meet 
a pressing social need.
18 As revised (STE No.163) 3 May 1996.
19 The International Labour Conference has pointed out in a resolution adopted at its 54th Ses-
sion, in 1970, that the right of assembly (among others) is “essential for the normal exercise 
of trade union rights”. See, “Freedom of association and collective bargaining: Resolution of 
1970 concerning trade union rights and their relation to civil liberties” (Document No. (ilolex): 
251994G16). For a concrete example, see Committee of Experts on the Application of [ILO] 
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), “Individual Observation concerning Freedom 
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention”, 1948 (No. 87) Malawi 
(ratification: 1999; Document No. (ilolex): 062006MWI087, published 2006): “The Commit-
tee notes the … violent police repression of a protest march by tea workers in September 2004 
as well as issues previously raised by the Committee on the right to strike. … [F]reedom of as-
sembly and demonstration constitutes a fundamental aspect of trade union rights and … the 
authorities should refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the 
lawful exercise thereof, provided that the exercise of these rights does not cause a serious and 
imminent threat to public order…”.
20 For example, a number of cases have been communicated to Moldova by the European Court 
of Human Rights in relation to the regulation of the election-related protests in 2009. See, 
Popa (Radu) v. Moldova (Application no. 29837/09); Mocanu (Sergiu) v. Moldova (Applica-
tion no. 24163/09); Stati and Marinescu v. Moldova (Application no.19828/09); Mătăsaru v. 
Moldova (Application no. 20253/09). Similarly, Sultanov (Vidadi) v. Azerbaijan (Application 
no. 21672/05).
21 See, for example, OSCE/ODIHR Panel on Freedom of Assembly and European Commission 
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) “Opinion on the Amendments to the Law 
of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Right of Citizens to Assemble Peaceably, Without Weapons, to 
Freely hold Rallies and Demonstrations”, Strasbourg/Warsaw, 27 June 2008, Opinion-Nr.: 
FOA – KYR/111/2008), available at: <http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/
download/id/824/file/test.pdf>. Also see OSCE Election Observation Mission, Kyrgyz 
Republic, “Presidential Election, 23 July 2009: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Con-
clusions”, p.3; UN Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Republic of Moldova” CCPR/C/MDA/CO/2, 4 November 2009, para.8(d). not-
ing that against the backdrop of violence at post-election demonstrations in April 2009, “[t]
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he State party should: …(d) Ensure respect for the right to freedom of assembly in accord-
ance with article 21 of the Covenant, including through the enforcement of the 2008 Law on 
Assemblies and put in place safeguards, such as appropriate training, to ensure that such vi-
olation of human rights by its law enforcement officers do not occur again.”; and UN Human 
Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Azerbaijan” 
CCPR/C/AZE/CO/3, 13 August 2009, paras.16-17.
22 Barankevich v. Russia (2007), para.30. In such circumstances, Article 11 should be interpreted 
in light of Article 9 (see Barankevich, paras. 20 and 44). The Court further stated, in para.31: “It 
would be incompatible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise of Conven-
tion rights by a minority group were made conditional on its being accepted by the majority.”
23 See, inter alia, Bączkowski and Others v. Poland (2007), para.63; Hyde Park and others v. 
Moldova (No.1) (2009), para.28; Hyde Park and others v. Moldova (No.2) (2009), para.24; 
Hyde Park and others v. Moldova (No.3) (2009), para.24; Chassagnou and Others v. France 
[GC] (1999), para.112; Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova (Application no. 
28793/02, judgment of 14 February 2006), para.64; and Young, James and Webster v. the 
United Kingdom (1981), para.63.
24 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations Gener-
al Assembly in 1948, is a declaration rather than a binding treaty. The International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR) and its first Optional Protocol, were adopted in 1966 to give effect to the 
principles enunciated in the Declaration. Together, the three documents constitute the Inter-
national Bill of Human Rights. The ICCPR sets out universally accepted minimum standards in 
the area of civil and political rights. The obligations undertaken by states ratifying or acceding 
to the Covenant are meant to be discharged as soon as a state becomes party to the ICCPR. 
The implementation of the ICCPR by its States Parties is monitored by a body of independent 
experts – the UN Human Rights Committee. All States Parties are obliged to submit regular 
reports to the Committee on how the rights are being implemented. In addition to the report-
ing procedure, Article 41 of the Covenant provides for the Committee to consider interstate 
complaints. Furthermore, the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR gives the Committee com-
petence to examine individual complaints with regard to alleged violations of the Covenant by 
States Parties to the Protocol. See, further, Annex A.
25 The ECHR is the most comprehensive and authoritative human rights treaty for the European 
region. The treaty has been open for signature since 1950. All Member States of the Council 
of Europe are required to ratify the Convention within one year of the state’s accession to the 
Statute of the Council of Europe. The ECHR sets forth a number of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, and parties to it undertake to secure these rights and freedoms to everyone within 
their jurisdiction. Individual and interstate petitions are dealt with by the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg. At the request of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, the Court may also give advisory opinions concerning the interpretation of the ECHR 
and the protocols thereto. See Annex A.
26 As provided by Article 44 of the American Convention, “Any person or group of persons, or 
any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member States of the Organ-
ization [of American States], may lodge petitions with the [Inter-American] Commission [on 
Human Rights] containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a 
State Party.” See Annex A. 
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27 The CIS Convention was opened for signature on 26 May 1995 and came into force on 11 Au-
gust 1998. It has been signed by six of the 11 CIS member States (Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia and Tajikistan) and ratified by Belarus, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Fed-
eration and Tajikistan. See, for example, Decision on the Competence of the [European] Court 
[of Human Rights] to Give and Advisory Opinion concerning “the coexistence of the Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
and the European Convention on Human Rights” (2 June 2004).
28 See Article 29 of the UDHR for the general limitations clause.
29 See Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd edi-
tion). (Kehl: N.P. Engel, 2005) pp. 481-494; Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz, and Melissa Castan, 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2nd edition) (New York: OUP, 2004) 
pp. 568-575.
30 See, for example, the Organization of American States, “Annual Report of the Office of the 
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression” (2005), Chapter 5, “Public Demonstrations 
as an exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly Available online at: <http://
www.cidh.oas.org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?artID=662&lID=1 ; U.N. Doc. A/62/225 
Human Rights Defenders: Note by the Secretary-General, 13 August 2007, Section D, pp.8-14: 
“Monitoring the right to protest at the regional level: jurisprudence and positions of region-
al mechanisms.” Available online at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4732dbaf2.
pdf>.
31 For example, following the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Stank-
ov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria (2001), the Bulgarian Ministry 
of Justice sent the judgment of the ECtHR, translated into Bulgarian, and accompanied by a cir-
cular letter, to the mayors of the cities concerned. In order to inform the courts and the public 
of the new binding interpretation of the law, the court also posted the Bulgarian translation of 
the judgment on its website, at http://www.mjeli.government.bg/. See also Human Rights 
Information Bulletin, No.64, 1 December 2004 – 28 February 2005, pp. 49-50. (ISSN 1608-
9618 H/Inf (2005) 3), available at: http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/hrib64e.pdf.
32 See, for example, Mkrtchyan v. Armenia (2007), para. 39, in relation to the requisite quality 
of any such law if it is to meet the foreseeability standard.
33 Ukraine, for example, requested a review of its Draft Law on Organizing and Conducting 
Peaceful Events. See “Joint Opinion of ODIHR and the Venice Commission on the order of or-
ganizing and conducting peaceful events in Ukraine” (14 December 2009) CDL-AD(2009)052; 
Opinion no. 556/2009; ODIHR Opinion-Nr:FOA-UKR/144/2009. Available at: <http://www.
legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/2908/file/144_FOA _UKR_14%20
DEC09_en.pdf>. The need for clear legislation governing public assemblies has also been in 
recognized in Kosovo: See: “Report of the Special Representative on the situation of human 
rights defenders, Hina Jilani, op. cit. note 4, para.111: “At the time of the visit, the Kosovo Assem-
bly had recently adopted a law on public assembly, which was in the legal office of UNMIK for 
examination. The Special Representative was later informed that the law could not be prom-
ulgated because legislation in this area is not within the competency of the Kosovo Assembly. 
The legislation in force on freedom of assembly is therefore a law adopted in 1981 under the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. … [T]he Special Representative urges the 
authorities to adopt adequate legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly. Adequate legis-
lation and its scrupulous implementation are fundamental to preventing the reoccurrence of 
the tragic incidents that happened on 10 February 2007. The Special Representative suggests 
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using the Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly published by the Office for Democrat-
ic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of OSCE to draft and implement legislation in this 
area. She further refers to the recommendations of her reports to the General Assembly of 
2006 and 2007, which focus on freedom of peaceful assembly and the right to protest in the 
context of freedom of assembly.”
34 Op. cit., note 1, Point 12.
35 See, for example, Ezelin v. France (1991), para.35. Thus, if the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly is considered to be the lex specialis in a given case, it would not be plausible for a 
court to find a violation of the right to freedom of expression if it had already established, on 
the same facts, that there had been no violation of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 
This question was touched upon by Mr. Kurt Herndl in his dissenting opinion in the case of 
Kivenmaa v. Finland (1994) CCPR/C/50/D/412/1990, para. 3.5.
36 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (1994), para. 47.
37 See, for example, Vajnai v. Hungary (2008), paras, 20-26 (discussing the Article 17 jurispru-
dence, and finding that the application in this case did not constitute an abuse of the right of 
petition for the purposes of Article 17). Similarly, Article 17 was not engaged in the cases of 
Soulas v. France (2008, in French only), or Association of Citizens Radko & Paunkovski v. the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1999), para. 77. These cases can be contrasted with 
Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands (1979); Garaudy v. France (2003); and Le-
hideux and Isorni v. France (1998).
38 Also see Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, op.cit., note 
29, p.373: “The term ‘assembly’ is not defined but rather presumed in the Covenant. There-
fore, it must be interpreted in conformity with the customary, generally accepted meaning in 
national legal systems, taking into account the object and purpose of this traditional right. It 
is beyond doubt that not every assembly of individuals requires special protection. Rather, 
only intentional, temporary gatherings of several persons for a specific purpose are afforded 
the protection of freedom of assembly.” Further, in Kivenmaa v. Finland Communication No. 
412/1990, para.7.6, the Human Rights Committee stated that “public assembly is understood 
to be the coming together of more than one person for a lawful purpose in a public place that 
others than those invited also have access to”.
39 A flash mob occurs when a group of people assemble at a location for a short time, perform 
some form of action, and then disperse. While these events are planned and organized, they 
do not involve any formal organization or group. They may be planned using new technologies 
(including text messaging and Twitter). Their raison d’être demands an element of surprise, 
which would be defeated by prior notification.
40 See (generally) the decisions of the German Constitutional Court in relation to roadblocks in 
front of military installations. BVerfGE 73,206, BVerfGE 92,1 and BVerfGE 104,92. Note, howev-
er, that the blocking of public roads as a protest tactic can be restricted in certain circumstances 
under Article 11(2) – see, for example, Lucas v. UK (2003, admissibility), where the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights declared inadmissible the application of a demonstrator at Faslane 
naval base in Scotland (where protesters against Trident nuclear submarines blocked a pub-
lic road) after her conviction for a breach of the peace.
41 In Christians Against Racism and Fascism (CARAF) (1980), the European Commission ac-
cepted “that the freedom of peaceful assembly covers not only static meetings, but also public 
processions” (p.148, para. 4). This understanding has been relied upon in a number of subse-
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quent cases, including Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria (1988) and Ezelin v. France 
(1991). In the latter, it was stated that the right to freedom of assembly “is exercised in particu-
lar by persons taking part in public processions”. (Commission, para. 32). Also see David Mead, 
“The Right to Peaceful Process under the European Convention on Human Rights – A Content 
Study of Strasbourg Case Law”, 4 European Human Rights Law Review, (2007) pp. 345-384.
42 In Poznan, Poland, for example, authorities refused to recognize the “Great Bike Ride”, by a 
“critical mass” group of cyclists, as a public assembly within the meaning of Article 7(2)(3) of 
the Polish Assemblies Act and Article 57 of the Constitution of Poland. It thus treated the ride 
as an “other event” under Article 65 of the Road Traffic Act (requiring the organizer to obtain 
an administrative ruling granting consent). See Adam Bodnar and Artur Pietryka, Freedom of 
Assembly from the Cyclist’s Perspective (Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, 18 September 
2009), referring to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal judgment of 18 January 2006 (K21/05), 
relating to the Equality parade in Warsaw, where the Tribunal distinguished between assem-
blies (organized to express a point of view) and competitions or races (recreational events with 
no political or communicative importance). Also see Kay v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner 
[2008] UKHL 69, holding that a critical mass cycle ride with no pre-determined route could be 
construed as a procession “customarily held” (and thus within the exemption from prior notifi-
cation under the United Kingdom’s Public Order Act of 1986). Lord Phillips (para.25) identified 
three possible alternative constructions of the notification requirement in the Act: “(i) The noti-
fication obligation does not apply to a procession that has no predetermined route; (ii) There 
is no obligation to give notice of a procession that has no predetermined route because it is 
not reasonably practicable to comply with section 11(1); or (iii) The notification obligation is 
satisfied if a notice is given that states that the route will be chosen spontaneously.”
43 Barraco v. France (2009, in French only).
44 Women and Waves v. Portugal (2009). It is worth noting, however, that the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights previously held, in Anderson v. UK (Application No. 33689/96, decision 
of 27 October 1997, admissibility), that “there is … no indication ... that freedom of assembly 
is intended to guarantee a right to pass and re-pass in public places, or to assemble for pure-
ly social purposes anywhere one wishes”.
45 See, for example, Çiloğlu and Others v. Turkey (2007, in French only) in which the European 
Court of Human Rights noted that unlawful weekly sit-ins (every Saturday morning for over 
three years) of around 60 people in front of a high school in Istanbul, to protest against plans 
to build an F-type prison, had become an almost permanent event that disrupted traffic and 
clearly caused a breach of the peace: “In view of the length and number of previous demonstra-
tions, the Court considered that the authorities had reacted within the margin of appreciation 
afforded to States in such matters. It therefore held, by five votes to two, that [dispersal re-
sulted in] no violation of Article 11.” Also see Cisse v. France (2002), in which the evacuation 
of a church in Paris that a group of 200 illegal immigrants had occupied for approximately 
two months was held to constitute an interference (albeit justified on public health grounds, 
para.52) with the applicant’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly (paras.39-40). In the case 
of Friedl v. Austria (1992) the European Commission – in finding the applicant’s Article 11 com-
plaint to be inadmissible – did not rule on whether a camp of (on average) 50 homeless persons 
with tables and photo stands that lasted approximately one week “day and night” before be-
ing dispersed fell within the definition of “peaceful assembly” under Article 11(1) of the ECHR. 
The Commission noted that it had previously held that a demonstration by means of repeat-
ed sit-ins blocking a public road did fall within the ambit of Article 11(1), although, ultimately, 
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the demonstration was legitimately restricted on public order grounds (G v. the Federal Re-
public of Germany, 1989, admissibility). In 2008, the Hungarian Constitutional Court rejected 
a petition that sought a finding of “unconstitutional omission” because the law failed to ade-
quately secure the protection of the right to free movement and the right to transport against 
“extreme forms” of practising the right of assembly. The Constitutional Court held that, while 
freedom of movement may be violated by events “practically without time limits”, such events 
were “not protected by Article 62(1) of the Constitution, as they cannot be regarded as ‘as-
semblies’. This term, as used in the Constitution, clearly refers to ‘ joint expressions of opinions 
within fixed time limits’.” The Court noted that, while organizers might not know in advance 
how long an assembly would actually last (and this could be “several days”), the time-frame 
must still be set out in notification. An organizer may then subsequently “file an additional no-
tification in order to have the duration of the event extended”. (Decision 75/2008, (V.29.) AB). 
Also worth noting is the United Kingdom case concerning Aldermaston Women’s Peace Camp, 
which, over the past 23 years, had established a camp on government-owned land, close to 
the Atomic Weapons Establishment. The women camped out there on the second weekend of 
every month, during which time they held vigils, meetings and distributed leaflets. In the Unit-
ed Kingdom case of Tabernacle v. Secretary of State for Defence [2009], a 2007 by-law that 
attempted to prohibit camping in tents, caravans, trees or otherwise in “controlled areas” was 
held to violate the appellant’s rights to freedom of expression and assembly. The court noted 
that the particular manner and form of this protest (the camp) had acquired symbolic signifi-
cance inseparable from its message. Also see Lucas v. UK (2003, admissibility), op. cit., note 
40. 
46 Patyi and Others v. Hungary (2008) cf. Éva Molnár v. Hungary (2008), para.42, and Barra-
co v. France (2009, in French only). In finding a violation of Article 11 of the ECHR in the case 
of Balcik and Others v. Turkey (2007), the European Court of Human Rights noted that it was 
“particularly struck by the authorities’ impatience in seeking to end the demonstration”.
47 This draws on the United States doctrine of the “public forum”. See, for example, Hague v. 
Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 US 496 (1939).
48 In Patyi and Others v. Hungary (2008), paras.42-43, for example, the European Court of Hu-
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a body of local government to reject a notification (thus, effectively creating a system of prior 
license rather than prior notification), Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association Zaal Tkeshelash-
vili, Lela Gurashvili and Others v. Parliament of Georgia (5 November 2002) N2/2/180-183. 
Also see Mulundika and others v. The People, Supreme Court, Zambia, 1 BHRC 199 (10 Janu-
ary 1996); All Nigeria Peoples Party v. Inspector General of Police (Unreported, June 24, 2005) 
(Fed HC (Nig)); and Rev. Christopher Mtikila v. Attorney-General, High Court of Tanzania at 
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